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ABSTRACT
Forest degradation has steadily increased throughout much of the world. The cause
of this continued degradation is complex and multifaceted but there is a growing
realization that a key cause, especially in developing countries, is insecure rights to
ownership and use of forest resources. This realization coupled with a call for propoor forestry policy has stimulated the recent trend in forest policy toward
strengthening property rights for forest resources by transferring property rights from
the state to communities and individuals, giving them defined rights to manage and
extract forest resources. However, a big puzzle remains unsolved—such reforms on
property rights have not consistently led to the intended sustainable resource use and
management, particularly in developing countries.
The overall goal of this dissertation research is to offer insight into why forest
tenure reforms may not always lead to their intended effects by focusing on how an
individual’s preferences over time and risk affect individual responses to forest tenure
reforms. Since forest management involves dynamic decision making with uncertainty
in future returns, individuals’ forest management decisions, as well as their responses
to forest tenure reforms, will depend on: 1) how an individual perceives preference for
income today versus the future (time preference), and 2) an individual’s attitude
towards risk (risk preference). For example, even if individuals are given secure
property rights, those with strong preference for current benefits (most commonly
observed among the poor) may have the incentive to use forest resources faster.
Failure to recognize the impacts of time and risk preferences of individuals may result
in outcomes that policy maker sought to prevent. Furthermore, forest tenure reforms
ii

are often implemented in areas where the poverty rate is high. Those living in poverty
are often assumed to have both high discount rates (i.e., impatient) and high levels of
risk aversion, which make them less likely to make investments. Such characteristics
may also hinder the intended effects of forest tenure reforms.
This study examines these issues in the context of rural China, where a large-scale
reform of forest property rights is being implemented in areas where the poverty rate
is still high. To examine these issues, this dissertation research has three objectives: 1)
identify the impact of forest property rights reforms on forest management decisions
and how individual risk and time preferences may augment those impacts; 2) examine
the correlation between time and risk preferences and poverty; and 3) identify the
effect of the forest tenure reform on household wealth.
This dissertation research contributes to the literature on the effect of property
rights reforms on natural resource management in developing countries in several
ways. This study is the first to use a large-scale property rights reform to examine the
heterogeneity of its impact on forest management due to risk and time preferences.
Moreover, it integrates experimental economics methods into natural resource
management, which is an innovative approach to test the behavioral reactions to policy
alternatives. This study is unique because it tests the theory by integrating field
experiments to capture risk and time preferences and panel survey data to capture
poverty and forest management decisions.
To achieve the research objectives, I first designed experiments to capture
individual time and risk preferences and then ran them in the field with farmers in
China. Then I integrated data the field experiment data with a household panel data in

an econometric framework. In manuscript 1, I use this integrated data set to examine
how preferences over time (present vs. future) and risk can affect households’ forest
management responses to strengthened forest property rights. I find that risk and time
preferences impact households’ forest management responses to forest plot
certification. Specifically, in response to forest certification, more risk averse
households used less labor for harvesting and more labor for applying inputs, while
more loss averse households used more labor for harvesting. Households with higher
discount rates (i.e., impatient) used less labor for applying inputs and spent less on
forest inputs (chemical fertilizer, pesticides, and seeds) in response to receiving a
forest certificate.
Manuscript 2 investigates the correlation between poverty and individual
preferences for time and risk. The classic assumption is that the poor have both high
levels of risk aversion and high discount rates. Contrary to this assumption, my
research demonstrates that wealth does not have a significant effect on risk aversion or
loss aversion (with the one exception that households with more forestland per capita
are less loss averse). However, consistent with this assumption I find statistically weak
evidence that households with lower wealth have higher discount rates (i.e., more
impatient).
In manuscript 3, I examine the effect of forest tenure reform on household wealth.
I find statistically weak evidence that the forest tenure reform has had a positive effect
on household wealth, specifically, increased tenure security in the form of a forest
certificate increased net worth per capita by 42% between 2000 and 2008. To further
examine the source of increased wealth, I also examine the effect of the reform on

household forest use. Results suggest that forest certification increased bamboo
revenue, while obtaining a new plot (without a forest certificate) increased non-timber
forest product revenue, although these results are statistically weak. Overall
manuscript 3 provides weak evidence that forest tenure reform garners potential for
improving poor rural households’ livelihoods in China.
Overall this dissertation research demonstrates that time and risk preferences
matter for forest management and responses to forest tenure reforms. This suggests
that policymakers designing and implementing tenure reforms should consider the
particular context of the reform and consider coupling the reform with appropriate
programs and instruments to alleviate poverty and to help households’ to deal with
risks and make long-term investments to further stimulate the intended effects of the
reform—increased investment in forest resources and improved livelihoods.
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PREFACE

This dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of
doctor of philosophy in Environmental and Natural Resource Economics is in the
manuscript style format. The dissertation is composed of three manuscripts.
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INTRODUCTION
Forests perform a multitude of ecosystem services and contribute directly to the
livelihoods of more than one billion people living in extreme poverty (World Bank
2004). Despite the national and international efforts devoted to global problems of
deforestation, forest degradation has steadily increased throughout much of the world
(White et al. 2002).
The cause of this continued degradation is complex and multifaceted but there is a
growing realization that a key cause, especially in developing countries, is insecure
rights to ownership and use of forest resources (White et al. 2002; Sunderlin et al.
2005; FAO 2007; Sunderlin et al. 2008). Property rights to ownership and use of forest
resources are often contested, overlapping or unenforced. This insecurity undermines
sound forest management, for without secure rights forest holders have few incentives
to invest in managing and protecting their forest resources. This realization coupled
with a call for pro-poor forestry policy from international institutions, NGOs, and
community organizations has stimulated the recent trend in forest policy toward
strengthening property rights for forest resources by transferring property rights from
the state to communities and individuals, giving them defined rights to manage and
extract forest resources (Wunder 2001; Edmonds 2002; FAO 2003; Ellsworth et al.
2004; Sunderlin et al. 2005; Hobley 2007; FAO 2009). In the most forested
developing countries, this trend has resulted in a doubling of the percent of forest
owned or controlled by indigenous and rural communities between 1985 and 2000
(White et al. 2002). By 2050, 40% of the world’s forest is expected to be managed or
owned by communities and individuals (FAO 2003).
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However, research to date presents conflicting conclusions regarding the impacts
of tenure insecurity on forest management. For example, some empirical studies found
that stronger land tenure facilitated investment in trees (e.g., Ghana (Besley 1995) and
Ethiopia (Holden, Deininger, and Ghebru 2009)). At the same time, other examples
illustrate that these reforms have not led to their intended consequence of sustainable
resource management (Ecuador (Wunder 2000), Indonesia (Barr 2001), Russia (White
and Martin 2001) and newly independent states of Eastern Europe (INDUFOR
OY/ECO for the World Bank and World Wildlife Fund Alliance 2001) and others
(Bromley 1989; Ostrom 1990; Bromley 1991; Alston, Libecap, and Mueller 1999).
This dissertation research attempts to offer insight into why forest tenure reforms
may not always lead to their intended effects by focusing on how an individual’s
preferences over time and risk affect individual responses to forest tenure reforms
(Figure 0.1). Forest management involves decisions about investments with long time
horizons and those decisions involve uncertainties (e.g., price uncertainty; uncertainty
about future growth and quality of retained stands; uncertainty about property rights
and expropriation; uncertainty associated with outbreaks of disease, pests, and forest
fire and the occurrence of extreme weather events) (Newman 2002; Alvarez and
Koskela 2004; Nielsen and Kristensen 2005; Wilson et al. 2011). Since forest
management involves dynamic decision making with uncertainty in future returns,
individuals’ forest management decisions, as well as their responses to forest tenure
reforms, will depend on: 1) how an individual perceives preference for income today
versus in the future (time preference), and 2) an individual’s attitude towards risk (risk
preference). By taking individual preferences into account, we may find that forest
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tenure reform has the intended effects on individuals with some characteristics, while
it does not have the intended effects on others. This heterogeneity in policy effect may
be masked in studies that find negligible effect of the reforms.
In a developing country context, the potential correlation between individual
preferences and the effect of forest tenure reforms is also associated with poverty. The
intended effect of forest tenure reforms is to increase tenure security. Economic theory
predicts that increased tenure security will give households greater incentives to invest
without fear of expropriation. This increased investment should raise productivity and
cash flows, which in turn should stimulate incomes as well as land values and general
levels of economic activity, helping the rural poor escape from poverty (Demsetz
1997; Besley 1995; World Bank 2003; Feder 1999; Conning and Deb 2007). This
often-assumed premise is examined specifically in this dissertation. Moreover,
households living in poverty are often assumed to be highly risk averse (Bardhan and
Udry 1999; Stiglitz) and have high rates of discount rates (impatient), which keep
them from making investments. This assertion is also tested in this dissertation. In sum,
I examine four main hypotheses (Figure 0.1): H1) Forest property right reforms affect
how individuals manage their forest resources; H2) Time and risk preferences affect
forest management and therefore also augment individual forest management
responses to forest property rights reforms; H3) Time and risk preferences are
negatively correlated with wealth; and H4) Household wealth increases as a result of
the forest tenure reforms.
Economic theory predicts that increased tenure security from tenure reform will
increase households’ investment in forest resources. However, because investment and
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forest management decisions are dynamic, there are several possible paths by which
households may reach a higher steady state investment level (I*) in response to the
tenure reform (Figure 0.2). Households’ investment paths may depend on factors such
as their available capital, access to credit, other investment opportunities, forest
product market conditions, forest plot characteristics, and individual preferences. For
example, line (a) depicts a trajectory in which a household instantaneously increases
investment to the optimal level in response to the tenure reform. A household with
abundant capital or ability to borrow such that it can invest as soon as its land tenure is
strengthened may follow an investment path like (a). Alternatively, a household
without access to capital or credit or that has a high discount rate (i.e., impatient) may
not increase investment even with strengthened tenure, as depicted by line (d). Lastly,
in response to the tenure reform households may exhibit a period of transition during
which the household increases the investment level towards a new steady-state level.
During the transition period, a household may increase investment gradually, as
depicted by line (b) or in a series of steps (c), depending on their particular
circumstances. A household’s investment path may look like (c) if, for example, the
household is risk averse and is unsure about the security of their new property rights,
or if a household cannot access capital or credit quickly. Such a household may wait a
period of time before increasing investment.
Increased investment should raise productivity and cash flows, which in turn
should stimulate forest revenue. As with changes in investment, changes in forest
revenue may take different paths towards a higher steady state level of forest revenue,
R* (Figure 0.3). Households’ forest revenue depends on both their investment and
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harvesting decisions, which in turn depend on a variety of factors such as their
available capital, access to credit, other investment opportunities, forest plot
characteristics, product market conditions, and personal preferences. For example, a
household that is able to invest in its forest plot immediately following the reform may
see a gradual increase in forest revenue over a transition period, as depicted by line
(a), before it reaches the long-term steady state level of forest revenue, R*.
Alternatively, a household that is unable to invest following the reform may not
experience any increase in forest revenue, as depicted by line (b). Furthermore, a
household may experience a temporary dip in forest revenue during the transition
period, as depicted by line (c). This temporary dip may occur if a household with
strengthened land tenure now waits until the new, longer optimal harvesting age is
reached. The next subsection will explain how the three manuscripts in this
dissertation investigate these hypotheses.
Outline of the three manuscripts
In Manuscript 1, I examine the relationships in H1 and H2. Specifically, I examine
how forest tenure reform affects harvesting behavior and investment in forest plots.
Increased tenure security gives households confidence that if they invest in their plot
(planting, maintenance, etc.) then they will be able to obtain the benefits from those
efforts in the future (Demsetz 1967; Besley 1995). As such, I hypothesize that
households that were subject to forest tenure reform will have an incentive to invest in
their forests resources and delay harvest until the optimal harvesting threshold is
reached (H1).
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Furthermore, in manuscript 1, I investigate the heterogeneity in the effects of the
forest tenure reform by focusing on risk and time preferences as the source of
heterogeneity (H2). Households making forest management decisions face many
uncertainties. Furthermore, decisions about forest management often involve a long
time horizon (Alvarez and Koskela 2006; Nielsen and Kristensen 2005; Wilson et al.
2011). As such, households’ risk and time preferences take an important role in their
forest management decisions (Newman 2002; Tahvonen et al. 2006; Couture et al.
2008), and may affect their responses to forest tenure reforms. Certain types of
households’ risk and time preferences may lead forest tenure reform to affect forest
management in ways that are consistent with what policymakers intended. For
example, assuming that with forest tenure reform a household believes that there has
been a reduction in the risk of expropriation of its forest plot, then a household that is
more risk averse may make more investments on the forest plots than a risk neutral or
risk seeking household. Alternatively, households’ risk and time preferences may
cause them to respond to receiving a forest tenure reform in a way that is contrary to
what policymakers intended. For example, in response to forest tenure reform, a
household that has a high discount rate (impatient) may make less investment than a
household with a low discount rate. Relatedly, a household that is more loss averse
(i.e., has a tendency to strongly prefer avoiding losses to acquiring gains and to
dramatically overweight losses relative to gains) may make less investment after a
forest tenure reform than a household that is less loss averse. Therefore the intended
effect (increased investment) that policymakers expected in response to a forest tenure
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reform may be weak or may not be exhibited by households with high discount rates
or a high degree of loss aversion.
In manuscript 2, I examine the association between poverty and individual
preferences (H3). Households living in poverty are often assumed to be highly risk
averse and have high discount rates (impatient), characteristics that keep them from
making investments (Fisher 1930; Lipton 1968; Lumley 1997; Bardhan and Udry
1999; Fafchamps 2003). Since Binswanger’s early use of experimental economics to
capture risk preferences in India in the 1980s and Pender’s work also in India in the
late 1990’s, economists have been examining the correlation between poverty, risk and
time preferences. However, empirical findings on whether individual time and risk
preferences vary with wealth have been mixed (e.g., Binswanger 1980; Pender 1996;
Kirby et al. (2002) Nielsen 2001; Wik 2004; Mosley and Verschoor 2005; Chytilová
and Morduch (2010)). Manuscript 2 offer new empirical evidence.
Finally, manuscript 3 examines whether or not household wealth has increased as a
result of the forest tenure reform (H4). In addition to increasing investment in forest
resources, an additional goal of the forest tenure reform in many developing countries
is to improve households’ livelihoods. Economic theory predicts that with more secure
property rights, households will have a greater incentive to invest in their forest
resources without fear of expropriation, which will stimulate income (Demsetz 1967;
Besley 1995; Feder 1999; Coning and Deb 2007). There is growing evidence that
forest tenure reforms cause changes in local livelihoods but those changes have been
both positive and negative (Shackleton and Campbell 2001; Edmunds and Wollenberg
2003; Jagger, Pender and Gebremedhin 2005; Sikor and Nguyen 2007). Manuscript 3
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offers new empirical evidence based on a large-scale forest property rights reform.
Specifically, I examine how changes in forest land tenure affect households’ net worth
per capita, and further examine to see if the source of this effect is from changes in
revenue from bamboo and non-timber forest products.
I examine these issues empirically in the context of China’s collective forests,
where a large-scale reform of forest property rights began in 2003 in rural areas where
the poverty rate is still high. The reform was aimed at delegating responsibility of
forest management from the collective (by townships and villages) to households and
strengthening property rights with the distribution of forest certificates that establish
the use of a specific forest plot for a period of 30-70 years and expand rights to include
those of land transfer, inheritance, and mortgaging (Xu et al. 2009). An advantage of
this study is that we utilize this actual change in forest property rights whereas
previous studies have used proxy variables (e.g., number of conflict with abutters and
duration of residence in a village) that are either subjective or indirect measures and
may not accurately measure tenure security (Godoy et al 1998; Godoy et al. 2001;
Hagos and Holden 2006). China’s collectively owned forests total approximately 100
million hectares and are home to more than 400 million people, which arguably makes
these reforms the largest one undertaken in modern times both in terms of forest area
and people affected (Xu et al. 2010). In China, many people living in or near forests
are poor (Zhou and Veeck 1999), and while there has been a dramatic reduction in the
poverty rate in China over the last decades, poverty is still a serious problem,
particularly in rural areas (Chen and Ravallion 2008; 2009). The recent rapid and
dramatic changes in forest tenure in poor regions in China makes it an ideal context to
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study how individual preferences affect forest management decisions and the
implications for the effectiveness of strengthening property rights to stimulate
investment in forest resources and improve households’ livelihoods.
To test these hypotheses, I combine original field experiment data on risk and time
preferences collected from among 103 households in 2009 in Fujian Province with an
original panel survey data set collected from among the same 103 households in 2006
and 2009. The panel data set contains pre- and post-reform, quantitative and
qualitative data for three years: 2000 (before the reform), 2005 and 2008 (after the
reform). The major strength of the time and risk preference data is that I use
experiments with real monetary rewards, which reduces hypothetical biases that exist
in previous related studies (Godoy et al. 1998; Godoy et al. 2001; Hagos et al. 2006).
Furthermore, our risk preference experiment design follows a recently developed
methodology that expands the classic lottery experiment of Holt and Laury (2002) to
allow for estimation of a more flexible and richer description of a person’s risk
preference as described under prospect theory—the degree of risk aversion, the degree
of loss aversion, and a nonlinear probability weighting measure (Tanaka et al. 2010).
In examining these hypotheses there are econometric challenges that must be
addressed. For example, in manuscript 1, I aim to identify how heterogeneity in
households’ time and risk preferences may impact the average effect of forest plot
certification on household forest management (H1). To identify this effect, the ideal
would be to compare forest management outcomes under the counterfactual of no
forest certification. But plots cannot both receive a forest certificate and not receive a
forest certificate, and so actual counterfactuals cannot be observed. Instead we need to
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estimate the value of this unobserved counterfactual’s outcomes by obtaining a
comparison group of plots that did not receive a forest certificate. The identification
problem is that it is difficult to identify a reliable comparison group for those receiving
a forest certificate because of non-random placement of forest plot certification and/or
self-selection of households into forest plot certification. Without a carefully selected
comparison group, we risk incorrectly attributing differences in measured forest
management outcomes between those plots for which households received a forest
certificate and plots for which households did not receive a forest certificate to forest
plot certification when in fact they may be due to initial differences in observed (e.g.,
education of the head of household) and unobserved characteristics (e.g.,
entrepreneurial ability) between the two groups (Conning and Deb 2007). To address
these sources of biases, we use a variety of econometric techniques throughout the
three manuscripts, including: preprocessed matched data in a difference-in-differences
framework, fixed effects, and instrumental variable approach.
The outcome of this research has implications for policymakers in China and
elsewhere by informing when they can expect property right reforms to stimulate
investment in the resource and when they may not as a result of heterogeneity in
households’ risk and time preferences. The results may indicate that instruments to
deal with risk, time preferences, and poverty need to be coupled with such reforms.
Although this research is conducted in the context of forests, the general finding may
also apply to other natural resources where lack of property rights have been
recognized as a key barrier to sustainable management of natural resources.
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Figure 0.1 Main Hypotheses
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Figure 0.2 Examples of investment paths following forest tenure reform
Investment

I*
(a)

(b)

(c)

(d)

Rotation age (time)
Tenure
Reform

T*

Notes: T* indicates the optimal rotation age under well-defined property rights. This figure
assumes that the optimal rotation time with well-defined property rights is longer than with
weaker property rights and that prior to the reform the rotation is shorter than optimal. I* is the
optimal steady state investment level. (a) indicates a trajectory in which a household
instantaneously increases investment to the optimal level after the tenure reform. (b) and (c)
include a transition period after the tenure reform during which the investment level increases
towards the new steady state level. (d) is a trajectory in which the tenure reform does not
affect the investment level.

12

Figure 0.3 Examples of forest revenue paths following forest tenure reform

Forest revenue
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Rotation age (time)
Tenure
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Note: T* indicates the optimal rotation age under well-defined property rights. This figure
assumes that the optimal rotation time with well-defined property rights is longer than with
weaker property rights and that prior to the reform the rotation is shorter than optimal. R*
indicates the optimal steady state forest revenue level. (a) indicates a transition period after the
tenure reform during which the forest revenue increases towards the new steady state level. (b)
indicates a trajectory where the tenure reform does not affect forest revenue. (c) is a trajectory
where forest revenue falls temporarily during the transition period.
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MANUSCRIPT 1
Impact of Risk and Time Preferences on Responses to Forest Land Tenure
Reform: Empirical Evidence from Fujian, China

1.1 Abstract

We examine how preferences over time (present vs. future) and risk can affect
households’ forest management responses to strengthened forest property rights. We
investigate this question in the context of rural Fujian, China, where a large-scale
reform of property rights began in 2003. The different extent of the reform and its
different timing across villages provide a natural experiment to test how time and risk
preferences affect households’ forest management activities in response to the reform.
Empirically, we combine original field experiment data on time and risk preferences
collected from among 103 households with an original panel survey data set collected
from among the same households. The panel data set contains data for three years:
2000 (before the reform), 2005 and 2008 (after the reform). We preprocess the data
using matching methods and then use difference-in-differences to identify the impact
of the reform and its sensitivity to risk and time preferences on three measures of
household forest management: labor for applying forest inputs to each plot,
expenditure on inputs for each forest plot and labor for harvesting forest products from
each plot. The status of the forest tenure reform on each forest plot is captured by an
indicator variable of whether or not the household has a forest certificate for the plot.
Results show that risk and time preferences impact households’ forest management
responses to forest plot certification. Specifically, in response to forest certification,
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more risk averse households used less labor for harvesting and more labor for applying
forest inputs, while more loss averse households used more labor for harvesting.
Households with higher discount rates (i.e., stronger preference for income today)
used less labor for applying inputs and spent less on forest inputs in response to forest
certification.

1.2 Introduction
Forest degradation has steadily increased throughout much of the world (White et
al. 2002). The cause of this continued degradation is complex and multifaceted but
there is a growing realization that a key cause, especially in developing countries, is
the insecurity of rights to ownership and use of forest resources (White et al. 2002;
Sunderlin et al. 2005; FAO 2007; Sunderlin et al. 2008). Property rights to ownership
and use of forest resources are often contested, overlapping or unenforced. This
insecurity undermines sound forest management, for without secure rights forest
holders have few incentives to invest in managing and protecting their forest
resources. This realization has stimulated the recent trend in forest policy toward
strengthening property rights for forest resources by transferring property rights from
the state to communities and individuals, giving them defined rights to manage and
extract forest resources (Edmonds 2002; FAO 2003; Ellsworth et al. 2004). In the
most forested developing countries, this trend has resulted in a doubling of the percent
of forest owned or controlled by indigenous and rural communities between 1985 and
2000 (White et al. 2002). By 2050, 40% of the world’s forest is expected to be
managed or owned by communities and individuals (FAO 2003). However, a puzzle
remains unsolved—such reforms on property rights have not consistently led to the
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intended sustainable resource use and management, particularly in developing
countries (Bromley 1989; Ostrom 1990; Bromley 1991; Alston et al. 1999; Bohn et al.
2000; Wunder 2000; Barr 2001; White et al. 2002; Jagger et al. 2005).
Despite the existence of this puzzle, a lack of attention has been given to
understanding the heterogeneity in how people respond to property rights reforms
depending on their individual preferences. In particular, given that forest management
decisions need to be made by looking into the future and therefore inherently contain
uncertainties (e.g., price uncertainty; uncertainty about future growth and quality of
retained stands; uncertainty about property rights and expropriation; uncertainty
associated with outbreaks of disease, pests, and forest fire and the occurrence of
extreme weather events), the two key factors that would influence a forest
management decisions are: 1) the household’s preference for income today versus in
the future (time preference), and (2) the household’s attitude towards risk (risk
preference).
In this paper, we examine how households’ preferences over time (present vs.
future income) and risk affect forest management responses to property rights reforms.
For example, even if households are given secure property rights, those with strong
preference for current benefits (commonly observed among the poor) may have the
incentive to harvest forest resources faster. Given that resource management is a
dynamic problem and thus inherently faces uncertainties, failure to recognize the
impacts of households’ time and risk preferences may result in outcomes that
policymakers sought to prevent through the implementation of the reform.
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We examine these issues by capitalizing on a large-scale reform of forest land
tenure in Fujian Province, China that began in 2003. Under this reform, the
responsibility of forest planting and management were transferred from collective
management (by townships and villages) to households. The different extent of the
reform, its different timing across villages and the resulting variation in the years
households received forest certificates for plots provide a natural experiment to test
how time and risk preferences affect households’ forest management activities in
response to the reform.
Empirically, we combine original field experiment data on risk and time
preferences collected from among 103 households in 2009 in Fujian Province with an
original panel survey data set collected from among the same 103 households in 2006
and 2009. The panel data set contains pre- and post-reform, quantitative and
qualitative data for three years: 2000 (before the reform), 2005 and 2008 (after the
reform). To capture household forest management, we examine labor used for
applying forest inputs to each plot, expenditure on inputs (chemical fertilizer, pesticide
and seeds) for each plot, and labor used for harvesting from each plot. The status of
the forest tenure reform on each forest plot is captured by an indicator variable of
whether or not the household has a forest certificate for the plot. The major strength of
the time and risk preference data is that we use experiments with real monetary
rewards, which reduces hypothetical biases that exist in previous related studies
(Godoy et al. 1998; Godoy et al. 2001; Hagos et al. 2006). Our time preference
experiment uses methods originally developed by Coller and Williams (1999) and
Harrison and Lau (2002). The data are then used to estimate three parameters in a
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general time discounting model using nonlinear least-squares (Benhabib et al. 2007;
Tanaka et al. 2010). Furthermore, our risk preference experiment design follows a
recently developed methodology that expands the classic lottery experiment of Holt
and Laury (2002) to allow for the estimation of a more flexible and richer description
of a person’s risk preference as described under prospect theory (Liu 2008; Tanaka et
al. 2010). To capture risk preferences, we use the data to estimate three parameters:
the degree of risk aversion, the degree of loss aversion and a nonlinear probability
weighting measure. The combined experiment and household survey data allow us to
link behavior elicited in experiments to actual economic institutions and performance,
which few studies have previously done (Cardenas et al. 2005).
To identify the effect of forest tenure reform and how risk and time preferences
augment the effect, we use matching techniques to preprocess the data (Ho et al. 2007)
and then use the preprocessed matched data in a difference-in-differences framework.
The strategy capitalizes on the exogenous variation across villages of the starting year
of the reform, and the resulting variation in the year households received a forest
certificate for their plots. Results show that risk and time preferences impact
households’ forest management responses to forest plot certification. Specifically, in
response to forest certification more risk averse households reduced labor for
harvesting more and increased labor for applying inputs more, while more loss averse
households increased labor for harvesting more. As such, the results of this paper have
implications for policymakers in China and elsewhere by informing them about how
heterogeneity in households’ preferences may impact the outcomes of property right
reforms.
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This paper proceeds as follows. The first section gives an overview of the forest
tenure reform history in China, with an emphasis on the recent tenure reforms in
Fujian, China. The next section provides an overview of the most relevant literature,
followed by the hypotheses to be tested. An explanation of the data collection
procedures and a description of the data follow. Then the empirical framework is
outlined, followed by the results and a conclusion.

1.3 China’s Forest Tenure Reform

This paper examines changes in forest property rights in the context of China,
specifically in Fujian Province. China’s forest area accounts for 4.5 percent of the
world’s total. China has two main categories of forest landownership. Approximately
42 percent of forest land in China is owned by the state and the rest is owned by the
collective (Liu and Lixia 2009). Since the early 1950s, forest tenure and management
policies of China’s collective forests have undergone fundamental changes.
Collectivization of non-state owned forests began in 1956, and remained dominant
until the reforms of the 1980s (Xu et al. 2009). Under collectivization, administrative
villages, usually comprised of a number of natural villages or clusters of families,
functioned as the legal owners of collective forests, and households had little active
participation in management. For households there were no links between or among
their rights to forests, their responsibility for forest establishment and management,
and their benefits from forests (Dachang 2001).
The first major wave of reforms in China’s collective forests began in 1981, and
was aimed at transferring the responsibility of forest planting and management from
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the collective to households (Miao et al. 2004). By 1986, nearly 70% of collectively
owned forest land had been transferred to rural household management (Xu et al.
2009). In 1987, however, due the occurrence of unsustainable logging the government
reverted a large portion of forest land under household management back to collective
management (Hyde et al. 2003).
By 1986, while 70% of the collectively owned forest land in China had been
transferred to rural household management, in Fujian only 32% of the collective forest
land had been distributed for household management (CFYB 1987). This low
percentage of forest land under household management was due to the fact that Fujian
had not fully participated in the first round of the tenure reforms in the 1980s. Instead,
the provincial government in Fujian had implemented a shareholding system to keep
forests under collective management while distributing “paper shares” of collective
forests based on family population. In Fujian, forest land was not actually physically
distributed, rather only dividends from the forest were distributed to households. At
first Fujian’s shareholding system was highly regarded by forest administrators for its
ability to maintain forests under collective management but fifteen years after
establishment of the system, two issues became increasingly evident (Xu et al. 2009).
First, forestry’s contribution to rural incomes was negligible in spite of the fact that
forest land occupies more than 60% of the total provincial land area, and 80% of rural
land area (Qin 2008). Second, enforcing forest conservation had become increasingly
difficult for local forest authorities due to lack of cooperation from farmers. For
example, the severity of forest fire incidents grew over the course of the 1990s, and
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there is anecdotal evidence that many of the fires were caused by farmers (Xu et al.
2009).
Under these circumstances, in 2003 the second wave of reforms was officially
approved by the provincial government in Fujian province.1 In this second wave of
reforms, Fujian, the largest but once resistant collective forest province, adopted forest
tenure reforms aimed at individualization of forest land. The decisions regarding forest
land reallocation during this reform required a 2/3 majority vote by the village
representative committees or the village assemblies. Redistribution of plots was
accompanied by legal contracts and forest certificates with extended contract periods
of 30 to 70 years, whereas previously contract periods had only been 5 to 15 years
(Liu and Lixia 2009). Furthermore, adoption of the Rural Land Contract Law allowed
for the expansion of rights under the new forest certificates to include those of land
transfer, inheritance, and mortgaging (Xu et al. 2009).
Since 2007, fourteen provinces have initiated reforms aimed at both delegating
collectively owned forest land to direct household management and strengthening
property rights with forest certificates for both households already managing forest
plots individually and for new forest plots distributed to households. China’s main
objectives with this reform are to increase forest coverage, increase farmers’
enthusiasm for forest management and investment, and improve farmers’ livelihoods
(Liu and Lixia 2009). However, China’s extensive reform, may not achieve these
desired outcomes. The primary recipients of forest certificates during China’s reforms
have been the rural poor. Individuals living in poverty often exhibit risk aversion and
have relatively high rates of time preference (a preference for income and
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consumption today), which keeps them from making long-term investments (Fisher
1930; Lawrance 1991; World Bank 2000). These common characteristics of the poor
not only have traditionally been cited as reasons why the poor remain poor but they
may also hinder the anticipated outcome of creating and strengthening forest property
rights through the issuance of forest certificates for household forest plots. Therefore,
it is of critical importance to understand the effect of time and risk preferences on
household forest management responses to changes in forest property rights.

1.4 Property Rights, Individual Preferences, and Natural Resource Management
Economic theory predicts that if a natural resource is open access, individual
extractors do not fully incorporate the resource cost associated with current extraction
and thus the resource is overexploited (Gordon 1954; Hardin 1968). Moreover,
without secure property rights, individuals lack long-term incentives to use their forest
resources (White et al. 2002). In rural areas of poor countries, many forests are subject
to open-access extraction even if the government has the property right for the forest
because property rights are difficult and costly to enforce (Larson et al. 1990). This
lack of secure property rights is recognized as one of the key underlying causes of
continued forest degradation in many parts of the world. In response to this
recognition, many governments have begun to reform forest ownership policies by
devolving resource management to the local level, giving individuals or communities
rights to manage and extract the resources (White et al. 2002; FAO 2003).
Research to date, however, presents conflicting conclusions regarding the impacts
of tenure security reform on forest management decisions. For example, Besley (1995)
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and Holden et al. (2009) find empirical evidence that better land rights facilitated
investment in trees in Ghana and Ethiopia, respectively. At the same time, other
examples illustrate that tenure reforms have not led to their intended consequence of
sustainable resource management (e.g., Indonesia (Barr 2001), Russia (White et al.
2002) and newly independent states of Eastern Europe (INDUFOR OY/ECO for The
World Bank and World Wildlife Fund Alliance 2001) and others (Bromley 1989;
Ostrom 1990; Bromley 1991; Alston et al. 1999; Bohn et al. 2000).
This paper examines why tenure reforms may not work as intended from a
microeconomics perspective, focusing on how risk and time preferences augment
individual households’ responses to forest property rights reforms. In forest
management, households must make decisions about investments over a long time
horizon. Furthermore, forest management decisions involve uncertainty over prices
and about future growth and quality of retained stands and various production risks
such as outbreaks of disease, pests, and forest fire; and the occurrence of extreme
weather events (e.g., blizzards, flooding, earthquakes, etc.) as well as uncertainty
about property rights and possible expropriation (Alvarez and Koskela 2004; Nielsen
and Kristensen 2005; Wilson et al. 2011). Specifically in China, the problems of pests
and disease are extremely serious with increasing types, expanding affected areas, and
shortening of intervals between attacks, as well as threats from forest fire (Kunshan et
al. 1997; Wenhua 2004; Dong et al. 2006). Between 2003 and 2007, China (along with
the United States, the Russian Federation, India and Poland) reported the highest
average number of forest fires at more than 10,000 per year (FAO 2010). China also
has a history of extreme weather events causing severe damage to forest resources. For
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example, storms and blizzards in January 2008 damaged 18.6 million hectares of
forest in eight provinces in China (FAO 2010). Since forest management involves
dynamic decision making with uncertainty in future returns, household forest
management decisions, as well as responses to increased tenure security, will depend
on households’ time and risk preferences (Newman 2002; Nielsen and Kristensen
2005; Alvarez and Koskela 2006; Tahvonen et al. 2006; Couture et al. 2008; Wilson et
al. 2011).
Failure to recognize the impact of risk and time preferences on individual
responses to forest property rights reforms may result in outcomes policymakers
sought to prevent. These factors become even more important in poor economies
because risk and time preferences are often found to be correlated with wealth—the
poor tend to be more risk averse and have a strong time preference for the present.2
Yet to our knowledge, no previous study has directly examined how risk and time
preferences affect household responses to property right reforms. This paper extends
the literature on property rights reform by using a large-scale property rights reform to
examine the heterogeneity of its impact due to risk and time preferences.
The most relevant set of previous work includes Godoy et al.’s (1998; 2001)
studies in Bolivia on how tenure insecurity and rate of time preference affect forest
resource harvesting and Hagos et al.’s (2006) study in Ethiopia on how tenure
insecurity and time and risk preferences affect investment in land conservation. Godoy
et al. (1998; 2001) use the duration of a household’s residence in the village and the
number of conflicts with abutters as proxies for tenure security, and find mixed results.
The length of residence in the village was associated with a lower area of old-growth
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forest cleared but with a greater area of fallow forest cleared, whereas the opposite
was true for conflict with abutters. Conflict was associated with a smaller area of
fallow forest cleared but with a greater area of old-growth forest cut. Hagos et al.
(2006) find that neither the degree of tenure security nor individual time and risk
preferences explains the differences in land conservation and investment decisions.
Although these studies are informative, the measures of risk and time preferences
and tenure security need to be improved to achieve stronger confidence in the
estimates. Hagos et al. (2006) elicited risk and time preferences from households using
hypothetical questions. Results using this method to elicit risk and time preferences
may suffer from hypothetical bias, which means that people respond differently when
the situation is hypothetical than when the situation is real (Cardenas et al. 2005). By
designing questions or experiments to elicit time and risk preferences that offer
subjects real payoffs based on their choices, hypothetical bias can be reduced. (Smith
et al. 1993; List et al. 2002). Godoy et al. (1998) elicited time preferences by asking
subjects if they would prefer one piece of candy now (at the midpoint of an interview)
or two at the end of the interview. Although this method involves a real reward, the
authors acknowledge that the choice of candy to measure time preference over a very
short time may not capture with accuracy time preference or commitment for
economic investments, which take place over a longer stretch of time, such as for
forest resources. Godoy et al. (2001) elicited risk preferences using hypothetical
questions but elicited time preferences using a series of choices with real monetary
payoffs. In this paper, we use risk and time preference parameters elicited using
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economic experiments with real monetary payoffs; therefore the hypothetical bias is
reduced.
In addition, the measures of tenure security also require improvement to achieve
more reliable estimates. These studies use proxy variables such as number of conflicts
with abutters and duration of residence in a village (Godoy et al. 1998; Godoy et al.
2001; Hagos and Holden 2006). These proxies are either subjective or indirect
measures and may not accurately measure tenure security. In this paper, we utilize
actual changes in forest property rights and use a more explicit and discrete measure
of forest property right changes.
Furthermore, we estimate the joint effect of risk and time preferences on individual
responses to changes in property rights, which none of these previous studies have
done. Interacting the risk and time preferences with changes in forest property rights
allows us to capture how risk and time preferences augment forest management
decisions in response to changes in forest property rights.

1.5 Hypotheses
Hypothesis 1: The estimated forest certification effect (the conditional
average difference in each forest management activity on plots for which
a household has a forest certificate) will be positive when the dependent
forest management variable is the value of labor used to apply inputs or
expenditure on inputs and negative when it is the value of labor used for
harvesting forest product.

Hypothesis (1) is based on the theory that increased tenure security gives
households an incentive to invest in their forest resources; that is to increase labor
allocation for applying inputs, to increase expenditure on inputs, and to delay harvest
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until the optimal harvest time (Demsetz 1967; Besley 1995). A forest certificate
increases a household’s tenure security. Increased tenure security gives households
confidence that if they invest in their plot (planting, maintenance, etc.) then they will
be able to obtain the benefits from those efforts in the future. As such, households that
receive a forest certificate for a plot will use more labor to apply inputs, spend more
on inputs and will delay harvest until the optimal harvesting threshold is reached.

Hypothesis 2: Risk and time preferences augment households’ responses
to forest property right reforms.

Households making forest management decisions face many uncertainties such as
those related to prices, growth and quality of retained stands, redistribution of forest
land, outbreaks of disease, pest infestations, forest fire, and extreme weather events.
Furthermore, decisions about forest management often involve a long time horizon
(Alvarez and Koskela 2006; Nielsen and Kristensen 2005; Wilson et al. 2011). As
such, households’ risk and time preferences play an important role in their forest
management decisions (Newman 2002; Tahvonen et al. 2006; Couture et al. 2008),
and by extension will affect their responses to forest property right reforms.
To model risk preferences we use prospect theory because it allows for the
estimation of a more flexible and richer description of a person’s risk preferences than
under expected utility theory. Most previous risk preference experiments conducted in
the field are based on the expected utility theory notion of risk preferences but these
models often fit experimental and field data less well than models with multiple
components of risk preference (Camerer 2000; Cardenas et al. 2008). In expected
utility theory, an individual’s risk preferences are solely characterized by the
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concavity of the utility function and are classified as risk averse, risk neutral or risk
seeking. In contrast, prospect theory allows for the possibility that an individual may
be risk averse, risk neutral or risk seeking, depending on whether choices involve
gains or losses and whether the probabilities of gains or losses are large or small
(Kahneman et al. 1979). Under prospect theory, an individual’s risk preferences are
described by three measures: the degree of risk aversion, the degree of loss aversion,
and a nonlinear probability weighting measure. We use these three parameters to
represent a household’s risk preferences. Hypotheses 2a thru 2f describe our
hypotheses regarding each of these parameters.
Hypothesis 2a: A more risk averse household will allocate less labor for
application of forest inputs, spend less on forest inputs and allocate more
labor to harvesting.
Hypothesis 2b: A more risk averse household will exhibit a stronger
behavioral response to forest certification (allocate more labor to
application of forest inputs, spend more on forest inputs, and allocate less
labor to harvesting).

With regard to a household’s degree of risk aversion, we hypothesize that a more
risk averse household will be less likely to assume the risks associated with forest
production (such as potential loss of forest stock due to pests, disease, illegal logging,
natural disaster, redistribution of property, etc.) therefore, a more risk averse
household will allocate less labor for application of forest inputs, spend less on forest
inputs, and allocate more labor to harvesting. This hypothesis is based on the theory
that higher risk aversion decreases the optimal harvesting threshold, which has been
the main conclusion in most studies dealing with forest management under production
risk (Alvarez and Koskela 2006; Couture and Reynaud 2008). However, it should be
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noted that some studies have found that the effect of risk aversion on the optimal
rotation is ambiguous and depends on economic and biological parameters, as well as
how risk is modeled (Couture and Reynaud 2008).
Furthermore, we hypothesize that more risk averse households will exhibit a
stronger behavioral response to forest certification. Assuming that a forest certificate
reduces the risks associated with loss of forest stock due to redistribution of property,
a more risk averse household that receives a forest certificate for a plot will respond to
that reduction in risk by allocating more labor to application of forest inputs, spending
more on forest inputs, and allocating less labor to harvesting forest products than risk
neutral or risk-seeking households that receive a forest certificate.
Hypothesis 2c: A more loss averse household will allocate less labor for
application of forest inputs, spend less on forest inputs, and allocate more
labor to harvesting.
Hypothesis 2d: A more loss averse household that receives a forest
certificate for a plot will allocate less labor for application of forest inputs,
spend less on forest inputs, and allocate more labor to harvesting

Loss aversion refers to an individual’s tendency to strongly prefer avoiding losses
to acquiring gains. Furthermore, people have a tendency to dramatically overweight
losses relative to gains (Kahneman and Tversky 1979; Tversky and Kahneman 1991).
In forest management, households make management decisions involving potential
losses and gains. Psychologically, losses may overshadow objectively commensurate
gains in evaluation of prospects (Kahneman, Knetch and Thaler 1990). In general,
individuals tend to be more reluctant to accept an uncertain gain over a more certain,
albeit lower gain. As a result, households may not invest in forests or may harvest
prior to the optimal harvesting threshold (when in actuality investments in the forest
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resource and delaying harvest until the optimal harvesting threshold would be
beneficial). We therefore hypothesize that a more loss averse household will allocate
less labor for application of forest inputs, spend less on forest inputs, and allocate
more labor to harvesting.
To understand how loss aversion may impact a household’s response to forest
certification we consider the potential endowment effect of forest certification. As
described by Kahneman and Tversky (1991), an endowment effect “is produced,
apparently instantaneously, by giving an individual property rights over a consumption
good.” As a result of the endowment effect, households may be more averse to loss of
forest stock from the plot with a forest certificate than from a plot without a forest
certificate. Therefore, we hypothesize that more loss averse households that receive a
forest certificate for a plot will allocate less labor for application of forest inputs,
spend less on forest inputs, and allocate more labor to harvesting because they will be
more averse to potential loss of forest stock from a plot with a forest certificate than to
loss from a plot without a forest certificate.
Hypothesis 2e: The effects of the probability weighting parameter on
forest management are ambiguous.
Hypothesis 2f: The effects of the probability weighting parameter on
forest management responses to receiving a forest certificate are
ambiguous.

The probability weighting parameter indicates whether or not an individual puts
excessive decision weight on small probabilities (Kahneman and Tversky 1979). Since
we do not know whether the actual probabilities that households may lose their forest
stock to such events as pest infestation, disease, illegal logging, natural disaster, or
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redistribution of property rights are high or low, we cannot hypothesize about how a
household’s tendency to excessively weight small probabilities will affect its decision
making process on its forest management decisions or on its responses to forest
certification.
In addition to risk preferences, we examine how a household’s time preference
affects its forest management decisions and responses to receiving a forest certificate.
To represent each household’s time preference we use a discount rate. There are
several competing models for time discounting that have received a significant amount
of attention in both experimental psychology (e.g., de Villiers and Herrnstein (1976),
Ainslie and Haslam (1992), etc.) and behavioral economics (e.g., Laisbons (1997),
Lowenstein and Prelec (1992), O’Donoghue and Rabin(1999).3 The competing models
were developed to account for observed behavioral regularities that are not consistent
with the classic exponential discounting model. For example, the most common
documented behavioral regularity is called “reversal of preferences.” It occurs, for
example, when a subject prefers $10 now rather than $12 a day later, but also prefers
$12 in a year plus a day rather than $10 in a year. This type of preference is not
consistent with exponential discounting but would be consistent with a rate of time
preference that declines with time such as hyperbolic discounting. We use a
hyperbolic discounting parameter because we find that the hyperbolic discounting
functional form fits our data better than the exponential discounting functional form
(constant discount rate). Similar to our findings, other studies have found that the
hyperbolic discounting functional form fits field data better than the exponential
discounting functional form (Rachlin, Raineri and Cross 1991; Kirby and Marakovic
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1995; Myerson and Green 1995; Kirby 1997). Hypotheses 2g and 2h describe our
expectations related to a household’s discount rate.
Hypothesis 2g: Households with higher discount rates will allocate less
labor to applying inputs, spend less on forest inputs, and allocate more
labor to harvesting.
Hypothesis 2h: Households with higher discount rates that receive a forest
certificate for a plot will allocate less labor for application of inputs, spend
less on forest inputs and allocate more labor to harvesting.
Forest management decisions often have a long time horizon, making households’
time preferences (i.e., preference between immediate income and future income)
important in the decision making process. In forest management, the Faustmann model
is best known for providing a benchmark model for determining optimal timber
rotation age (Newman 2002). In the model, a forest owner’s goal is to choose the
rotation period that maximizes the net present value of the forest. In the infinite
rotation model, the decision rule is to harvest when the marginal benefit of delaying
(new growth) is equal to the marginal cost of delaying (lost interest on the timber
revenue and on future stands). An increase in the interest rate will tend to shorten the
optimal rotation length. As such, we hypothesize that households with higher discount
rates (i.e., impatient) will shorten the optimal rotation length and allocate labor to
harvesting more frequently. Furthermore, we hypothesize that households with
stronger preference for consumption or income today (i.e., higher discount rate) will
allocate less labor to applying inputs and spend less on forest inputs, as other shortterm return investment opportunities will be more attractive than the long-term returns
from investing in forest resources. Additionally, households with a stronger preference
for income today that receive a forest certificate for a plot will allocate less labor for
33

application of inputs, spend less on forest inputs, and allocate more labor to harvesting
than households with weaker preferences for income today that receive a forest
certificate.

1.6 Data, Definitions, and Descriptive Statistics

The household panel data set contains pre- and post-reform, quantitative and
qualitative data for 104 households spanning two counties, Sanming City and Datian
County, and 10 villages in Fujian Province for three years: 2000 (before the reform),
2005 and 2008 (after the reform). Survey data for the years 2000 and 2005 were
collected in 2006 by a research team from Peking University, Gothenburg University
and Forest Trends. The 2006 survey team conducted interviews in three townships,
each with two villages and ten households in each village—for a total of 600
households. In 2009, two of the twelve counties were randomly chosen and efforts
were made to conduct a follow-up survey with the 120 households in those counties
that had been included in the previous survey.
During the 2009 follow-up survey, 104 of the 120 households included in the
previous survey were located. The 104 located households were asked to complete the
survey and to participate in two decision-making tasks (the risk and time preference
experiments) during which they could earn a real monetary payoff. All households
completed the survey but one household chose not to participate in the decisionmaking tasks due to lack of time. Each household was paid 15 yuan compensation to
complete the survey plus their earning in the decision-making tasks.4
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In the analysis, we construct a balanced panel data set by using only those forest
plots that were managed by the household in 2000, 2005 and 2008, so that we have
pre- and post- reform data for every plot in the analysis. This results in a sample size
of 197 plots, owned by 69 households. The status of forest plot certification for each
forest plot is captured by an indicator variable of whether or not the household has a
forest certificate for the plot. In the year 2000, none of the plots in our balanced panel
data set had forest certificates.5 By the year 2005, 36 of these plots had received forest
certificates. And by the year 2008, 69 plots had received forest certificates.
To capture household forest management, we use the value of labor used for
applying forest inputs to each plot, expenditure on inputs for each plot, and the value
of labor used for harvesting from each plot. The expenditure on inputs includes
expenditure on fertilizer, irrigation, animal or machinery rental fees, seeds and other
forest inputs. The two labor-related outcome variables are based on the sum of the
annual value of family and exchanged labor and the annual expenditure on hired labor
for applying forest inputs and for harvesting forest products. The annual expenditure
of hired labor is calculated based on responses to survey questions regarding the
number of working days of hired labor and the wage per working day paid to hired
labor for each forest management activity. For the annual value of family and
exchanged labor, we sum the responses to the survey question regarding the number of
working days of family and exchanged labor for each forest management activity. We
then multiply the total number of family and exchanged labor working days times the
average county wage paid to hired forest labor based our survey data, and use the
resulting value as a proxy for the opportunity cost of a household’s time. We
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recognize that an estimated shadow wage would be a more accurate measure of a
household’s opportunity cost of time spent laboring on its forest plot; however, the
data necessary to estimate a shadow wage are not available (Jacoby 1993).
Descriptive statistics for our balanced panel data set indicate that from 2000 to
2008 the value of labor used for applying forest inputs increased from 487 to 4,390
yuan per hectare (table 1.1). Likewise, the expenditure on forest inputs increased from
466 to 1,010 yuan per hectare from 2000 to 2008. From 2000 to 2005, there was an
increase in the labor used for harvesting forest products from 148 to 525 yuan per
hectare, and then a slight decrease to 489 yuan per hectare in 2008.
As a preview to more rigorous estimates of forest plot certification effects, we
examine the descriptive statistics for the forest management variables by whether or
not a household has received a forest certificate for its plot. Interestingly, we find that
the change in the mean value of labor used for harvesting forest products and for
applying forest inputs is statistically different at the 1% and 10% significance level,
respectively, indicating that forest plot certification had an effect on households
decisions regarding allocation of labor to their forest plot (table 1.2). Specifically, the
change between 2000 and 2008 in the mean value of labor used for harvesting forest
products was 558 yuan per hectare for those plots for which households never received
a forest certificate and 61 yuan per hectare for those plots for which households
received a forest certificate. However, the change between 2000 and 2008 in the mean
expenditure on forest inputs by forest plot certification status was not statistically
significant, indicating that forest plot certification has not had an effect on the trend in
households’ expenditure on forest inputs.
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Table 1.3 identifies the household and forest plot control variables that will be
used in this analysis and provides descriptive statistics for the year 2000. In 2000, an
average household had 4.9 household members; a head of household, who was 46
years old and has had 4.7 years of education; and total assets of 10,430 yuan. On
average each household held a total of 2.3 hectares of forest land. The average forest
plot had an area of 0.59 hectares, was 1.43 kilometers from home, and was 0.87
kilometers from the road. Bamboo was the primary forest type of 52% of the plots.
Risk Preference Data
To elicit a measure of risk preference, we follow the experimental design
developed by Tanaka et al. (2010) and later modified by Liu (2008), both of whom
expand the classic Accept/Reject lottery experiments of Holt and Laury (2002) to
incorporate prospect theory. We use cumulative prospect theory and a non-linear
probability weighting measure extended from the one-parameter form of Drazen
Prelec’s (1998) axiomatically-derived weighting function (Kahneman and Tversky
1979). Following Liu (2008), we assume a utility function of the following form:
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where U(x,p; y,q) denotes the expected prospect value over binary prospects
consisting of the outcomes x and y with the probability of p and q, respectively. The
function v(x) denotes a power value function.6 The parameter σ describes the curvature
of an individual’s value function. An individual’s risk preferences are described as risk
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averse when σ > 0, risk neutral when σ = 0, and risk loving when σ < 0. The parameter
λ describes the curvature of an individual’s value function above zero relative to the
curvature of the value function below zero. The higher the value of λ, the more loss
averse the individual is. The parameter α is a non-linear probability weighting
measure, which is extended from a model by Prelec (1998). The probabilities are
weighted by the function π(p). When α <1, π(p) has an inverted S-shape, indicating
that an individual tends to overweight low probabilities and underweight high
probabilities, as shown by Tversky and Kahneman (1992). This model reduces to
expected utility theory when α = 1 and λ=1.
In the experiment, participants were asked to choose between sets of lottery
options. For example, Figure 1.1 illustrates one set of options that a subject was asked
to choose between. In this example, Option A offers a 30% chance of receiving 20
yuan and a 70% chance of receiving 5 yuan. Option B offers a 10% chance of
receiving 34 yuan and a 90% chance of receiving 2.5 yuan. A total of 35 choices,
divided between three series were asked. The payoffs ranged from a loss of 10 yuan to
a gain of 850 yuan, which is roughly half a months pay in rural China (CSY 2009). If
a subject was illiterate (27% of our sample), then the enumerator read the choice to the
subject and recorded the subject’s answers on the record sheet. Monotonic switching
was enforced, meaning that once the subject switched to option B they were not
allowed to switch back to option A.7 By enforcing monotonic switching, we eliminate
the possibility of inconsistent choices within each series and also make the task more
clear and concise for participants, as they only need to identify one switch point in
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each series.8 Once the subject had completed the entire series of choices, one question
was chosen randomly for payoff.
In our sample, the average derived values for α and λ are 0.73 and 6.02,
respectively, and both are statistically different from 1 at the 1% significance level by
t-test, implying that our experimental results reject expected utility theory in favor of
prospect theory’s inverted S-shaped probability weighting and loss aversion.9 The
average derived value of σ is 0.42, indicating on average rural individuals in China
exhibit risk aversion.10 Figure 1.2, Panel A, B and C illustrate the distribution of σ, α,
λ, respectively. While the distributions for σ and α in Panel A and B exhibit a rather
normal distribution, the distribution for λ in Panel C is bimodal with a share of
subjects exhibiting low degrees of loss aversion and another share of subjects showing
high degrees of loss aversion.
We use the individual values for σ (degree of risk aversion), λ (degree of loss
aversion) and α (nonlinear probability weighting measure) to represent the risk
preferences of each household in our empirical model, which will be discussed in
section 1.7.11
Time Preference Data
Our time experiment design follows the methods originally developed by Coller
and Williams (1999) and Harrison, Williams and Lau (2002). The data are then used
to estimate three parameters—the conventional time discounting parameter (r),
present-bias (β), and hyperbolicity of the discount function (θ)—in a general time
discounting model using nonlinear least-squares, which allows us to test which
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discounting model fits the data best—exponential, hyperbolic, quasi-hyperbolic, or a
more general form (Benhabib et al. 2007; Tanaka et al. 2010).
In the time preference experiment subjects were asked to choose between, for
example, a real monetary payoff today or a larger payoff six months from now. The
hypothetical bias of earlier studies that aim to capture time preferences is addressed
here because participants received a real monetary payment based on their choices.
Choices were always posed as a choice between a monetary payoff today versus a
larger monetary payoff in the future.12
To ensure the credibility of a future payment, subjects were told that the future
payments would be delivered by China Post, which is the official postal service of the
Peoples Republic of China, an agency with which rural households are very familiar
and comfortable using for the delivery of money. Furthermore, we believed the
credibility problem to be minimal because our participants were part of a panel survey
and this was the second time that the household had been visited by a research team
from Peking University. Repeat visits by our research team built trust with and
provided reassurance to the participants.
Following the experimental design of Tanaka et al. (2010), the subjects were asked
a total of 75 questions divided into 15 series of 5 questions each.13 A single series of
questions is depicted in Figure 1.3. In this example, the subject was asked to choose
Plan A or Plan B for each of the 5 questions. Plan A, the future payoff plan remained
the same for each question in the series, while the immediate option increased as the
subject moved down the column from 25 yuan to 125 yuan, at 1/6 increments of the
future payoff. As in the risk experiment, monotonic switching within each series was
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also enforced here. The point at which an individual switches from choosing the more
immediate reward to taking the delayed reward provides a bound on his or her
discount rate. The discount rate indicates the rate that would make a person indifferent
between the immediate and the delayed reward. An individual with a high discount
rate has a preference for the present, whereas an individual with a low discount rate
has a preference for the future.
We used 15 combinations of future payoff and time in the experiments; that is 15,
60 and 150 yuan with delays of 2 weeks, 3 months, and 6 months and 30 and 120 yuan
with delays of 1 week, 2 months and 4 months.14 The maximum payoff of 150 yuan is
equal to roughly 2 to 3 days pay in rural China (CSY 2009). For each future payofftime combination, we asked 5 questions, with the immediate payoff equal to 1/6, 1/3,
1/2, 2/3, and 5/6 of the future payoff in the 5 question series. Once the subject had
completed all 75 questions, one question was randomly chosen for payment. The
subject’s choices on the selected question, determined how much money and when it
was to be delivered. The average payoff in the time experiment was 59 yuan. Fiftyeight of the subjects received payment immediately, while 45 subjects received a
future payment. The average delay for future payments was 68 days.
Table 1.4 compares the aggregate results of the estimations. Estimating the full
model with unrestricted θ gives a relatively high value of θ=5.16, which is similar to
Tanaka et al.’s (2010) estimate of θ=5.07, and influences the estimates of r and β but
does not improve the R2 compared with estimations from the quasi-hyperbolic model.
While quasi-hyperbolic discounting model seems to fit the aggregate sample best, at
the individual level the quasi-hyperbolic model has convergence problems for 32

41

subjects (31% of our sample), whereas there are no convergence problems for the
exponential and hyperbolic models when estimating each subject’s time parameters.
Therefore, we focus on the estimates from the hyperbolic model and use those
parameters to represent the time preference of each household in our empirical model,
which will be discussed in section 1.7. Figure 1.4 depicts the distribution of the
hyperbolic discounting parameter, from our experiment. Surprisingly, the figure shows
that the hyperbolic time preference parameter was relatively low for the majority of
our subject, indicating that they have a relatively weak preference for income today. In
the hyperbolic discounting model, we find that on average a subject would be willing
to trade 92 yuan today for 100 in 1 week, 74 yuan today for 100 yuan in 1 month and
32 yuan today for 100 yuan in 6 months.

1.7 Empirical Framework
Our objective is to identify how heterogeneity in households’ time and risk
preferences may impact the average effect of forest plot certification on household
forest management. The ideal would be to compare forest management outcomes
under the counterfactual of no forest certification. But plots cannot both receive a
forest certificate and not receive a forest certificate, and so actual counterfactuals
cannot be observed. Instead we need to estimate the value of this unobserved
counterfactual’s outcomes by obtaining a comparison group of plots that did not
receive a forest certificate. The identification problem is that it is difficult to identify a
reliable comparison group for those receiving a forest certificate because of nonrandom placement of forest plot certification and/or self-selection of households into
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forest plot certification. Without a carefully selected comparison group, we risk
incorrectly attributing differences in measured forest management outcomes between
those plots for which households received a forest certificate and plots for which
households did not receive a forest certificate to forest plot certification when in fact
differences may be due to initial differences in observed (e.g., education of the head of
household) and unobserved characteristics (e.g., entrepreneurial ability) between the
two groups (Conning and Deb 2007).
Identification Strategy
In this study we use a two-step approach to reduce estimator bias caused by
potential self-selection of households into forest plot certification. In the first step, we
preprocess the data set with nonparametric matching methods so that the treated group
(plots for which a household received a forest certificate) is as similar as possible to
the control group (plots for which a household did not receive a forest certificate) to
reduce estimator bias caused by potential self-selection of households into forest plot
certification based on observed characteristics (Ho et al. 2007). The goal of matching
is to create a data set that looks closer to one that would result from a randomized
experiment. When we get close, we break the link between the treatment variable and
the pretreatment controls, which makes the parametric form of the analysis model less
relevant or irrelevant entirely. To break this link, we need the distribution of covariates
to be the same within the matched treated and control groups.
Specifically, we divide all the plots into two groups: plots that received a forest
certificate and plots that did not receive a forest certificate. We then use 1-to-1 nearest
neighbor matching (without replacement) to match each plot that received a forest
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certificate (“treated plot”) with a plot that did not receive a forest certificate (“control
plot”) based on the propensity score (the predicted probability of forest plot
certification). The variables used to estimate the propensity score in a logistic
regression include three household level variables (age of household head, household
head’s education level, and the household’s total land holdings) and four plot level
variables (distance from plot to home, distance from plot to the road, slope of the plot,
and whether the plot’s forest type is primarily bamboo). Once the propensity score is
estimated, a comparison observation for each treated observation is created by
choosing the “nearest neighbor”, which is the untreated household with the closest
propensity score. Control observations that are not matched are discarded. This
reduced our sample to 134 plots owned by 69 households. Following Ho et al. (2007),
we selected the matching method that produced the best covariate balance with each
treated plot. As a result, in the preprocessed data set, the treatment variable is closer to
being independent of other covariates, which helps us obtain more accurate causal
effect estimates in the parametric model.
In the second step, using the preprocessed matched data we exploit plot-level
variation in the year that households received a forest certificate for a plot in a
difference-in-differences framework. The variation in the year that the household
received a forest certificate is the result of exogenous variation across villages of the
starting year of the reform. Using this framework, we can compare the before-after
changes in forest management activities on those plots for which households received
a forest certificate (the treatment group) to the before-after changes in forest
management activities on those plots that households did not receive forest certificates
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(the control group). The difference-in-differences framework allows us to difference
out any common trends between the treatment and the control group.
In summary, we use a two-step approach in which we preprocess the data using
matching methods and then use that preprocessed data in a difference-in-differences
framework in order to obtain more robust estimates of the forest plot certification
effect on households’ forest management and how that effect may vary depending on
heterogeneity in time and risk preferences of each household.
Empirical Model
The base estimate of the forest certification effect is obtained from the differencein-differences estimation using the preprocessed data:
forest management ijt = β0 + β1(fcertij) + β2(year2005t) + β3(year2008t)
+ β4(AfterReformijt) + eijt

(2)

where forest managementijt refers to each of the three forest management related
dependent variables: the value of labor used for applying inputs (input laborijt);
expenditure on forest inputs including chemical fertilizer, pesticide and seeds
(inputsijt); and the value of labor used for harvesting (harvest laborijt) by household i
on forest plot j at time t. All forest management variables are measured in yuan per
hectare at the plot level. fcertij is a dummy variable that is equal to one if household i
had a forest certificate for plot j in any year. The coefficient on fcertij controls for
characteristics that may differ between plots that received forest certificates during the
recent tenure reform and plots that did not. year2005t and year2008t are dummy
variables that take the value one if the observation is for the year 2005 and 2008,
respectively. The coefficients on year2005t and year2008t control for any systematic
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differences for years 2005 and 2008, respectively. AfterReformijt is a dummy variable
that takes the value one when household i has a forest certificate for plot j in a postreform year. The coefficient on AfterReformijt is the estimated forest certification
effect, which provides a measure of the conditional average difference in forest
management activities on plots for which a household has a forest certificate.
To test our main hypothesis that time and risk preferences affect how households
respond to property right reforms, we add the risk and time preference parameters and
their interaction variables to equation (2) to capture the interaction effects between the
risk and time preference variables and the change in forest certification status
(AfterReformijt). Our main difference-in-differences model is:
forest management ijt = β0 + β1(fcertij) + β2(year2005t) + β3(year2008t)
+ β4(AfterReformijt) + β5(riski) + Β6(lossi) +Β7(probweighti)
+ Β8(timeprefi) + β9(risk *AfterReformijt)
+ Β10(loss*AfterReformijt) + β11(probweight *AfterReformijt)
+ Β12(timepref*AfterReformijt) + ∏ Xi + ΩPijt + Vv + eijt (3)
riski is the risk aversion parameter; lossi is the loss aversion parameter; probweighti is
a dummy variable that takes the value one if the probability weighting parameter is
greater than one, indicating that individuals place excessive decision weight on small
probabilities; and timeprefi is the hyperbolic time discounting parameter for household
i. The interaction terms (risk*AfterReformijt, loss*AfterReformijt , probweight
*AfterReformijt, and timepref*AfterReformijt) capture heterogeneity of the treatment
effect due to households’ risk and time preferences. For example, risk*AfterReformijt
picks up any differential patterns in changes in household forest management activities
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on plots that receive a forest certificate relative to plots that do not receive a forest
certificate that may be correlated with the households’ risk preferences. The
interaction term timepref*AfterReformijt, picks up any differential patterns in changes
in household forest management activities on plots that receive a forest certificate
relative to plots that do not receive a forest certificate that may be correlated with
households’ time preferences. Xi is a vector of demographic controls, Pijt is a vector of
plot characteristic controls, and Vv is village fixed effects. Table 3 identifies each of
the control variables used in this analysis.15 For a better fit, we estimate a log
transformation of equations (2) and (3) for each of the three forest management
dependent variables. Table 1.5 summarizes our hypotheses from section 1.5 in terms
of the sign of the estimated coefficients in equation (3).

1.8 Empirical Results
Overall we find that there is evidence that risk and time preferences impact
households’ forest management responses to forest plot certification (tables 1.6, 1.7
and 1.8; columns 3 and 4).16
Impact on labor used for harvesting forest products
We hypothesized that the estimated certification effect (the conditional average
difference in labor used for harvesting from plots with forest certificates) would be
negative because increased tenure security from plot certification allows a household
to have greater confidence towards future benefits, and hence delay harvest to allow
the forest stock to grow larger. We do not find evidence of the hypothesized negative
certification effect on labor used for harvesting (table 1.6). In all models the
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coefficient on AfterReform is negative but not statistically significant (columns 1-4).
When we allow the certification effect to vary with households’ risk and time
preferences, include both household and plot controls and village effects, and evaluate
the estimate at the median values of the time and risk preferences parameters, the
implied total certification effect on labor for harvesting is -2.64% but is not
statistically significant (column 4).17
Interestingly, when we allow the certification effect to vary with households’ risk
and time preferences, we find that the negative effect of certification on the value of
labor allocated to harvest is larger for households that are more risk averse and smaller
for those households that are more loss averse (column 3-4). Specifically, the
interaction term between ln(risk) and AfterReform is -1.37%, suggesting that for a
household with a risk parameter that is 10% higher (more risk averse), the certification
effect on value of labor for harvesting is 14% less. And the coefficient on the
interaction term between ln(loss aversion) and AfterReform is 1.34%, suggesting that
for a household with a loss aversion parameter that is 10% higher (suggesting more
loss averse), the certification effect on labor for harvesting is 13% more. This result
implies that the intended effect of certification (reduce or delay harvest) is actually
larger for more risk averse households and smaller for more loss averse households.
The certification effect did not vary statistically significantly with households’ degree
of time preference or their tendency to place excessive decision weight on small
probabilities.
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More generally, results indicate that households that are more risk averse or that
tend to place excessive decision weight on small probabilities allocate more labor to
harvesting forest products (table 1.6, columns 2-4).

Impact on expenditure and labor used for applying forest inputs
We find no evidence of a certification effect on either the expenditure on forest
inputs or on labor used to apply forest inputs (tables 1.7 and 1.8). The implied total
effect of certification is insignificant for both dependent variables and the signs are
mixed.
However, when the estimation effect is allowed to vary with households’ risk and
time preferences, we find that for a household with a risk parameter that is 10% higher
(more risk averse), the certification effect on labor used for applying inputs is 5.6%
lower (table1. 7, columns 3 and 4). Also, we find that for a household with a time
preference parameter that is 10% higher (stronger preference for income today), the
forest certification effect on labor for applying inputs and expenditure on forest inputs
is 9% and 14% lower, respectively (table 1.7 and 1.8, columns 3 and 4).
More generally, results indicate that households that are more risk averse tend to
use less labor for applying inputs and have lower expenditure on forest inputs (tables
1.7 and 1.8, columns 2-4).
Robustness Checks
To check the robustness of our results, we run three additional variations of
equation (3). First, we estimate the model using the number of days rather than the
value of labor used for applying inputs and for harvesting (appendix tables 1.3 and
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1.4). Second, we estimate the model using the exponential time discounting parameter
instead of the hyperbolic time discounting parameter (appendix tables 1.5, 1.6 and
1.7). Third, we estimate the model using the number of years since the household
received a forest certificate for a plot rather than the dummy variable, AfterReformijt,
that takes the value one when household i has a forest certificate for plot j in a postreform year (appendix tables 1.8, 1.9 and 1.10). We find that the results are robust to
these alternative specifications with one exception. The exception is that when we
estimate the model using the number of years since the household received a forest
certificate for a plot rather than the dummy variable, the coefficient on the interaction
variable between the years since the household received a forest certificate for a plot
and the hyperbolic discounting parameter becomes insignificant in the full model.

1.9 Conclusion
Despite their potential importance, the heterogeneity in response to property rights
reforms due to individual preferences has not been studied adequately. Progress is
constrained by a lack of data. Measures of outcomes (such as forest investment,
harvesting of timber, etc.) are difficult to come by and eliciting measurement of risk
and time preferences is difficult (Frederick et al. 2002; Cardenas et al. 2008).
Furthermore, previous studies on tenure issues often use proxies to measure tenure
security that are either subjective or indirect and may not accurately measure tenure
security (Godoy et al. 1998; Godoy et al. 2001; Hagos and Holden 2006).
In this paper, we examined how preferences over time and risk affect household
forest management responses to property rights reforms by capitalizing on a large-

50

scale reform of forest land tenure in Fujian Province, which began in 2003.
Empirically, we combined original field experiment data on time and risk preferences
collected among 103 households in 2009 in Fujian Province with an original panel
survey data set collected among the same households in 2006 and 2009. We examined
three dependent variables as measures of household forest management activities, and
the status of the forest tenure reform on each forest plot was captured by an indicator
variable of whether or not the household has a forest certificate for the plot in an after
reform year. To identify how risk and time preferences augment the effect of forest
plot certification on forest management activities, a two step approach in which we
preprocess the data using matching methods and then use that preprocessed data in a
difference-in-differences framework in order to obtain more robust estimates of the
forest plot certification effect on households’ forest management and how that effect
may vary depending on heterogeneity in the time and risk preferences of households.
Results suggest that more secure tenure as a result of forest certification affects
households’ forest management decisions. Although forest certification led to a
decrease in labor allocated to harvesting as expected, surprisingly there was no
evidence that forest plot certification led to an increase in labor used to apply forest
inputs nor in forest input expenditure. The insignificant certification effect on labor
used to apply forest inputs and forest input expenditure suggests that further research
should examine whether or not households face credit constraints that prevent them
from increasing investment on their forest plots in response to increased tenure
security.
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Results suggest that household preferences, particularly households’ degree of risk
aversion, affect the impacts of forest tenure reforms. According to our results, the
negative impact of forest certification on labor allocated to harvesting was smaller for
households that were more risk averse. This indicates that when households are risk
averse, forest certification will be more likely to have the intended effect of
households reducing or delaying forest product harvests. Furthermore, we find that the
certification effect on labor for applying inputs is positive for households that are more
risk averse.
The results indicate that households with a higher preference for income today that
received a forest certificate used less labor for applying inputs and spent less on forest
inputs than those with a lower preference for income today that received a forest
certificate. Time preferences did not significantly augment labor for harvesting. The
insignificant effect of time preference on labor for harvesting may be a result of the
short time frame for which our time preference parameter can account, relative to the
longer time frame over which forestry decisions are made. Recall that the longest
period of time that participants were asked to consider in the time preference
experiment was 6 months. A time preference parameter collected based on a 6-month
time frame may not accurately capture time preferences concerning longer term
decisions, such as those decisions made in forest management. The insignificance of
the time preference parameter suggests that further research should be done in
designing experiments that could more accurately capture households’ time
preferences when decisions are over a longer time horizon.
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The results of this paper have implications for policymakers in China and
elsewhere by informing how heterogeneity among households may impact the
outcomes of property right reforms. Although this research is conducted in the context
of forests, the general finding may also apply to other natural resources such as
fisheries or groundwater where strengthening property rights have not always shown
success in the manner intended.
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Endnotes

1

While the Fujian provincial government formally approved the reform in 2003,

precedents had already been established in 1998 in Hongtian Village, Yongan County
of Fujian Province when a rural village suffering from severe deforestation due to
ineffective collective management, decided to reform forest tenure. Another village, in
2002 individualized user rights to villagers (those who accepted the forest user rights
were required to pay a land rental fee to the villages) and sold some of the forest to
people outside the village to help eliminate village debt (Xu and Jiang 2009).
2

For a review of literature studying the correlation between poverty and preferences

over risk and time see manuscript 2, section 2.3.
3

For a critical review of time discounting and time preference see Frederick,

Loewenstein, and O’Donoghue (2002).
4

1 USD ≈ 6.83 yuan at the time of the survey, August 1, 2009.

5

The year 2000 is pre-reform, however; for 21 plots households reported that they had

a forest certificate, which they had received as early as 1978. These “forest
certificates” are not equivalent to the forest certificates distributed during the recent
reform which began in 2002. Likely, these 21 “forest certificates” are not forest
certificates at all but rather they are household responsibility land certificates, and the
household has converted barren or cropland to forest, and so were confused about their
forest certificate status when asked by enumerators. We exclude these 21 plots from
the analysis, so as to not contaminate the effect of household having a certificate on
forest management with the changes in forest management on plots with the earlier
type of “forest certificate.”
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6

In Tanaka et al. (2010), the value function has the form: v(x)=xσ for x>0 and v(x)=-

λ(-x)σ. For ease of comparison with respect to the conventional form of expected
utility under constant relative risk aversion, where u(x)=x1-σ /(1-σ), Liu (2008) rewrites
the value function as v(x)=x1-σ. We follow Liu’s choice of value function for ease of
understanding.
7

Three examples were given in the instructions to help ensure that the subjects did not

feel that they must make a switch within the series. In one example, the subject never
switches to Option B. In another example, the subject switches at question 7 to Option
B. And in a third example, the subject switches to Option B at question 1.
8

Inconsistent choices within series of questions (in both risk and time preference

experiments of the type reported on in this paper) are problematic for identifying
parameters when structures are imposed on the subject’s responses but the theory
underlying those structures does not justify the subject’s responses. In risk and time
preference experiments, where subjects have been allowed to switch back and forth
between A and B, often only a small percentage of individuals do so. Using
experiments where in some rounds subjects are given an added option of indicating
indifference between Option A and B, researchers have found that subjects who switch
back and forth between Option A and B are not actually making inconsistent choices
but rather the subjects are expressing their indifference over a range of choices (Holt
and Laury 2002; Andersen et al. 2006). In our experiments, we follow the methods of
Tanaka et al. (2010) and Liu (2008), both of whom enforce mono-tonic switching.
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9

For more details on the methods used to estimate the risk preference parameters see

manuscript 2 and its appendix.
10

For comparison to other studies, Liu (2008) in a sample of Chinese farmers found

values for (σ, α, λ) of (0.48, 0.69, 3.47) and Tanaka et al. (2010) in a sample of
Vietnamese farmers found values of (0.40, 0.75 and 3.0). The values for σ and α
across the studies are very similar; however, our value for λ is approximately twice as
much as the values in the previous comparable studies, indicating that our sample
exhibits on average a higher degree of loss aversion.
11

In the experiment, 77% of our subjects identified themselves as the head of their

households. Since the head of households are those who likely have the most weight in
forest management decisions, we believe that the individual risk preferences elicited in
the experiments can accurately represent the preferences of the household.
12

Our design differs from the time preference experiments of Coller and Williams

(1999) and Harrison et al. (2002) in that we do not frame the choices with a front-end
delay. An example of using a frontend delay, is a choice between money one month
from today and more money seven months from now, rather than asking participants
to choose between money today and more money six months from now, as we did. A
frontend delay is used in time preference experiments to control (at least partially) for
the credibility problem. The credibility problem is that participants may not believe
that they will receive future payments, and therefore will be biased toward choosing
the immediate payoff. However, in much of the behavior economics literature, a
significant proportion of the action seems to revolve around payoffs that are truly
immediate versus payoffs that are not immediate (Frederick et al. 2002). By using a
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front-end delay, we would lose information about how individuals treat choices
between payoffs that are truly immediate versus payoffs that are not immediate.
Ideally, to address the credibility problem, while still having a way to capture the
information about choices between immediate payoffs and future payoffs, an
experimental design would include both questions with and without front-end delays.
Due to time constraints, in that participants may become exhausted with too many
questions, we choose to only use questions without a front-end delay.
13

To see the entire set of payoff-time combinations that were used in the experiment

and more details regarding the estimation of the time discounting parameters see
Manuscript 2 and its appendix.
14

The 15 combinations of future payoff and time as described in the text were used in

9 of the 10 villages. In the first village, we used the same payoffs but shorter
timeframes. Specifically, in the first village we used payoffs of 15, 60 and 150 yuan
with delays of 1 week, 1 month, and 3 months and 30 and 120 yuan with delays of 1
week, 2 weeks and 2 months. In the first village, 5 out of 10 households always choose
the future payoff. We thought that this high degree of preference for the future
amongst the households might be due to the timeframes being to short, and so in the
remaining villages we increased the timeframes.
15

Appendix table 1.1 describes each of the variables used in this analysis.

16

Tables 1.6, 1.7 and 1.8 summarize results for the variables of interest. Appendix

table 1.2 shows results with coefficients for all plot and household level control
variables for the full models (column 4 in tables 1.6, 1.7 and 1.8).
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17

The median value of the risk aversion parameter is 0.4 (risk averse), the loss

aversion parameter is 2.04 (very low level of loss aversion), the probability weighting
dummy is 1 (tends to put excessive decision weight on small probabilities), and the
hyperbolic time discounting parameter is 0.012 (weak preference for income today).
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Table 1.1 Forest management variables descriptive statistics by year
Std.
Variable
Year Mean
Dev.
Min
Max
Value of labor for harvesting forest
2000
148
461
0
3222
2005
525
1113
0
5911
2008
489
1326
0
11087
2000
487
2564
0
Value of labor for applying inputs
29165
2005
704
4298
0
54643
2008
4390
7569
0
53355
Expenditure on forest inputs
2000
466
2319
0
30000
2005
775
3308
0
34972
2008
1010
2696
0
21641
Notes: n=197 plots. All values are in yuan per hectare. Values for the years 2005 and
2008 are adjusted for inflation using the rural consumer price index for Fujian
Province, China (China Statistical Yearbook, 2009).
Source: Authors’ data.
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Table 1.2 Forest management variables means by forest certification status

Variable
No. of observations

Plots that
do not
receive a
forest
certificate
128

Plots that
receive a
forest
certificate
69

166
447
283

116
560
807

In 2000:
Value of labor for harvesting forest
Value of labor for applying inputs
Expenditure on forest inputs

Statistical
significance
of difference
in means
(t-test)

0.295
0.720
1.520

Between 2000 and 2008:
∆ Value of labor for harvesting forest
558
-61
1.686 ***
∆ Value of labor for applying inputs
4605
2599
3.111 *
∆ Expenditure on forest inputs
425
762
1.018
Notes: t-stat is absolute value. *, ** and *** denote significant difference in the
means at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. All values are in yuan per hectare.
Values for the years 2005 and 2008 are adjusted for inflation using the rural consumer
price index for Fujian Province, China (China Statistical Yearbook, 2009).
Source: Authors’ data
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Table 1.3 Comparison of means for year 2000 (before reform)

Variable
No. of observations

67

Household Characteristics
Age of head of household
Household head education (years)
Household size (age 5 to 59)
Household assets (yuan)
Total area of households forest land (ha)
Plot Characteristics
Area of plot (ha)
Distance of plot to home (km)
Distance of plot to road (km)
Bamboo (=1 if bamboo)
Slope of plot (=1 if gradient is > 25')
Source: Authors’ data

All Plots

Plots for which
households do
not receive a
forest
certificate

Plots for which
households
receive a forest
certificate

197

128

69

46.22
4.68
4.22
10430
2.30

45.84
4.54
4.20
11888
2.07

46.91
4.94
4.25
7725
2.74

0.599
0.999
0.184
1.456
1.121

0.59
1.43
0.87
0.52
0.71

0.59
1.43
0.90
0.59
0.73

0.60
1.44
0.83
0.39
0.67

0.022
0.041
0.450
2.752 ***
0.877

Statistical
significance of
difference in
means (t-test)

Table 1.4 Comparison of exponential, hyperbolic, quasi-hyperbolic and full discounting models

µ
r
β
θ
Observations
2

Exponential
0.010 ***
(0.001)
0.009 ***
(0.001)

Hyperbolic
0.012 ***
(0.001)
0.018 ***
(0.002)

Quasi-hyperbolic
0.015 ***
(0.001)
0.002 ***
(0.000)
0.573 ***
(0.032)

β=1

β=1

θ=1

θ=2

θ=1

3090

3090

3090

Equation(1)
0.015 ***
(0.001)
0.006
(0.005)
0.601 ***
(0.039)
5.162
(3.514)
3090

68

Adjusted R
0.510
0.512
0.517
0.517
Notes: *, ** and *** denote significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
Source: Authors’ data.

Table 1.5 Summary of hypothesized sign for each coefficient of interest

Variable of Interest

harvest
labor

input labor

inputs

-

+

+

AfterReform

β4

Hypothesis
1

Risk aversion

β5

2a

+

-

-

β6

2c

+

-

-

Probability weighting dummy

β7

2e

ambiguous

ambiguous

ambiguous

Time preference

β8

2g

+

-

-

β9

2b

-

+

+

Loss aversion*AfterReform

β10

2d

+

-

-

Probability weighting *AfterReform

β11

2f

ambiguous

ambiguous

ambiguous

β12

2h

+
ambiguous

ambiguous

ambiguous

Loss aversion

Risk aversion*AfterReform

69

Time preference*AfterReform
Implied certification effect

Coefficient

Table 1.6 The effect of forest plot certification on labor used for harvesting forest
products
Dependent Variable: Logged value of labor used for harvesting forest products (yuan/ha)
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
Variable
AfterReform

-2.091
(1.03)

-0.682
-2.175
(0.24)
(1.04)
ln(risk aversion)
0.445
0.969
(4.94)*** (4.07)***
ln(loss aversion)
-0.96
-0.449
(2.31)**
(0.86)
ln(probability weighting dummy)
4.482
2.649
(2.63)**
(1.76)*
ln(time preference)
-0.058
0.112
(0.18)
(0.55)
ln(risk aversion)*AfterReform
-1.126
-1.374
(3.90)*** (11.70)***
ln(loss aversion)*AfterReform
1.119
1.336
(1.99)*
(3.67)***
ln(probability weighting dummy)*AfterReform
-2.638
-2.031
(1.02)
(1.11)
ln(time preference)*AfterReform
-0.05
0.025
(0.11)
(0.08)
Constant
-9.624
-11.991
-5.304
(8.07)***
(6.22)***
(0.56)
Implied certification effect
-2.091
-2.255
-1.712
-2.643
(1.03)
(1.28)
(0.90)
(1.50)
N
414
414
414
414
2
R
0.03
0.37
0.09
0.40
Household characteristics
No
Yes
No
Yes
Plot characteristics
No
Yes
No
Yes
Village fixed effect
No
Yes
No
Yes
Note: Difference-in-differences regressions. Absolute value of t-stat in parentheses. Robust
standard errors account for sample clustering. Plots with missing data excluded. Implied
certification effects evaluated at the median ln(risk aversion)= -0.523, ln(time preferance) =
-4.394, ln(loss aversion) = 0.713, and probweightdum=1. Household characteristic control
variables include: ln(risk), ln(loss), ln(probweight), ln(r_hyp), ln(agehead), ln(hhtotarea),
hhnewplot, ln(num5and59age), and ln(assets). Forest characteristic control variables include:
fcert, ln(area), ln(disthome), ln(distroad), and slope25over. All include controls for the year
2005 and 2008. Significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level denoted by *, **, and ***,
respectively.
Source: Authors’ data.
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-2.255
(1.28)
0.729
(2.92)***
-0.062
(0.12)
2.36
(2.03)**
0.101
(0.54)

Table 1.7 The effect of forest plot certification on labor used for applying forest
inputs
Dependent Variable: Logged value of labor used for applying forest inputs (yuan/ha)
Variable
AfterReform

(1)
0.117
(0.06)

(2)
0.369
(0.20)
-0.685
(3.78)***
0.013
(0.03)
0.589
(0.26)
-0.266
(1.37)

-11.417
(15.49)***
0.117
(0.06)
414
0.32
No
No
No

-5.36
-0.48
0.369
(0.20)
414
0.40
Yes
Yes
Yes

ln(risk aversion)
ln(loss aversion)
ln(probability weighting)
ln(time preference)
ln(risk aversion)*AfterReform
ln(loss aversion)*AfterReform
ln(probability weighting)*AfterReform
ln(time preference)*AfterReform
Constant
Implied certification effect
N
R2
Household characteristics
Plot characteristics
Village fixed effect
Note: Same notes as table 1.6.
Source: Authors’ data.
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(3)
-7.809
(2.29)**
-0.673
(10.38)***
0.150
(0.39)
-1.300
(0.69)
-0.046
(0.28)
0.571
(2.72)***
-0.431
(0.57)
6.015
(1.57)
-1.206
(2.68)***
-11.359
(5.97)***
2.900
(1.42)
414
0.38
No
No
No

(4)
-7.773
(2.51)**
-0.719
(4.41)***
0.001
(0.00)
-1.147
(0.59)
-0.086
(0.34)
0.555
(2.19)**
-0.356
(0.44)
6.915
(1.92)*
-0.943
(1.68)*
0.944
(0.10)
2.741
(1.14)
414
0.42
Yes
Yes
Yes

Table 1.8 The effect of forest plot certification on expenditure on forest inputs
Dependent Variable: Logged value of expenditure on forest inputs (yuan/ha)
(1)
(2)
(3)
Variable
AfterReform

-1.380
(0.50)

0.661
(0.23)
-1.045
(5.09)***
-0.830
(1.92)*
2.266
(1.63)
0.026
(0.11)

-9.783
(8.15)***
-1.38
(0.50)
414
0.05
No
No
No

-37.127
(2.15)**
0.661
(0.23)
414
0.24
Yes
Yes
Yes

ln(risk aversion)
ln(loss aversion)
ln(probability weighting)
ln(time preference)
ln(risk aversion)*AfterReform
ln(loss aversion)*AfterReform
ln(probability weighting)*AfterReform
ln(time preference)*AfterReform
Constant
Implied certification effect
N
R2
Household characteristics
Plot characteristics
Village fixed effect
Note: Same notes as table 1.6.
Source: Authors’ data.

72

-7.651
(1.85)*
-0.430
(3.44)***
-0.313
(0.46)
0.208
(0.09)
0.262
(0.89)
-0.122
(0.42)
-0.878
(0.77)
2.575
(0.54)
-1.468
(2.46)**
-8.794
(3.26)**
0.812
(0.25)
414
0.11
No
No
No

(4)

-6.708
(1.78)*
-0.999
(5.13)***
-0.735
(1.23)
1.390
(0.85)
0.287
(0.84)
-0.010
(0.03)
-0.887
(0.79)
3.925
(0.90)
-1.376
(2.06)**
-29.73
(1.73)*
2.635
(0.80)
414
0.26
Yes
Yes
Yes

Figure 1.1 Example of risk preference experiment choice

Option A

Option B

Tokens in
the bag you
will draw from
if you choose A:
N o.
1

Description

Option

A

Tokens in
the bag you
will draw from
if you choose B:

If
If

Description

Option

, then receive 20 yuan
, then receive 5 yuan

B
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If
If

, then receive 34 yuan
, then receive 2.5 yuan

Figure 1.2 Distribution of risk preference parameters
Panel A. Distribution of σ (curvature of the value function, risk aversion parameter)

Panel B. Distribution of α (probability weighting parameter)
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Panel C. Distribution of λ (loss aversion parameter)
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Figure 1.3 Example of time preference experiment choice set
Plan A

Plan B

6-1

Receive 150 yuan in 6 months

Receive 25 yuan today

6-2

Receive 150 yuan in 6 months

Receive 50 yuan today

6-3

Receive 150 yuan in 6 months

Receive 75 yuan today

6-4

Receive 150 yuan in 6 months

Receive 100 yuan today

6-5

Receive 150 yuan in 6 months

Receive 125 yuan today

I choose A for questions 26 to

.

I choose B for questions

76

to 30.

Figure 1.4 Distribution of hyperbolic discounting parameter
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Appendix 1
Appendix Table 1.1 Variable descriptions
Variable
Dependent Variables
input labor
harvest labor
inputs
Variables of Interest
AfterReform
risk aversion
risk aversion*AfterReform
loss aversion
loss aversion*AfterReform
probability weight dummy
r_hyp
r_hyp*AfterReform
Control Variables
year2005
year2008
Demographic Control Variables
agehead
yreduhead
num5and59age
assets
hhtotarea
hhnewplot
Plot Characteristic Control
Variables
fcert
area
disthome
distroad
slope25over
bamboo

Description
Value of labor allocated to application of forest inputs
(yuan/hectare)
Value of labor allocated to harvesting (yuan/hectare)
Expenditure on forest inputs, including chemical fertilizer,
pesticide and seeds (yuan/hectare)
Dummy for plot has a forest certificate in data year after the
reform (1 yes, 0 no)
Risk aversion parameter
risk aversion and AfterReform interaction variable
Loss aversion parameter
loss aversion and AfterReform interaction variable
Dummy for the nonlinear probability weighting (1 tends to
overweight small probabilities, 0 otherwise)
Hyperbolic time discounting parameter
r_hyp and AfterReform interaction variable

Dummy for year 2005
Dummy for year 2008

Age of head of household
Years of education of head of household
Number of household members between age 5 and 59
Household's total assets
Household's total forest plot area (ha)
Household received a new forest plot in forest tenure reform (1
yes, 0 no)

Dummy for plot has had a forest certificate (in any year) (1 yes, 0
no)
Forest plot area (hectares)
Distance of plot from home (km)
Distance of plot from road (km)
Dummy for gradient of plot is greater than 25 (1 yes, 0 no)
Dummy for bamboo plot (1 bamboo, 0 other)
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Appendix Table 1.2 The effect of forest plot certification on forest management
Dependent Variable:
fcert
year2005
year2008
AfterReform
ln(risk aversion)
ln(loss aversion)
ln(probability weighting)
ln(time preference)
ln(risk aversion)*AfterReform
ln(loss aversion)*AfterReform
ln(probability weighting)*AfterReform
ln(time preference)*AfterReform
ln(agehead)
ln(yreduchead)
ln(num5and59age)
ln(assets)
ln(hhtotalarea)
hhnewplot

ln(harvest
labor)
-0.018
(0.02)
2.539
(2.24)**
0.330
(0.18)
-2.175
(1.04)
0.969
(4.07)***
-0.449
(0.86)
2.649
(1.76)*
0.112
(0.55)
-1.374
(11.70)***
1.336
(3.67)***
-2.031
(1.11)
0.025
(0.08)
-2.602
(1.11)
-0.296
(1.84)*
-0.107
(0.95)
0.155
(0.78)
-0.348
(0.75)
0.373
(0.30)

ln(input
labor)
0.08
(0.05)
0.538
(0.60)
12.133
(7.17)***
-7.773
(2.51)**
-0.719
(4.41)***
0.001
(0.00)
-1.147
(0.59)
-0.086
(0.34)
0.555
(2.19)**
-0.356
(0.44)
6.915
(1.92)*
-0.943
(1.68)*
-3.004
(1.22)
-0.156
(1.14)
0.054
(0.48)
0.102
(0.53)
-0.116
(0.19)
-0.404
(0.26)

ln(inputs)
-2.575
(1.16)
2.535
(1.61)
4.960
(2.24)**
-6.708
(1.78)*
-0.999
(5.13)***
-0.735
(1.23)
1.39
(0.85)
0.287
(0.84)
-0.010
(0.03)
-0.887
(0.79)
3.925
(0.90)
-1.376
(2.06)**
3.817
(0.88)
0.100
(0.66)
0.159
(0.84)
-0.111
(0.58)
-0.456
(0.81)
-2.280
(1.46)

Table continued on the next page.
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Appendix Table 1.2 [Continued] The effect of forest plot certification on forest
management
ln(harvest
ln(input
Variable
labor)
labor)
ln(inputs)
lnarea
0.919
0.580
0.404
(2.70)***
(1.05)
(0.89)
lndisthome
0.116
-0.108
-0.422
(0.54)
(0.23)
(0.84)
lndistroad
0.090
0.073
-0.078
(0.83)
(0.54)
(0.47)
slope25over
1.072
1.207
-0.071
(1.14)
(1.09)
(0.05)
bamboo
6.797
0.767
0.128
(6.01)***
(0.68)
(0.09)
Constant
-5.304
0.994
-29.73
(0.56)
(0.10)
(1.73)*
Implied certification effect
-2.643
2.741
2.635
(1.50)
(1.14)
(0.80)
N
414
414
414
2
R
0.40
0.42
0.26
Note: Difference-in-differences regressions. Village fixed effects included. Absolute value of
t-stat in parentheses. Robust standard errors account for sample clustering. Plots with missing
data excluded. Implied certification effects evaluated at the median ln(risk aversion)= -0.523,
ln(time preferance) = -4.394, ln(loss aversion) = 0.713, and probweightdum=1. ln(disthome),
ln(distroad), and slope25over. Significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level denoted by *, **,
and ***, respectively.
Source: Authors’ data.
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Appendix Table 1.3 Robustness Check 1: The effect of forest certification on labor
days for harvesting forest products
Dependent Variable: Logged labor used for harvesting forest products (days/hectare)
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
Variable
AfterReform

-1.598
(0.97)

-0.428
-1.702
(0.18)
(1.00)
ln(risk aversion)
0.361
0.780
(4.89)*** (4.10)***
ln(loss aversion)
-0.770
-0.361
(2.29)**
(0.86)
ln(probability weighting dummy)
3.605
2.124
(2.59)**
(1.74)*
ln(time preference)
-0.050
0.095
(0.19)
(0.57)
ln(risk aversion)*AfterReform
-0.888
-1.093
(3.83)*** (11.27)***
ln(loss aversion)*AfterReform
0.907
1.06
(2.01)**
(3.62)***
ln(probability weighting dummy)*AfterReform
-2.068
-1.548
(0.99)
(1.05)
ln(time preference)*AfterReform
-0.019
0.032
(0.05)
(0.12)
Constant
-10.336
-7.897
-12.257
-6.743
(10.48)***
(1.09)
(7.80)***
(0.89)
Implied certification effect
-1.598
-1.753
-1.300
2.741
(0.97)
(1.23)
(0.83)
(1.14)
N
414
414
414
414
R2
0.03
0.37
0.09
0.40
Household characteristics
No
Yes
No
Yes
Plot characteristics
No
Yes
No
Yes
Village fixed effect
No
Yes
No
Yes
Note: Difference-in-differences regressions. Absolute value of t-stat in parentheses. Robust
standard errors account for sample clustering. Plots with missing data excluded. Implied
certification effects evaluated at the median ln(risk aversion)= -0.523, ln(time preferance) = 4.394, ln(loss aversion) = 0.713, and probweightdum=1. Household characteristic control
variables include: ln(risk), ln(loss), ln(probweight), ln(r_hyp), ln(agehead), ln(hhtotarea),
hhnewplot, ln(num5and59age), and ln(assets). Forest characteristic control variables include:
fcert, ln(area), ln(disthome), ln(distroad), and slope25over. All include controls for the year
2005 and 2008. Significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level denoted by *, **, and ***,
respectively.
Source: Authors’ data.
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-1.753
(1.23)
0.590
(2.97)***
0.056
(0.13)
1.913
(2.02)**
0.089
(0.58)

Appendix Table 1.4 Robustness Check 1: The effect of forest certification on labor
days for applying inputs
Dependent Variable: Logged labor used for applying inputs (days/hectare)
Variable
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
AfterReform
0.117
0.259
-6.470
-6.559
(0.08)
(0.17)
(2.28)**
(2.60)**
ln(risk aversion)
-0.559
-0.549
-0.585
(3.72)*** (10.11)*** (4.31)***
ln(loss aversion)
0.008
0.138
-0.019
(0.02)
(0.43)
(0.05)
ln(probability weighting dummy)
0.358
-1.211
-1.066
(0.19)
(0.77)
(0.65)
ln(time preference)
-0.234
-0.044
-0.080
(1.45)
(0.32)
(0.39)
ln(risk aversion)*AfterReform
0.473
0.461
(2.85)*** (2.28)**
ln(loss aversion)*AfterReform
-0.32
-0.244
(0.52)
(0.37)
ln(probability weighting dummy)*AfterReform
4.908
5.671
(1.54)
(1.93)*
ln(time preference)*AfterReform
-1.011
-0.811
(2.74)***
(1.78)*
Constant
-11.806
-7.135
-11.686
-1.76
(0.78)
(7.33)***
(0.21)
(19.20)***
Implied certification effect
0.117
0.259
2.404
2.261
(0.06)
(0.17)
(1.45)
(1.17)
N
414
414
414
414
R2
0.32
0.39
0.37
0.41
Household characteristics
No
Yes
No
Yes
Plot characteristics
No
Yes
No
Yes
Village fixed effect
No
Yes
No
Yes

Note: Same notes as appendix table 1.3.
Source: Authors’ data.
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Appendix Table 1.5 Robustness Check 2: The effect of forest plot certification on
labor for harvesting forest products
Dependent Variable: Logged value of labor used for harvesting forest products
(yuan/hectare)
Variable
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
AfterReform
-2.091
-2.274
-0.653
-2.015
(1.03)
(1.30)
(0.24)
(0.99)
ln(risk aversion)
0.726
0.449
0.961
(2.92)*** (4.94)*** (4.09)***
ln(loss aversion)
-0.055
-0.975
-0.429
(0.11)
(2.35)**
(0.84)
ln(probability weighting)
2.361
4.494
2.648
(2.03)**
(2.63)**
(1.76)*
ln(exponential
0.127
-0.030
0.124
discounting parameter)
(0.69)
(0.09)
(0.61)
ln(risk aversion)*AfterReform
-1.126
-1.37
(3.90)*** (12.15)***
ln(loss aversion)*AfterReform
1.114
1.319
(2.04)**
(3.70)***
ln(probability weighting)*AfterReform
-2.638
-2.044
(1.02)
(1.10)
ln(exponential
-0.048
-2.044
discounting parameter)*AfterReform
(0.09)
(1.10)
Constant
-9.624
-6.741
-11.837
-5.554
(8.07)***
(0.74)
(6.42)***
(0.59)
Implied certification effect
-2.091
-2.274
-1.721
-2.744
(1.03)
(1.30)
(0.86)
(1.50)
N
414
414
414
414
2
R
0.03
0.37
0.09
0.40
Household characteristics
No
Yes
No
Yes
Plot characteristics
No
Yes
No
Yes
Village fixed effect
No
Yes
No
Yes
Note: Difference-in-differences regressions. Absolute value of t-stat in parentheses. Robust
standard errors account for sample clustering. Plots with missing data excluded. Implied
certification effects evaluated at the median ln(risk aversion)= -0.5232, ln(time preference –
exponential discounting parmater) = -3.932, ln(loss aversion) = 0.713, and probweightdum=1.
Household characteristic control variables include: ln(risk), ln(loss), ln(probweight),
ln(r_exp), ln(agehead), ln(hhtotarea), hhnewplot, ln(num5and59age), and ln(assets). Forest
characteristic control variables include: fcert, ln(area), ln(disthome), ln(distroad), and
slope25over. All include controls for the year 2005 and 2008. Significance at the 10%, 5%
and 1% level denoted by *, **, and ***, respectively.
Source: Authors’ data.
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Appendix Table 1.6 Robustness Check 2: The effect of forest plot certification on
labor for applying inputs
Dependent Variable: Logged value of labor used for applying inputs (yuan/hectare)
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
Variable
AfterReform

0.117
(0.06)

0.363
-7.861
(0.19)
(2.38)**
ln(risk aversion)
-0.674
-0.671
(3.76)*** (10.41)***
ln(loss aversion)
-0.023
0.142
(0.06)
(0.38)
ln(probability weighting)
0.604
-1.297
(0.27)
(0.69)
ln(exponential
-0.245
-0.035
discounting parameter)
(1.20)
(0.21)
ln(risk aversion)*AfterReform
0.588
(2.76)***
ln(loss aversion)*AfterReform
-0.481
(0.64)
ln(probability weighting)*AfterReform
6.112
(1.63)
ln( exponential
-1.469
discounting parameter)*AfterReform
(2.83)***
Constant
-11.417
-4.754
-11.270
(0.43)
(6.06)***
(15.49)***
Implied certification effect
0.117
0.363
2.582
(0.06)
(0.19)
(1.33)
N
414
414
414
R2
0.32
0.40
0.38
Household characteristics
No
Yes
No
Plot characteristics
No
Yes
No
Village fixed effect
No
Yes
No

Notes: Same notes as appendix table 1.5.
Source: Authors’ data.
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-8.076
(2.75)***
-0.704
(4.37)***
-0.035
(0.08)
-1.133
(0.58)
-0.052
(0.20)
0.562
(2.23)**
-0.378
(0.48)
7.042
(2.00)*
-1.222
(1.96)*
1.955
(0.19)
2.548
(1.14)
414
0.42
Yes
Yes
Yes

Appendix Table 1.7 Robustness Check 2: The effect of forest certification on
expenditure on forest inputs
Depdendent Variable: Logged value of expenditure on forest inputs (yuan/hectare)
Variable
AfterReform

(1)
-1.380
(0.50)

(2)
0.649
(0.23)
-1.046
(5.06)***
-0.831
(1.96)*
2.268
(1.64)
0.044
(0.17)

-9.783
(8.15)***
-1.38
(0.50)
414
0.05
No
No
No

-37.028
(2.15)**
0.649
(0.23)
414
0.24
Yes
Yes
Yes

ln(risk aversion)
ln(loss aversion)
ln(probability weighting)
ln(time preference - exponential
discounting parameter)
ln(risk aversion)*AfterReform
ln(loss aversion)*AfterReform
ln(probability weighting)*AfterReform
ln(time preference – exponential
discounting parameter)*AfterReform
Constant
Implied certification effect
N
R2
Household characteristics
Plot characteristics
Village fixed effect

Notes: Same notes as appendix table 1.5.
Source: Authors’ data.
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(3)
-7.836
(1.97)*
-0.433
(3.53)***
-0.291
(0.44)
0.213
(0.09)
0.283
(0.91)
-0.106
(0.37)
-0.929
(0.82)
2.66
(0.58)
-1.833
(2.67)**
-8.894
(3.45)**
0.436
(0.14)
414
0.11
No
No
No

(4)
-6.752
(1.85)*
-1.001
(5.12)***
-0.715
(1.20)
1.403
(0.86)
0.314
(0.84)
0.016
(0.05)
-0.96
(0.84)
4.047
(0.95)
-1.664
(2.19)**
-29.541
(1.73)*
2.246
(0.72)
414
0.26
Yes
Yes
Yes

Appendix Table 1.8 Robustness Check 3: The effect of forest plot certification on
labor for harvesting forest products
Dependent Variable: Logged value of labor used for harvesting forest products
(yuan/hectare)
Variable
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
YearsPostFC
-0.874
-0.912
-0.213
-0.484
(1.57)
(1.75)*
(0.32)
(0.85)
ln(risk aversion)
0.759
0.44
0.962
(2.92)*** (4.91)*** (3.85)***
ln(loss aversion)
-0.131
-0.891
-0.455
(0.25)
(2.32)**
(0.84)
ln(probability weighting)
2.259
4.520
2.945
(2.17)**
(2.99)***
(2.27)**
ln(time preference)
0.120
-0.071
0.135
(0.64)
(0.23)
(0.66)
ln(risk aversion)* YearsPostFC
-0.398
-0.506
(3.38)*** (8.57)***
ln(loss aversion)* YearsPostFC
0.234
0.351
(1.56)
(2.75)***
ln(probability weighting)* YearsPostFC
-0.802
-0.763
(1.59)
(1.64)
ln(time preference)*YearsPostFC
0.06
0.029
(0.53)
(0.24)
Constant
-9.702
-5.869
-12.314
-4.126
(8.04)***
(0.66)
(6.61)***
(0.44)
Implied certification effect
-0.874
-0.912
-0.905
-0.860
(1.57)
(1.75)*
(1.47)
(1.34)
N
414
414
414
414
2
R
0.04
0.37
0.09
0.40
Household characteristics
No
Yes
No
Yes
Plot characteristics
No
Yes
No
Yes
Village fixed effect
No
Yes
No
Yes
Note: Difference-in-differences regressions. Absolute value of t-stat in parentheses. Robust
standard errors account for sample clustering. Plots with missing data excluded. Implied
certification effects evaluated at the median ln(risk aversion)= -0.5232, ln(time preference –
exponential discounting parmater) = -3.932, ln(loss aversion) = 0.713, and probweightdum=1.
Household characteristic control variables include: ln(risk), ln(loss), ln(probweight),
ln(r_exp), ln(agehead), ln(hhtotarea), hhnewplot, ln(num5and59age), and ln(assets). Forest
characteristic control variables include: fcert, ln(area), ln(disthome), ln(distroad), and
slope25over. All include controls for the year 2005 and 2008. Significance at the 10%, 5%
and 1% level denoted by *, **, and ***, respectively.
Source: Authors’ data.
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Appendix Table 1.9 Robustness Check 3: The effect of forest plot certification on
labor for applying inputs
Dependent Variable: Logged value of labor used for applying inputs (yuan/hectare)
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
Variable
YearsPostFC

-0.331
(0.51)

ln(risk aversion)
ln(loss aversion)
ln(probability weighting)
ln(time preference)

-0.460
(0.73)
-0.657
(3.55)***
0.015
(0.04)
0.492
(0.23)
-0.24
(1.23)

ln(risk aversion)* YearsPostFC
ln(loss aversion)* YearsPostFC
ln(probability weighting)* YearsPostFC
ln(time preference)*YearsPostFC
Constant
Implied certification effect
N
R2
Household characteristics
Plot characteristics
Village fixed effect

-11.664
(15.64)***
-0.331
(0.51)
414
0.32
No
No
No

Notes: Same notes as appendix table 1.8.
Source: Authors’ data.
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-4.732
(0.42)
-0.460
(0.73)
414
0.40
Yes
Yes
Yes

-3.057
(2.48)**
-0.66
(9.55)
0.074
(0.19)
-1.261
(0.71)
-0.07
(0.42)
0.206
(2.51)**
-0.038
(0.17)
2.121
(1.86)*
-0.407
(1.85)*
-11.617
(6.25)***
0.717
(0.88
414
0.38
No
No
No

-3.214
(2.72)***
-0.662
(3.73)***
-0.109
(0.23)
-0.852
(0.46)
-0.064
(0.26)
0.199
(1.87)*
0.061
(0.23)
2.180
(2.03)**
-0.353
(1.41)
1.837
(0.17)
0.456
(0.50)
414
0.42
Yes
Yes
Yes

Appendix Table 1.10 Robustness Check 3: The effect of forest certification on
expenditure on forest inputs
Depdendent Variable: Logged value of expenditure on forest inputs (yuan/hectare)
Variable
YearsPostFC

(1)
-0.630
(0.86)

ln(risk aversion)
ln(loss aversion)
ln(probability weighting)
ln(time preference)

(2)
-0.145
(0.21)
-1.032
(5.01)***
-0.817
(1.83)*
2.17
(1.56)
0.04
(0.16)

ln(risk aversion)*YearsPostFC
ln(loss aversion)*YearsPostFC
ln(probability weighting)*YearsPostFC
ln(time preference)*YearsPostFC
Constant
Implied certification effect
N
R2
Household characteristics
Plot characteristics
Village fixed effect

-9.872
(8.12)***
-0.630
(0.86)
414
0.05
No
No
No

Notes: Same notes as appendix table 1.8.
Source: Authors’ data.
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-36.868
(2.18)**
-0.145
(0.21)
414
0.24
Yes
Yes
Yes

(3)
-3.08
(2.08)**
-0.422
(3.48)***
-0.468
(0.76)
-0.006
(0.00)
0.227
(0.83)
-0.026
(0.28)
-0.172
(0.58)
1.239
(0.86)

(4)
-2.56
(1.73)*
-0.976
(4.94)***
-0.831
(1.48)
1.284
(0.77)
0.25
(0.75)
0.015
(0.11)
-0.098
(0.33)
1.422
(1.05)

-0.478
(1.86)*
-8.74
(3.37)***
0.150
(0.15)
414
0.10
No
No
No

-0.420
(1.43)
-29.90
(1.71)*
0.628
(0.62)
414
0.25
Yes
Yes
Yes
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MANUSCRIPT 2
Poverty, Risk, and Time Preferences: A Study of Rural Chinese Households

2.1 Abstract

Those living in poverty are often assumed to have both high levels of risk aversion
and high rates of impatience, preferences that make it difficult for these households to
save and take the risks necessary to begin to accumulate capital. In this paper, we
investigate the relationship between poverty and individual preferences for time and
risk. To meet this objective, we use field experiment data collected in Fujian, China to
measure the time and risk preferences of 103 rural households combined with
household survey data. Specifically, we use net worth per capita as the primary
measure of wealth, and also use alternative variables as proxies for wealth (forest land
area, house value, assets, and liabilities) to check for robustness. To address the
problem of endogeneity of wealth, we use households’ net worth rank within their
village as an instrumental variable for net worth per capita. On average we find that
participants are risk averse, moderately loss averse and have relatively low discount
rates (i.e., patient). Contrary to the classic assumption, we find that wealth does not
have a significant effect on risk aversion or loss aversion (with the one exception that
households with more forest land per capita are less loss averse). However, consistent
with this assumption we find statistically weak evidence that households with lower
wealth have higher discount rates (i.e., more impatient).
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2.2 Introduction
In 2005 there was an estimated 1.4 billion people in the world that still lived below
the poverty line of $1.25 a day. And in China, while there has been a dramatic
reduction in the poverty rate over the last two decades, falling from 84% to 15.9%
over 1981 to 2005, the number living on less than $1.25 a day was still at 106.1
million people in 2005 (Chen and Ravallion 2008; 2009).1 A multitude of factors
contribute to the ongoing existence of poverty in the world: physical geography; lack
of government investment in public goods and services like primary health care,
education and infrastructure; governance failures; political conflicts and cultural
barriers (Sachs 2005). And at a more fundamental level, the ongoing existence of
poverty has been attributed to the idea that the poor remain poor because attempts to
escape poverty are hindered by the fact that they are poor (Fisher 1930; Myrdal 1957;
World Bank 2000; Mosley and Verschoor 2005). This argument, often referred to as
the `vicious circle of poverty’, is that poverty persists as a result of those
characteristics of poverty that make escape difficult including: poor health, lack of
skill, lack of support mechanisms, remoteness from markets and institutions, social
exclusion and lack of physical assets or access to credit (Mosley and Verschoor 2005).
This paper investigates the correlation between poverty and individual preferences
for time and risk. Specifically, we use field experiment data collected in Fujian, China
to measure the time and risk preferences of 103 rural households combined with
household survey data to examine the correlation between wealth and risk and time
preferences. This relationship is important in understanding this ‘vicious circle’
because two key elements in many versions of this ‘vicious circle’ are that those living
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in poverty have both high levels of risk aversion and high rates of impatience (Fisher
1930; Lipton 1968; Lumley 1997; Fafchamps 2003). For example, regarding time
preferences, Irving Fisher wrote,
A small income, other things being equal, tends to produce a high rate of
impatience, partly from the thought that provision for the present is necessary
both for the present itself and for the future as well, and partly from lack of
foresight and self-control. (Fisher 1930, p.73)
And with regard to risk preferences, Michael Lipton wrote, “The risk premium is an
increasing function of risk and a decreasing function of assets.”(Lipton 1968, p.335) In
other words, the poorer a household, the more impatient they are and the more they
seek to avoid risk. This makes it difficult, if not impossible, for these households to
save and take the risks necessary to begin to accumulate capital. Therefore, the manner
in which individuals discount the future and make decisions that involve risks are
important for understanding behavior in developing countries.
The ‘vicious circle of poverty’ also has implications for the linkages between
poverty and the environment. People everywhere consume water, food, energy and
other natural resources in order to live, and these productive activities deplete the
same natural resources upon which people depend. This is particularly true for poor
communities in developing countries where livelihoods are often entirely dependent
upon the local environment. When basic needs cannot be met with resources derived
from the local environment, or when those resources are used in an unsustainable
manner, subsistence communities expand into other areas to meet their needs, often
drawing on those resources until they too are depleted. Thus the downward cycle
continues (WCED 1987; UNCED 1993; World Bank 1996). Furthermore, since the
poor are characterized as risk averse and impatient (meaning a short planning time
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horizon), they may be less likely to invest in conservation and new technologies to
protect their natural resource base (Mink 1993; Perring 1996).
Since Binswagner’s early use of experimental economics to capture risk
preferences in India in the 1980s and Pender’s work also in India in the late 1990s,
economists have been examining the correlation between poverty, risk and time
preferences. However, empirical evidence on whether individual time and risk
preferences vary with wealth has been inconclusive (Binswanger 1980; Pender 1996;
Cardenas and Carpenter 2008).2 Furthermore, most studies have focused on
correlations, with few aiming to identify the direction of causality (Tanaka, Camerer,
and Nguyen 2010). Is one impatient and risk averse because they are poor? Or is one
inhibited from escaping poverty because they are risk averse and impatient? As such,
there is a need to examine the direction of causality between wealth and risk and time
preferences. In this paper, we address the potential endogeneity of wealth and begin to
explore the direction of causality by using an instrumental variable for wealth.
We believe that this paper has several contributions. First, we add to the empirical
literature aimed at understanding the linkages between risk and time preferences and
poverty. Second, this is one of the few papers to examine risk preferences of rural
Chinese households (Liu 2008; Carlsson et al. 2009; Gong et al. 2010).3 Third, to our
knowledge, this is the first paper to measure time preferences of rural Chinese
households using field experiments with real monetary rewards.
Overall, we find that on average participants exhibited risk aversion, moderate loss
aversion and relatively low discount rates (i.e., patience). There is little evidence that
wealth, measured by net worth per capita, affects risk and loss aversion. However,
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there is weak evidence that households with more forest land per capita are less loss
averse. Also, we find weak evidence that net worth per capita has a negative
significant effect on the discount rate, indicating that households with higher net worth
per capita have lower discount rates (i.e., more patient).

2.3 Previous Literature: Methods and Findings
Over the last three decades researchers have used a variety methods to measure
both time and risk preferences. Binswagner (1980) was the first to use experimental
economic methods in the field to measure risk preferences. Binswagner used an
Ordered Lottery Selection design in which each participant is presented with a series
of lotteries. Participants are then asked to choose one lottery from the list. Each lottery
is determined by the toss of a fair coin. While the probability is a 50/50 chance, the
payouts in each lottery pair are varied. The variation in payoffs causes the expected
payoffs to vary. A participant should trade off expected return for less variability,
depending on how risk averse the participant is.
Since the 1980’s several other researchers have followed Binswagner’s Ordered
Lottery Selection design to elicit risk preference measures from rural households in
developing countries (e.g., Nielsen (2001) in Madagascar; Barr (2003) in Zimbabwe;
Yesuf and Bluffstone (2009) in Ethiopia, etc.), while others have used the
Accept/Reject Lotteries experiment methods of Holt and Laury (2002) (e.g., Liu
(2008) and Gong et al. (2010) in China, Tanaka et al. (2010) in Vietnam).4 In an
Accept/Reject Lotteries design, participants are given an ordered array of binary
lottery choices to make. The lotteries are presented in two columns. Initially, the first
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column has a higher expected payoff and variance in payoffs but eventually as the
probability of the high payoff in the second column increases, the expected value of
the second column becomes higher than the expected value of the first column. More
risk averse individuals will choose the first column for longer. After all choices have
been made, typically one row is randomly chosen for play and payment is made
depending on the participants choice on that row.
Contrary to the ideas of Lipton (1968) and others that risk aversion would
increase with poverty, Binswanger found no statistically significant correlation
between wealth and risk aversion. However, results of empirical studies after
Binswanger have been mixed. In these studies, researchers have typically used either
wealth or income (or in some cases both) as an indicator of poverty, and a variety of
assets have been used in these studies to proxy for wealth. For example, Binswanger
(1980) uses total gross sales value of a household’s physical assets, whereas, Nielsen
(2001) and Yesuf and Bluffstone (2009) use a variety of livestock measures (such as
number of oxen or changes in cattle holdings) to proxy for wealth (and poverty).
Similar to Binswagner (1980), Mosley and Verschoor (2005) and Liu (2008) found no
significant correlation between wealth and risk aversion. Also, Mosley and Verschoor
(2005) and Tanaka et al. (2010) found that household income is not significantly
correlated with risk aversion. However, Tanaka et al. (2010) found that mean village
income had a significant negative relationship with risk aversion, indicating that
households living in wealthy villages are less risk averse. Yesuf and Bluffstone (2009)
found a significant positive relationship between income and risk aversion, while
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Neilson (2001) and Wik (2004) found a significant negative relationship between
income and risk aversion.5
While many researchers have explored the correlation between poverty and risk
aversion, few have examined the relationship between poverty and loss aversion (Liu
2008; Tanaka et al. 2010). In expected utility theory, risk attitudes are solely described
by the degree of risk aversion (the concavity of the utility function). Prospect theory
allows for a broader description of risk attitudes by allowing for the possibility that
individuals may be loss averse. Loss aversion refers to an individual’s tendency to
strongly prefer avoiding losses to acquiring gain, and describes the curvature of an
individual’s value function above zero relative to the curvature of the value function
below zero (Kahneman and Tversky 1979). In China, Liu (2008) found that wealth is
not significantly correlated with loss aversion. Similarly, Tanaka et al. (2010) found in
Vietnam that household income is not significantly correlated with loss aversion but
that mean village income is highly correlated with loss aversion, indicating that
households in poorer villages are more loss averse.
Time preference and poverty
Over the last three decades, researchers have also endeavored to measure time
preferences by estimating a discount rate. Some discount rates have been derived from
“real-world” behaviors while others have been derived from experimental elicitation
procedures. Some questions were hypothetical, while others involved real monetary
rewards. Furthermore, a variety of different protocols have been used to conduct time
preference experiments, making it difficult for comparison across studies. Here we
will only review findings from those studies most relevant to examining the
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relationship between time preferences and poverty in developing countries.6 For a
complete review of this literature see Frederick, Loewenstien and O’Donoghue
(2002).
As with the relationship between risk preferences and poverty, empirical finding
related to the relationship between time preferences and poverty have also been mixed.
Again, as indicators of poverty, studies have used either wealth or income, or in some
cases both.7 Most studies use exponential discounting, however this model often does
not fit experimental and field data well (Frederick et al. 2002). Pender (1996) found
weak evidence in India that wealthier respondents had lower discount rates. Also,
Neilsen (2001) in Madagascar and Yesuf and Bluffstone (2008) and Holden, Shiferaw,
and Wik (1998) in Ethiopia both found that wealthier households had significantly
lower discount rates, indicating that the poorer a household is, the more impatient they
are. However, Bauer, Chytilová, and Morduch (2010) and Kirby et al. (2002) found
that wealth was not correlated with the discount rate in India and Bolivia, respectively.
Findings in studies that use income rather than wealth as an indicator of poverty
are also mixed. Tanaka et al. (2010) in Vietnam found that both households with
higher income and households that live in villages with higher mean incomes have
significantly lower discount rates. Kirby et al. (2002) and Gunatilake,
Wickramasinghe, and Abeygunawardena (2007) also find a negative significant
relationship between income and the discount rate in Bolivia and Sri Lanka,
respectively. However, Nielsen (2001), Anderson et al. (2004), and Bauer and
Chytilová (2008) found that there was no statistically significant relationship between
income and time preferences.
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2.4 Survey Procedure and Data Description

The household and village survey, as well as the risk and time preference field
experiments were conducted in late July and early August of 2009. The household
data set contains year 2008 data for 104 households spanning two counties, Sanming
City and Datian County, and 10 villages located in the northwest area of Fujian
Province. The data is part of a larger panel data set collected in 2006 (for the years
2000 and 2005) by a research team from Peking University, Gothenberg University
and Forest Trends. In 2006, the survey team completed a survey in three townships,
each with two villages and ten households in each village—for a total of 600
households. At that time, data was collected for the years 2000 and 2005. In 2009, two
of the twelve counties were randomly chosen and efforts were made to conduct a
follow-up survey with the 120 households in those counties that had been included in
the previous survey.
During the 2009 follow-up survey, 104 of the 120 households from the previous
survey were located. These 104 households were asked to complete the survey and to
participate in two decision-making tasks (the risk and time preference experiments)
during which they could earn a real monetary payoff. All subjects completed the
survey but one subject choose not to participate in the decision-making tasks due to
lack of time. Each subject was paid 15 yuan compensation to complete the survey plus
its earning in the decision-making tasks.8
Enumerators visited households in pairs on the first day and individually each day
after that. Each visit began with the enumerators interviewing the household to
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complete the household survey. When the survey was fifty percent complete, the risk
decision-making task was completed and the appropriate payoff for the risk task was
delivered. Then, the enumerator continued with the household survey. Following the
completion of the survey, the participant completed the time decision-making task. A
final short survey was conducted that included self-rating risk preference questions
and hypothetical time preference questions. In total, the survey and decision-making
tasks took between 3 and 4 hours to complete. The risk decision-making task took
between 45 minutes and 1 hour. The time decision-making task took a little less time,
on average between 30 and 45 minutes. During each decision-making task,
enumerators carefully explained the task instructions to the participants and were
instructed to only begin the task when they felt confident that the participant
understood. For those participants who were illiterate (27% of subjects), enumerators
read each choice in the decision task out loud to the participant, the participant stated
his or her answer, and the enumerator recorded the answer on the record sheet.
Sample description
The sample consisted of 103 individuals, of which 81 identified themselves as
head of household. These individuals most likely are those who are faced with day-today consumption and investment decisions over different time horizons and with
varying degrees of risk and who have the primary responsibility for sustaining the
household. Eighty-six percent of the subjects were male and 46% had worked off farm
during 2008 (table 2.1). The mean age was 51.5 year old, and on average subjects had
5.4 years of education. Average household size was 4.5 people, with a mean
dependency ratio (number of children divided by number of adults) of 0.15, which is
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indicative of China’s 1979 one child policy and the tradition that the oldest son and his
spouse are responsible for caring for elderly parents (Zhang and Goza 2006). The
typical household managed 0.07 hectares of farmland per capita and 0.59 hectares
forest land per capita.
We are primarily interested in the relationship between poverty and risk and time
preferences. As a proxy for poverty, we choose to examine household wealth levels, as
measured by net worth per capita, defined as total assets minus liabilities. Household
assets include: the value of the household’s house, consumptive assets, productive
assets, and livestock; savings held in bank accounts; loans provided to others; and
other investments and deposits. Note that a real housing market does not exist in rural
China and that house values are those estimated by the interviewee, rather than the
market price. Household liabilities include both productive and non-productive loans.
The mean net worth per capita in 2008 was 25936 yuan (table 2.2), approximately
USD $3373. House value constitutes the largest share of household wealth. This is not
surprising, as it is common for households in China to spend a large share of their
income on their homes (McKinley and Wang 1992; Wu 1997). Culturally, the idea of
“face” (or honor) is very important in the Chinese culture. In rural Chinese villages,
the family home, which is visible to the local villagers, is an important signal of
wealth. The home plays an important role for the person who is concerned with face.
A person can gain more face by having a beautiful house (Carlsson and Qin 2010). In
our empirical work, we will use net worth per capita to measure household wealth.
Furthermore, we use both forest land per capita and sub-categories of net worth to
check the robustness of our results.
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Risk Experiment Design
To elicit a measure of risk preference, we follow the experimental design
developed by Tanaka et al. (2010), who expands the classic Accept/Reject Lotteries of
Holt and Laury (2002) to incorporate prospect theory. Following, Tanaka et al. (2010)
we use cumulative prospect theory and a non-linear probability weighting measure
extended from the one-parameter form of Drazen Prelec’s axiomatically-derived
weighting function (Kahneman and Tversky 1979; Tversky and Kahneman 1992;
Prelec 1998). We assume a utility function of the following form:
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U(x,p; y,q) denotes the expected prospect value over binary prospects consisting of the
outcomes x and y with the probability of p and q, respectively. The function v(x)
denotes a power value function.9 The parameter σ describes the curvature of an
individual’s value function. An individual’s risk preferences are described as risk
averse when σ > 0, risk neutral when σ = 0, and risk loving when σ < 0. The
parameter λ describes the curvature of an individual’s value function above zero
relative to the curvature of the value function below zero. The higher the value of λ,
the more loss averse the individual is. The parameter α is a non-linear probability
weighting measure, which is extended from a model by Prelec (1998). The function
π(p) weights the probabilities. When α <1, π(p) has an inverted S-shape, indicating
that an individual tends to overweight low probabilities and underweight high
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probabilities (Kahneman and Tversky 1979). This model reduces to expected utility
theory when α = 1 and λ=1.
In our experiment, participants were asked to choose between two sets of lottery
options. For example, Figure 1.1 illustrates one set of options that a subject was asked
to choose between. In this example, Option A offers a 30% chance of receiving 20
yuan and a 70% chance of receiving 5 yuan. Option B offers a 10% chance of
receiving 34 yuan and a 90% chance of receiving 2.5 yuan. A total of 35 choices,
divided between three series were asked. Monotonic switching was enforced, meaning
that once the subject switched to option B they were not allowed to switch back to
option A. 10 By enforcing monotonic switching, we eliminate the possibility of
inconsistent choices within each series and also make the task more clear and concise
for participants, as they only need to identify one switch point in each series.11 Once
the subject had completed the entire series of choices, one question was chosen
randomly for payoff. The choices in the risk experiment were designed so that any
combination of choices in the three series determine a particular combination of
prospect theory parameter values.
Table 2.3 shows the entire payoff matrix for the experiment. The payoffs range
from a loss of 10 yuan to a gain of 850 yuan.12 We use a relatively high maximum
payoff of 850 yuan, which is roughly half a months pay in rural China. The average
payoff in the risk experiment was 27 yuan (inclusive of the 10 yuan participation
compensation), which is roughly half a single days wage in the survey area in 2008.
In the payoff matrix note that at first, the first column (Option A) dominates the
second column (Option B) in terms of expected payoff and variance in the payoffs, but
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eventually, as the value of the high outcome in the second column increases, the
expected value of the second column begins to dominate (table 2.3). The more risk
averse individual would choose option A longer before switching to option B. The
point at which participants switch from option A to option B in series 1 and 2 allows
for the classification of an individual’s risk preferences as risk adverse, risk neutral or
risk seeking (the curvature of the value function) and to identify if the subject tends to
overweight low probabilities and underweight high probabilities (the non-linear
probability weighting parameter). The points at which participants switch from option
A to option B in series 1, 2 and 3, together allow for the identification of the loss
aversion parameter.13
Risk preferences description
In our sample, the average derived values for α and λ are 0.73 and 6.02,
respectively, and both are statistically different from 1 at the 1% significance level by
t-test. This implies that our experimental results reject expected utility theory in favor
of prospect theory’s inverted S-shaped probability weighting and loss aversion. The
average derived value of σ is 0.42, indicating on average rural individuals in China
exhibit risk aversion. For comparison to other studies, Liu (2008) in a sample of
Chinese farmers found values for (σ, α, λ) of (0.48, 0.69, 3.47) and Tanaka et al.
(2010) in a sample of Vietnamese farmers found values of (0.40, 0.75 and 3.0). The
values for σ and α across the studies are very similar; however, our value for λ is
approximately twice as much as the values in the previous comparable studies,
indicating that our sample exhibits on average a higher degree of loss aversion. Figure
1.2, Panel A, B and C illustrate the distribution of σ, α, λ, respectively. While the
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distributions for σ and α in Panel A and B exhibit a rather normal distribution, the
distribution for λ in Panel C is bimodal with a share of subjects exhibiting low degrees
of loss aversion and another share of subjects showing high degrees of loss aversion.
Comparability of self-rated risk survey questions
Dohmen et al. (2005) find that a general risk question can be used to predict actual
risk-taking behavior, while Liu (2008) find that self-reported risk attitude does not
predict risk aversion. Yesuf and Bluffstone (2009) find that risk aversion is lower
when the rewards are hypothetical rather than real. To further investigate the
comparability of self-rated risk questions to risk preference measures from field
experiments with monetary rewards, we also asked participants two questions to allow
the participants to self-rate their risk preferences. The first question was “How do you
see yourself: Are you generally a person who is fully prepared to take risks or do you
try to avoid taking risks?” Participants were asked to circle a number on a scale of 0 to
10, where the value 0 indicates that you are unwilling to take risks and the value 10
means that you are fully prepared to take risks. While the first question was asked
about taking risks in general, the second question was more specific, asking about
taking risks in investment, such as in agricultural investment.
Figure 2.1, a box plot of the quartile level of the risk aversion parameter given the
level of self-rated risk aversion in each of these two questions, shows that the selfreported risk aversion levels are noisy measures. Simple regressions using self-rated
risk aversion (general) as the independent variable and risk aversion as measured in
the experiments as the dependent variable, reveal that the self-rated risk aversion
predicts the experiment risk aversion measure at a 5% significance level. However, the
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self-rated risk aversion in the context of taking risks in investment is not correlated
with the experiment risk aversion measure.
Time Preference Experimental Design
There are several competing models for time discounting that have received a
significant amount of attention in both experimental psychology (e.g., de Villiers and
Herrnstein (1976), Ainslie and Haslam (1992), etc.) and behavioral economics (e.g.,
Laisbons (1997), Lowenstein and Prelec (1992), O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999).14 The
competing models were developed to account for observed behavioral regularities that
are not consistent with the classic exponential discounting model. For example, the
most common documented behavioral regularity is called “reversal of preferences”. It
occurs, for example, when a subject prefers $10 now rather than $12 in one day, but
also prefers $12 in a year plus a day rather than $10 in a year. This type of preference
is not consistent with exponential discounting but would be consistent with a rate of
time preference that declines with time. There are a variety of specifications of
discounting with this property of rates of time preference that decline with time, most
notably hyperbolic discounting and quasi-hyperbolic discounting.
Our time experiment design follows procedures similar to those originally
developed by Coller and Williams (1999) and Harrison, Lau and Williams (2002). The
data are then used to estimate three parameters—the conventional time discounting
parameter (r), present-bias (β), and hyperbolicity of the discount function (θ)— in a
general time discounting model using nonlinear least-squares, which allows us to test
which discounting model fits the data best—exponential, hyperbolic, quasi-hyperbolic,
or a more general form (Benhabib, Bisin, and Schotter 2007; Tanaka et al. 2010).15
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In the time preference experiment subjects were asked to choose between, for
example, a real monetary payoff today or a larger payoff six months from now. The
hypothetical bias typically found in earlier time preference studies is addressed here
because participants received a real monetary payment based on their choices. Choices
were always posed as a choice between a monetary payoff today or a larger monetary
payoff in the future.16
To ensure the credibility of a future payment, subjects were told that the future
payments would be delivered by China Post, which is the official postal service of the
Peoples Republic of China, an agency with which rural households are very familiar
and comfortable using for the delivery of money. Furthermore, we believed the
credibility problem to be minimal because our participants were part of a panel survey
and this was the second time that the household had been visited by a research team
from Peking University. Repeat visits by our research team built trust and reassurance
with the participants.
Following the experimental design of Tanaka et al. (2010), the subjects were asked
a total of 75 questions divided into 15 series of 5 questions each.17 A single series of
questions is depicted in Figure 1.3. In this example, the subject was asked to choose
Plan A or Plan B for each of the 5 questions. Plan A, the future payoff plan remained
the same for each question in the series, while the immediate option increased as the
subject moved down the column from 25 yuan to 125 yuan, at 1/6 increments of the
future payoff. As in the risk experiment, monotonic switching within each series was
also enforced here. The point at which an individual switches from choosing the more
immediate reward to taking the delayed reward provides a bound on his or her
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discount rate. The discount rate indicates the rate that would make a person indifferent
between the immediate and the delayed reward. An individual with a high discount
rate has a preference for the present, whereas an individual with a low discount rate
has a preference for the future.
We used 15 combinations of future payoff and time in the experiments; that is 15,
60 and 150 yuan with delays of 2 weeks, 3 months and 6 months and 30 and 120 yuan
with delays of 1 week, 2 months and 4 months.18 For each future payoff-time
combination, we asked 5 questions, with the immediate payoff equal to 1/6, 1/3, 1/2,
2/3 and 5/6 of the future payoff in the 5 question series. Once the subject had
completed all 75 questions, one question was randomly chosen for payment. The
subject’s choices on the selected question, determined how much money and when it
was to be delivered. The average payoff in the time experiment was 59 yuan. Fiftyeight of the subjects received payment immediately, while 45 subjects received a
future payment. The average wait time for future payments was 68 days.
Time Preferences Description
Table 1.4 compares the aggregate results of the estimations. Estimating the full
model with unrestricted θ gives a relatively high value of θ=5.16, which is similar to
Tanaka et al.’s (2010) estimate of θ=5.07, and influences the estimates of r and β but
does not improve the R2 compared with estimations from the quasi-hyperbolic model.
While quasi-hyperbolic discounting model seems to fit the aggregate sample best, at
the individual level the quasi-hyperbolic model has convergence problems for 32
subjects (31% of our sample), whereas there are no convergence problems for the
exponential and hyperbolic models when estimating each subject’s risk parameters.
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Therefore, we focus on the estimates from the hyperbolic model and use those
parameters to represent the time preference of each household in our empirical model.
The estimated values of r is 0.018. Since the delay is measured in days, the hyperbolic
discounting parameter, multiplied by 100, can approximately be interpreted as
expressing the percent decrease per day. It is an approximation because for a
hyperbolic function the percent decrease gets smaller as the delay increases. On
average, we find (based on the hyperbolic model estimates) that a subject would be
willing to trade 89 yuan today for 100 in 1 week, 65 yuan today for 100 yuan in 1
month, and 24 yuan today for 100 yuan in 6 months.
Figure 1.4 depicts the distribution of the hyperbolic discounting parameter, from
our experiment. Surprisingly, the figure shows that the hyperbolic time preference
parameter was relatively low for the majority of our subject, indicating that they have
a relatively weak preference for income today.
Comparability of hypothetical time preference questions
Several experimenters have compared discount rates derived from questions
with hypothetical and real rewards. Johnson and Bickel (2002), Madden et al. (2003),
Hamoudi and Thomas (2006) did not find differences between hypothetical and real
rewards in their experiments. However, Kirby and Marakovic (1996) and Coller and
Williams (1999) found that hypothetical choices resulted in lower discount rates than
real choices. To further examine the comparability of discount rates estimated from
experiments with real monetary rewards to those with hypothetical rewards, we asked
participants two hypothetical contextualized time preference questions. Specifically,
we asked subjects:
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Imagine that you were given 10 yuan and told that you can use it to buy two
types of tree seedling to plant on your forest plot. Imagine that your plot
currently has no trees growing on it. Type 1 tree seedling costs 1 yuan and will
grow into a tree that can be harvested and sold for 10 yuan in 5 years. Type 2
tree seedling costs 1 yuan each and will grow into a tree that can be harvested
and sold for 30 yuan in 10 years. How much of the 10 yuan would you like to
invest in Type 1 tree seedling? How much of the 10 yuan would you like to
invest in Type 2 tree seedling?
The mean investment in Type 1 trees (faster growing, lower return species) was 4
yuan, and in type 2 trees (slower growing, higher return species) was 6 yuan. Figure
2.2 shows a box plot of the quartile level of the hyperbolic time discounting parameter
given the level of investment in the Type 2 tree (slower growing, higher return
species). The hypothetical parameter is a rather noisy parameter, although there is a
similar pattern to the distribution of the time preference parameter (Figure 2.2). A
regression with the hyperbolic discounting parameter as the independent variable and
the investment in the type 2 tree (slower growing, higher return species) as the
dependent variable indicates that investment in type 2 tree is negatively correlated
with the experimental hyperbolic time discounting parameter, indicating that higher
investment in the slower growing, higher return species is correlated with individuals
who displayed a lower discount rate (i.e., more patient) in the time preference
experiment. However, the coefficient on investment in type 1 trees in not significant
(t=1.62).

2.5 Correlations
We begin our empirical analysis of the determinants of risk and time preferences
by estimating ordinary least squares regressions for the risk aversion, loss aversion and
hyperbolic time discounting parameter. In each regression, we include individual and
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household level characteristics. At the individual level, we control for the subjects
gender, age and whether or not the subject has off farm employment. At the household
level, we include net worth per capita (1000s of yuan), which is the variable of
interest. We also control for household size, a dependency ratio that equals the number
of children divided by the number of adults, the number of household members who
work and the distance to both the post office and county seat.
Additionally, in the regressions where the dependent variable is the hyperbolic
time discounting parameter we include two additional control variables: the subject’s
degree of risk aversion as measured from our risk decision-making task and the
subject’s earnings in the risk preference experiment. Participants were told that future
payments in the time decision-making task would be delivered via China Post. If risk
averse participants viewed receiving the future payments in the time decision-making
task as “risky”, then their risk aversion may impact their decisions in the time task;
that is risk averse participants may choose the immediate reward, which they view as
“safer”. To control for this potential bias, we include risk aversion in the regressions
where time preference is the dependent variable. If this was a potential source of bias
in the time decision-making task, then we would expect to find a significant positive
relationship between risk aversion and the time discounting parameter. In addition,
earnings from the risk decision-making task were distributed to the participant prior to
their participation in the time decision-making task. We might expect that higher
earnings in the risk decision-making task might influence decisions in the time
decision-making task. Individuals with higher earnings in the risk decision-making
task may exhibit more patience in the time decision-making task (choosing the larger
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future reward more often than they would have if they had not just received a sum of
money). To control for this potential bias, we include the earnings in the risk
experiment in the regressions where the dependent variable is the time preference
parameter. If this is a source of bias, we would expect to see a significant negative
relationship between the two variables.
We also estimate each model with township fixed effects to control for
unobservable factors that may be correlated with an individual’s risk and time
preferences, such as access to formal credit and insurance markets.
Correlations with risk preferences
Interestingly, we do not find a statistically significant correlation between any of
the characteristics and risk aversion (table 2.4, columns 1 and 2). However, we do find
a statistically significant negative correlation between net worth per capita and loss
aversion (table 2.4, columns 3 and 4). This indicates that wealthy individuals are less
loss averse. Also, we find a significant negative relationship between loss aversion and
the dependency ratio, indicating that those from households with a higher dependency
ratio (relatively more children than adults) tend to be less loss averse.
Correlations with time preferences
We find a significant negative correlation between net worth per capita and the
discount rate, indicating that poorer individuals have a higher discount rates (i.e., more
impatient) (table 2.5). Additionally, we find a significant positive relationship between
the discount rate and both age and off farm employment. Those individuals who are
older or who have off farm employment tend to have higher discount rates (i.e.,
impatient). There is also weak evidence that the discount rate is positively correlated
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with years of education and the number of household members who work, indicating
that more education and more workers in a household are associated with higher
discount rates.
Consistent with previous studies (Holden et al. 1998; Nielsen 2001; Gunatilake et
al. 2007; Yesuf and Bluffstone 2008), there is weak evidence that more risk averse
individuals have higher discount rates. Earnings from the risk experiment were not
significantly correlated with the time preference parameter, indicating that choices in
the time preference decision-making task were not influenced by earnings in the
previous risk preference decision-making task.

2.6 Instrumental Variable for Wealth

While we find that low levels of wealth are associated with higher levels of loss
aversion and impatience, we cannot conclude that wealth causes these preferences
because of the endogeneity of wealth. Unobservable or omitted variables that affect
wealth may also affect a household’s risk and time preferences, making the estimated
coefficient on net worth per capita biased. For example, if an individual’s profession is
risky (such as mining), then the individual may be wealthier (assuming higher pay for
higher risk work) and also being in such a risky environment may decrease their risk
aversion (growing more comfortable with taking risks). In this case, the profession
affects both the risk preferences and wealth, and we would falsely attribute decreases
in risk aversion to increases in wealth, when in fact it was the individual growing more
comfortable taking risks due to employment as a miner, which was causing a decline
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in their aversion to risk. In this case, the coefficient on wealth would be biased
upward.
To address potential endogeneity of wealth and omitted variables bias, we use an
instrumental variable approach.19 Instrumental variable estimation solves the omitted
variable problem by using only part of the variability in the endogenous variable that
that is uncorrelated with the omitted variables to estimate the relationship between the
endogenous regressor, wealth, and the dependent variable (Angrist and Krueger 2001).
Following Godoy et al. (2009), we use households’ wealth rank in the village as an
exogenous instrumental variable for wealth. Specifically, we assign a value of 1 to the
household with the highest net worth per capita in a village. The rank of each other
household in the village is expressed as a share of the net worth per capita of the
wealthiest household in the village. For example, if a village had 3 households, one
household with a net worth per capita of i.) 200000 yuan (the richest household); ii)
100000 yuan (second richest household); and iii.) 40000 yuan (the poorest household),
then the three households would have the following ranks: i.) 1 (200000/200000), ii.)
0.5 (100000/200000), and iii.) 0.2 (40000/200000). We calculate households’ wealth
rank in the village for each household in each of the survey years.
Households’ rank in the village according to net worth per capita is highly
correlated with net worth per capita but is not directly correlated with the risk and time
preference parameters. Risk and time preferences could only influence household rank
in net worth through households’ net worth per capita. Furthermore, rank is not a
variable over which a household has control and therefore is exogenous to the
household. A household might decide that it wants to change its wealth rank in the
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village by increasing its net worth but a household’s final rank in the village will
depend on the decisions of other households over which this household has no control.
We conduct tests to validate the use of households’ net worth per capita rank in the
village as an instrumental variable for household net worth per capita. An instrumental
variable should be highly correlated with the endogenous regressor (Angrist and
Krueger 2001). We find that this condition is supported by the results from the first
stage regression, in which the instrumental variable shows strong and statistically
significant correlation with net worth per capita in each model (appendix tables 2.4
and 2.5). Second, we compute an F statistic to test the null hypothesis that the
coefficient on the instrumental variable is equal to zero in the first stage regression. A
general rule of rule of thumb is that if the F statistic value is greater than 10, then the
instruments do not seem to be weak. In our case, this is a test on net worth per capita
rank in the village, and the F statistics equals 27.45 in the first stage of the risk and
loss aversion structural models and 25.81 in the first stage of the hyperbolic
discounting model. From these tests, we conclude that households’ net worth per
capita rank in the village is a valid instrumental variable for net worth per capita.

2.7 Empirical Results
When we use the instrumental variable approach in 2SLS, the effect of net worth
per capita on risk aversion remains insignificant, consistent with the OLS estimate
(table 2.6, columns 1 and 2). In contrast, the effect of net worth per capita on loss
aversion, which was negative and significant in the OLS regressions, becomes
insignificant (table 2.6, columns 3 and 4). This indicates that after addressing the
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endogeneity of wealth problem by using an instrumental variable approach, wealth no
longer has a statistically significant relationship with risk or loss aversion. Our result
that wealth is not correlated with risk aversion is consistent with the classic results of
Binswanger (1980) and with the more recent results of Tanaka et al. (2010) who also
uses an instrumental variable approach to deal with the endogeneity problem. The
result that loss aversion is not correlated with household wealth is also consistent with
previous findings by Liu (2008) and Tanaka et al. (2010) in China and Vietnam,
respectively.
We find weak evidence that net worth per capita has a negative significant effect
on the discount rate, indicating that households with higher net worth per capita have
lower discount rates (i.e., more patient, table 2.7). When we use the instrumental
variables approach in 2SLS, the effect of net worth per capita on the hyperbolic
discounting parameter remains negative; however, the statistical significance of the
coefficient on net worth per capita falls to the 10% level in the model without
township fixed effects and the 15% level when we use township fixed effects. This
result, although weaker, is consistent with the findings in earlier studies that do not
address the endogeneity of wealth or income (Pender 1996; Holden et al.1998; Nielsen
2001; Gunatilake et al. 2007; Yesuf and Bluffstone 2008), as well as with the findings
of Tanaka et al. (2010), who uses an instrumental variable approach to deal with the
problem of income endogeneity. These results are contrary to Bauer et al. (2010),
Kirby et al. (2002), Nielsen (2001), Anderson et al. (2004), and Bauer and Chytilová
(2008), all of whom do not find a significant relationship between wealth and time
preferences.
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Robustness Checks
As a robustness check, we examine alternative measures of wealth, including: 1)
forest land area per capita, 2) house value per capita, 3) assets per capita and 4)
liabilities per capita. House value, asset, and liabilities are sub-categories of the net
worth per capita measure. We use forest land per capita rather than total land per
capita or farm land per capita because we believe the former will be more indicative of
a household’s wealth than the later. This is because responsibility land, the main
tenure type of agricultural land in China, has traditionally been allocated on the basis
of the number of family members, the number of laborers in each family, or the desire
and/or ability of the household to engage in agricultural production, resulting in little
variation in agricultural land holdings across households (Brandt et al. 2002).
However, during the recent 2003 forest tenure reform the method of allocation was
decided on by farmers through their voting representatives on village committees. This
resulted in greater variance in forest land holdings per capita, making forest land area
per capita a potentially better proxy for household wealth than agricultural land area
per capita.20
We find again that each of these alternative proxies for wealth is not correlated
with risk aversion, and this result remains even after addressing the endogeneity of
wealth with respective instrumental variables (table 2.8). In agreement with our main
result that there is no significant relationship between net worth per capita and risk or
loss aversion, we find that there is no evidence that house value, assets or liabilities
per capita affects risk or loss aversion (table 2.8 and 2.9, rows 2 to 4). However, we
find that there is a negative relationship between forest land per capita and loss
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aversion, and this result is statistically significant at the 1% level in three of the four
models (table 2.9, row 1). This indicates that wealth in the form of forest land per
capita effects loss aversion. This may indicate that increases in forest land per capita
decrease loss aversion, although we should be careful not to put too much weight to
the direction of causality in a cross-sectional study like this one, as it hinges on the
validity of our choice of an instrument variable for wealth.
With regards to the relationship between wealth and time preferences, robustness
checks indicate that house value, assets, and forest land per capita each have a
significant negative relationship with the discounting parameter, however, in the
instrumental variable approach in 2SLS and control for township fixed effects each of
these wealth categories becomes insignificant (table 2.10).
We also check the robustness of our results to the statistical significance of the
individual hyperbolic discounting parameters. When we estimate the hyperbolic
discounting parameter for each individual in the sample, only 41 subjects have an
estimated parameter that is statistically significant between the 1% and 10% level.
Using only those subjects that had a statistically significant hyperbolic discounting
parameter, we estimate the regressions in tables 2.5 and 2.7 again. These results (table
2.11) are consistent with the main results. Again, we find a statistically significant
negative relationship between net worth per capita and the discount rate when using
OLS. However, when we use the instrumental variable approach in 2SLS and control
for township fixed effects, the significance level falls to 12%, indicating that there is
only weak evidence that an increase in net worth per capita makes individuals more
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patient (i.e., lower discount rate). This finding concurs with the classic assumption that
households with low wealth have high discount rates (i.e., more impatient).

2.8 Conclusion

In this paper we investigate the correlation between poverty and individual
preferences for time and risk. Specifically, we use field experiment data collected in
Fujian, China to measure the time and risk preferences of 103 rural households
combined with household survey data to examine the correlation between risk and
time preferences and wealth. We find little evidence that wealth is correlated with risk
aversion and loss aversion, however there is evidence that wealth is correlated with
time preferences. Ordinary least squares regressions indicated that those who have a
lower net worth per capita, lower house value per capita, or lower forest land per
capita (poorer) tend to be more loss averse, as well as exhibit a higher discount rate
(i.e., impatient). Those with lower assets per capita (poorer) also exhibit significantly
more impatience.
To address the problem of endogeneity of wealth, we use households’ net worth
rank within their village as an instrumental variable for net worth. When we use the
instrumental variable in 2SLS, we find that the wealth proxy variables no longer have
a statistically significant effect on risk and loss aversion with the one exception that
households with more forest land per capita are less loss averse. This suggests that
forest land plays a significant role as a safety net for negative shocks. When a
household experiences a negative shock, a household with more forest land per capita
may be able to recover more quickly by harvesting from its forest land. Knowing that
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they have this safety net, a household may be less averse to loss. We find weak
evidence that net worth per capita has a negative significant effect on the discount rate,
indicating that households with higher net worth per capita have lower discount rates
(i.e., more patient). However, caution should be taken in concluding the direction of
causality in a cross-sectional study like this one, as it depends on the validity of our
choice of instrumental variable for wealth. To better identify the direction causality
between poverty and time and risk preferences, future research on this topic should
include collecting a panel data set that includes both household characteristics and
time and risk preference experiment data for multiple years, so that changes in wealth
and time and risk preferences overtime can be examined.
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Endnotes
1

China participated in the International Comparison Program (ICP) for this first time

in 2005. The ICP collects data across countries on the prices of an internationally
comparable list of goods and services, in 2005. The ICP is used to derive Purchasing
Power Parity (PPP) rate, which is the basis for the international poverty line. Based on
this new data, Chen and Ravallion (2008) find a substantially higher poverty rate for
China than past estimates. Using an international poverty line of $1.25 at 2005 PPP,
Chen and Ravallion estimate that 15% of the population was living in consumption
poverty in 2005. While this implies that about 130 million more people in poverty by
the new standard, the new ICP data also suggest an even larger reduction in the
number of poor since 1981.
2

See Cardenas and Carpenter (2008) for a review of the literature.

3

Kachelmeir and Shehata (1992) examined risk preferences of college students at

Beijing University, as well as at both a Canadian and American university.
4

See appendix table 2.7 for a review of risk preference elicitation in developing

countries.
5

See appendix table 2.8 for a review of previous findings on the relationship between

poverty and risk preferences.
6

See appendix table 2.9 for a review of time preference elicitation in developing

countries.
7

See appendix table 2.10 for a review of previous findings on the relationship between

poverty and time preferences.
8

1 USD ≈ 6.83 yuan (August 1, 2009).
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9

In Tanaka et al. (2010), the value function has the form: v(x)=xσ for x>0 and v(x)=-

λ(-x)σ. For ease of comparison with respect to the conventional form of expected
utility under constant relative risk aversion, where u(x)=x1-σ /(1-σ), Liu (2008) rewrites
the value function as v(x)=x1-σ. We follow Liu’s choice of value function for ease of
understanding.
10

Three examples were given in the instructions to help ensure that the subjects did

not feel that they must make a switch within the series. In one example, the subject
never switches to option B. In another example, the subject switches to option B at
question 7. And in a third example, the subject switches to option B at question 1.
11

Inconsistent choices within series of questions (in both risk and time preference

experiments of the type reported on in this paper) are problematic for identifying
parameters when structures are imposed on the subject’s responses but the theory
underlying those structures does not justify the subject’s responses. In risk and time
preference experiments, where subjects have been allowed to switch back and forth
between A and B, often only a small percentage of individuals do so. Using
experiments where in some rounds subjects are given an added option of indicating
indifference between option A and B, researchers have found that subjects who switch
back and forth between option A and B are not actually making inconsistent choices
but rather the subjects are expressing their indifference over a range of choices (Holt
and Laury 2002; Andersen et al. 2006). In our experiments, we follow the methods of
Tanaka et al. (2010) and Liu (2008), both of whom enforce mono-tonic switching.
12

Note that in the risk experiment is possible for the subject to lose up to 10 yuan.

However, it would be unethical to ask rural households who participate in the
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experiment to pay us if they incur the loss. To address this issue at the beginning of
the game we announce that there will be participation compensation of 10 yuan (which
is equivalent to the highest possible loss in the risk experiment). Liu et al. (2008)
follows a similar strategy to ensure the subjects are treated ethically. While Camerer
(2000) suggests that losses that are in fact net gains may be treated differently from
real losses, we believe that because the 10 yuan participation fee was pointed out at
the very beginning of the experiment, 30-45 minutes later when the subject got to
Series 3 the individual would not consider the 10 yuan as a windfall but rather earning
they had made for participating, and therefore treat the possible losses in the
experiment as true losses.
13

The risk preference parameter estimation methods are detailed in appendix 2.

14

For a critical review of time discounting and time preference see Frederick,

Loewenstein, and O’Donoghue (2002).
15

Benhabib et al.’s (2007) model is detailed in appendix 2, as well as the time

preference parameter estimation procedure.
16

Our design differs from the time preference experiments of Coller and Williams

(1999) and Harrison et al. (2002) in that we do not frame the choices with a front-end
delay. An example of using a front-end delay, is a choice between money one month
from today and more money seven months from now, rather than asking participants
to choose between money today and more money six months from now, as we did. A
front-end delay is used in time preference experiments to control (at least partially) for
the credibility problem. The credibility problem is that participants may not believe
that they will receive future payments, and therefore; will be biased toward choosing
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the immediate payoff. However, in much of the behavior economics literature, a
significant proportion of the action seems to revolve around payoffs that are truly
immediate versus payoffs that are not immediate (Frederick, Loewenstein, and
O’Donoghue 2002). By using a front-end delay, we would lose information about how
individuals treat choices between payoffs that are truly immediate versus payoffs that
are not immediate. Ideally, to address the credibility problem, while still having a way
to capture the information about choices between immediate payoffs and future
payoffs, an experimental design would include both questions with and without frontend delays. Due to time constraints, in that participants may become exhausted with
too many questions, we choose to only use questions without a front-end delay.
17

The entire set of payoff-time combinations that were used in the experiment are

displayed in appendix table 2.4.
18

The 15 combinations of future payoff and time as described in the text were used in

9 of the 10 villages. In the first village, we used the same payoffs but shorter
timeframes. Specifically, in the first village we used payoffs of 15, 60 and 150 yuan
with delays of 1 week, 1 month, and 3 months and 30 and 120 yuan with delays of 1
week, 2 weeks and 2 months. In the first village, 5 out of 10 households always choose
the future payoff. We thought that this high degree of preference for the future
amongst the households might be due to the timeframes being to short, and so in the
remaining villages we increased the timeframes.
19

We use the Durbin-Wu-Hausmann (DWH) test as detailed in Cameron and Trivedi

(2009) to test the exogeneity of net worth per capita. To do so, we estimated a
regression with net worth per capita as the dependent variable. The explanatory
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variables included households’ net worth rank per capita in the village (the
instrumental variable) and all of the other control variables as in table 2.5, column 1
and 3 (for risk aversion and loss aversion) and table 2.6, column 1 (for the hyperbolic
discounting parameter). From each of those regressions, we obtain the predicted
residual, and use them to run the regression as reported for risk aversion and loss
aversion (table 2.5, column 1) and for the hyperbolic discounting parameter (table 2.6,
column 1) but add the residual as an additional explanatory variable. In all three cases,
we cannot reject the null hypothesis that household net worth per capita is exogenous
(the robustified DWH test statistic is 1.32, 1.24 and 0.67 when the dependent variable
is risk aversion, loss aversion and the hyperbolic discounting parameter, respectively).
20

This is a result of the 1989 Village Self-Governance Law, under which decisions on

village affairs should be made by farmers through voting. Furthermore, provincial
decrees stated that decisions regarding forest land reallocation should be made by
village representative committees or by village assemblies required a 2/3 vote
majority.
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Table 2.1 Descriptive statistics (2008)
Variable
Risk aversion

Mean
0.42
(0.35)
Loss aversion
6.02
(6.67)
Probability weighting parameter
0.73
(0.29)
Hyperbolic discounting parameter
0.13
(0.24)
Male
0.86
(0.34)
Education (years)
5.36
(3.54)
Age (years)
51.47
(12.12)
Had off farm work (1=yes; 0=no)
0.46
(0.50)
Household size
4.53
(1.88)
Dependency Ratio: Number of children/number of adults
0.15
(0.26)
Number in household who work
3.19
(1.51)
Farm land per capita (hectares)
0.07
(.084)
Forest land per capita (hectares)
0.59
(1.14)
Distance to post office (km)
7.58
(7.22)
Distance to county seat (km)
37.36
(22.97)
Note: Standard deviations in parentheses. For all variables except farm land
per capita n=103. For farm land per capita n=102 because one subject did
not know the area of the household’s farm land.
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Table 2.2 Household wealth composition (2008)

Obs.

Mean

Std.
Dev.

94
103
71
82
18
9
2

23146
946
876
1487
6881
3572
1500

45239
1171
4979
6773
8802
2698
707

200
7
4
4
37
150
1000

250833
8240
42033
50002
30000
6667
2000

Liabilities
Productive loans
Non-productive loans

9
21

4531
4899

4322
5433

500
333

12500
20000

Net worth = Assets - Liabilities

96

25936

47029

-9785

251808

Variable
Assets
House value
Consumptive assets
Livestock
Productive assets
Savings in the bank
Loans provided to others
Other investments/deposits

Min

Max

Note: This table displays conditional means. All values are measured in yuan per
capita. For net worth per capita, n=96 because seven subjects did not know the value
of their household’s house. 1 USD = 6.94 yuan (Average for the year 2008.)
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Table 2.3 Payoff matrix for risk experiment

Series 1
Probability

Series 2
Probability

Option A
30%
70%
20
5
20
5
20
5
20
5
20
5
20
5
20
5
20
5
20
5
20
5
20
5
20
5
20
5
20
5

Option B
90%
10%
2.5
34.0
2.5
37.5
2.5
41.5
2.5
46.5
2.5
53.0
2.5
62.5
2.5
75.0
2.5
92.5
2.5
110.0
2.5
150.0
2.5
200.0
2.5
300.0
2.5
500.0
2.5
850.0

90%
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
20

30%
2.5
2.5
2.5
2.5
2.5
2.5
2.5
2.5
2.5
2.5
2.5
2.5
2.5
2.5

10%
15
15
15
15
15
15
15
15
15
15
15
15
15
15

70%
27
28.0
29.0
30.0
31.0
32.5
34.0
36.0
38.5
41.5
45.0
50.0
55.0
65.0

Expected
payoff
difference
(A-B)
3.85
3.50
3.10
2.60
1.95
1.00
-0.25
-2.00
-3.75
-7.75
-12.75
-22.75
-42.75
-77.75

-0.15
-0.85
-1.55
-2.25
-2.95
-4.00
-5.05
-6.45
-8.20
-10.30
-12.75
-16.25
-19.75
-26.75

Table continued on the next page.
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Table 2.3 [continued] Payoff matrix for risk experiment

Series 3
Probability

Option A
50%
50%
12.5
-5
2.0
-2
0.5
-2
0.5
-2
0.5
-4
0.5
-4
0.5
-4

Option B
50%
50%
15
-10
15
-10
15
-10
15
-8
15
-8
15
-7
15
-5

Expected
payoff
difference
(A-B)

Note: All payoffs listed under option A and B are in yuan.
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1.25
-2.50
-3.25
-4.25
-5.25
-5.75
-6.75

Table 2.4 Correlations between risk preferences and characteristics
Dependent variable:
Net worth per capita (1000s of yuan)

Risk aversion
Loss aversion
-0.001
-0.001
-0.31
-0.033
(0.84)
(0.93) (2.95)*** (2.69)***
Male
-0.060
0.043
3.152
3.234
(0.53)
(0.42
(1.20)
(1.24)
Years of education
-0.016
-0.013
-0.245
-0.206
(1.18)
(0.89)
(0.95)
(0.74)
Age
-0.001
-0.001
0.056
0.063
(0.40)
(0.32)
(1.23)
(1.12)
Has off farm employment
0.044
0.026
1.900
1.857
(0.61)
(0.32)
(1.23)
(1.12)
Household size
-0.034
-0.029
0.378
0.568
(1.10)
(0.92)
(0.67)
(0.91)
Number of children/number of adults
0.121
0.071
-3.975
4.867
(1.05)
(0.55)
(1.80)*
(2.01)**
Number in household who work
0.060
0.061
-0.089
-0.333
(1.38)
(1.44)
(0.11)
(0.38)
Distance to post office (km)
0.001
0.008
-0.039
0.002
(0.17)
(1.48)
(0.40)
(0.02)
Distance to county seat (km)
0.002
-0.005
0.050
-0.050
(1.12)
(1.01)
(1.56)
(0.44)
Constant
0.476
0.551
-0.694
-0.800
(0.13)
(0.14)
(1.97)* (2.34)**
Township fixed effects:
No
Yes
No
Yes
N
96
96
96
96
2
0.09
0.13
0.15
0.18
R
Note: Ordinary least squares estimations. Absolute value of robust t-statistic in
parentheses. ***=significant at 1% level, **=significant at 5% level, and *=significant
at 10% level.
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Table 2.5 Correlations between time preference and characteristics
Dependent Variable:
Net worth per capita (1000s of yuan)

Hyperbolic discounting parameter
-0.001
-0.001
(2.58)**
(2.78)***
Male
0.089
0.064
(1.76)*
(1.15)
Years of education
0.014
0.016
(1.62)
(1.75)*
Age
0.007
0.007
(2.55)**
(2.39)**
Has off farm employment
0.123
0.109
(2.29)**
(2.11)**
Household size
0.014
0.011
(0.75)
(0.63)
Number of children/number of adults
-0.111
-0.082
(1.51)
(1.05)
Number in household who work
-0.04
-0.044
(1.68)*
(1.78)*
Distance to post office (km)
-0.003
-0.005
(0.77)
(1.39)
Distance to county seat (km)
-0.001
-0.002
(1.11)
(0.64)
Risk aversion
0.13
0.153
(1.61)
(1.91)*
Risk experiment earnings
0.000
0.000
(0.82)
(0.48)
Constant
-0.304
-0.266
(1.78)*
(1.42)
Township fixed effects:
No
Yes
N
96
96
R2
0.23
0.29
Note: Ordinary least squares estimation. Absolute value of robust t-statistic in
parentheses. ***=significant at 1% level, **=significant at 5% level, and *=significant
at 10% level.
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Table 2.6 IV-2SLS for risk preferences
Dependent variable:
Net worth per capita (1000s of yuan)

Risk aversion
-0.002
-0.002
(1.38)
(1.48)
-0.047
-0.035
(0.41)
(0.33)
-0.016
-0.013
(1.20)
(0.87)
-0.001
-0.001
(0.35)
(0.30)
0.064
0.038
(0.91)
(0.48)
-0.032
-0.027
(1.07)
(0.90)
0.098
0.048
(0.86)
(0.38)
0.054
0.055
(1.24)
(1.33)
0.002
0.009
(0.33)
(1.60)
0.002
-0.006
(1.25)
(1.10)
0.477
0.572
(1.94)* (2.36)**

Male
Years of education
Age
Has off farm employment
Household size
Number of children/number of adults
Number in household who work
Distance to post office (km)
Distance to county seat (km)
Constant

Loss aversion
-0.013
-0.016
(0.55)
(0.68)
2.927
3.062
(1.12)
(1.19)
-0.239
-0.213
(0.93)
(0.76)
0.054
0.061
(0.72)
(0.80)
1.544
1.62
(0.97)
(0.95)
0.358
0.546
(0.61)
(0.85)
-3.57
-4.415
(1.53)
(1.76)*
0.022
-0.219
(0.03)
(0.24)
-0.054
-0.022
(0.54)
(0.17)
0.045
-0.038
(1.34)
(0.33)
-0.725
-1.214
(0.14)
(0.22)

Township fixed effects:
No
Yes
No
Yes
N
96
96
96
96
2
R
0.07
0.12
0.14
0.16
Note: Absolute value of robust t-statistic in parentheses. ***=significant at 1% level,
**=significant at 5% level, and *=significant at 10% level. The instrumental variable
for net worth per capita in the IV-2SLS regressions is the households wealth rank in
the village according to their net worth per capita. The first stage results of the IV2SLS regressions are presented in appendix D, table 1.
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Table 2.7 IV-2SLS for time preference
Dependent Variable:
Net worth per capita (1000s of yuan)

Hyperbolic Discounting parameter
-0.001
-0.001
(1.77)*
(1.60)
0.095
0.066
(1.83)*
(1.16)
0.013
0.016
(1.58)
(1.74)*
0.007
0.007
(2.58)**
(2.40)**
0.133
0.111
(2.47)**
(2.17)**
0.014
0.012
(0.78)
(0.65)
-0.122
-0.086
(1.50)
(1.02)
-0.043
-0.045
(1.75)*
(1.81)*
-0.002
-0.004
(0.60)
(1.16)
-0.001
-0.002
(0.96)
(0.68)
0.124
0.15
(1.61)
(1.90)*
0.000
0.000
(0.96)
(0.53)
-0.295
-0.258
(1.76)*
(1.41)

Male
Years of education
Age
Has off farm employment
Household size
Number of children/number of adults
Number in household who work
Distance to post office (km)
Distance to county seat (km)
Risk aversion
Risk experiment earnings
Constant

Township fixed effects:
No
Yes
N
96
96
2
R
0.23
0.29
Note: Absolute value of robust t-statistic in parentheses. ***=significant at 1% level,
**=significant at 5% level, and *=significant at 10% level. The instrumental variable
for net worth per capita in the IV-2SLS regression is the households wealth rank in the
village according to their net worth per capita. The first stage results of the IV-2SLS
regressions are presented in appendix D, table 2.

138

Table 2.8 Effect of alternative wealth proxy variables on risk aversion
Dependent Variable:
Estimation method:
Township fixed effects:
Wealth variable
Forest land area per
capita (hectares)

Risk aversion
OLS
No
IV
Rank in village by forest land per capita

OLS
Yes

IV-2SLS
No

IV-2SLS
Yes

-0.001
(0.02)

-0.007
(0.27)

0.020
(0.43)

0.013
(0.33)

Rank in village by net worth per capita

-0.001
(0.87)

-0.001
(0.90)

-0.002
(1.38)

-0.002
(1.47)

Assets per capita
(savings, consumptive,
and productive assets)

Rank in village by assets per capita

0.000
(0.05)

-0.001
(0.53)

-0.002
(0.37)

-0.003
(0.55)

Liabilities per capita

Rank in village by debt per capita
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House value per capita

-0.010
-0.009
-0.003
0.000
(0.72)
(0.56)
(0.18)
(0.02)
Note: Absolute value of robust t-statistic in parentheses. ***=significant at 1% level, **=significant at 5% level, and *=significant at
10% level. n=103 for the regressions where the dependent variables is forest land per capita. n=96 for all other regressions. House
value, assets and liabilities per capita are measured in 1000’s of yuan. This table summarizes the results for our wealth variable of
interest for 32 separate regressions. All regressions include the following controls: male, years education, age, has off farm work,
household size, number of children/number of adults, number of household members who work, distance to post office, and distance
to county seat.

Table 2.9 Effect of alternative wealth proxy variables on loss aversion
Dependent Variable:
Estimation method:
Township fixed effects:
Wealth variable
Forest land area per
capita (hectares)

OLS
No

Loss aversion
OLS
IV-2SLS
Yes
No

IV
Rank in village by
forest land per
capita

-1.046
-1.11
-1.467
(3.02)*** (3.14)*** (1.81)***

House value per capita

Rank in village by
net worth per capita

-0.032
-0.035
(2.98)*** (2.79)***

Assets per capita
(savings, consumptive,
and productive assets)

Rank in village by
assets per capita

Liabilities per capita

Rank in village by
debt per capita

IV-2SLS
Yes
-1.45
(2.06)**

-0.018
(0.68)

0.101
(0.88)

0.085
(0.82)

140

-0.015
(0.56)

-0.001
(0.01)

-0.004
(0.06)

0.352
0.405
0.472
0.500
(1.59)
(1.74)*
(1.54)
(1.57)
Note: Absolute value of robust t-statistic in parentheses. ***=significant at 1% level, **=significant at 5% level, and *=significant at
10% level. n=103 for the regressions where the dependent variables is forest land per capita. n=96 for all other regressions. House
value, assets and liabilities per capita are measured in 1000’s of yuan. This table summarizes the results for our wealth variable of
interest for 32 separate regressions. All regressions include the following controls: male, years education, age, has off farm work,
household size, number of children/number of adults, number of household members who work, distance to post office, and distance
to county seat.

Table 2.10 Effect of alternative wealth proxy variables on time preference
Dependent Variable:
Estimation method:
Township fixed effects:
Wealth variable
Forest land area per
capita (hectares)

Hyperbolic discounting parameter
OLS
OLS
IV-2SLS IV-2SLS
No
Yes
No
Yes
-0.045
-0.043
(3.20)*** (2.92)***

-0.032
(0.99)

-0.017
(0.53)

House value per capita

Rank in village by
net worth per capita

-0.001
(2.11)**

-0.001
(2.43)**

-0.002
(1.69)*

-0.001
(1.57)

Assets per capita
(savings, consumptive,
and productive assets)

Rank in village by
assets per capita

-0.003
(2.36)**

-0.002
(1.98)*

-0.004
(1.18)

-0.003
(0.86)

Liabilities per capita

Rank in village by
debt per capita
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IV
Rank in village by
forest land per
capita

0.013
0.010
0.009
0.005
(1.54)
(1.24)
(1.03)
(0.56)
Note: Absolute value of robust t-statistic in parentheses. ***=significant at 1% level, **=significant at 5% level, and *=significant at
10% level. n=103 for the regressions where the dependent variables is forest land per capita. n=96 for all other regressions. House
value, assets and liabilities per capita are measured in 1000’s of yuan. This table summarizes the results for our wealth variable of
interest for 16 separate regressions. All regressions include the following controls: male, years education, age, has off farm work,
household size, number of children/number of adults, number of household members who work, distance to post office, distance to
county seat, risk aversion, and the amount earned in the risk experiment.

Table 2.11 Robustness of time preference results
Dependent Variable:
Estimation Method:
Net worth per capita (1000s of yuan)

Hyperbolic discounting parameter
OLS

OLS

IV-2SLS

IV-2SLS

-0.003
-0.003
-0.004
-0.003
(3.09)*** (2.73)** (1.79)*
(1.64)
Male
0.273
0.208
0.272
0.209
(1.65)
(1.09)
(1.60)
(1.09)
Years of education
0.009
0.016
0.009
0.016
(0.53)
(0.75)
(0.56)
(0.76)
Age
0.003
0.007
0.003
0.007
(0.59)
(1.19)
(0.52)
(1.16)
Has off farm employment
0.162
0.223
0.169
0.223
(1.46)
(1.58)
(1.60)
(1.56)
Household size
0.041
0.027
0.039
0.027
(0.97)
(0.46)
(0.90)
(0.46)
Number of children/number of adults
-0.325
-0.162
-0.342
-0.169
(2.16)**
(0.59)
(2.20)**
(0.61)
Number in household who work
-0.115
-0.071
-0.115
-0.072
(1.84)*
(0.75)
(1.87)*
(0.77)
Distance to post office (km)
0.003
-0.004
0.003
-0.004
(0.35)
(0.33)
(0.38)
(0.29)
Distance to county seat (km)
0.001
0.000
0.001
0.000
(0.17)
(0.01)
(0.23)
(0.00)
Risk aversion
0.099
0.148
0.099
0.147
(0.70)
(0.85)
(0.71)
(0.85)
Risk experiment earnings
(0.001)
0.001
(0.002)
0.001
(0.23)
(0.26)
(0.34)
(0.21)
Constant
-0.033
-0.458
0.008
-0.441
(0.08)
(0.71)
(0.02)
(0.66)
Township fixed effects:
No
Yes
No
Yes
N
41
41
41
41
2
R
0.42
0.46
0.42
0.46
Note: Absolute value of robust t-statistic in parentheses. ***=significant at 1% level,
**=significant at 5% level, and *=significant at 10% level. This set of regressions only
includes those individuals whose hyperbolic discounting parameter when estimated
was statistically significant at the 1%, 5% or 10% level. The instrumental variable for
net worth per capita in the IV-2SLS regression is the households wealth rank in the
village according to their net worth per capita.

142

.5
.25
-.5

-.25

0

Risk aversion

.75

1

Figure 2.1 Box plot of risk aversion estimated from experiment data relative to selfrated hypothetical risk aversion level
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Self-rated level of risk aversion in an investment context

Note: For each self-rated level of risk aversion, the bottom bar corresponds to the
minimum value of the risk aversion parameter, while the top bar corresponds to the
maximum value. The box corresponds to the 25th to the 75th percentile values, with the
median value represented by the line that bisects the box. Outliers are represented by a
dot.
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Figure 2.2 Box plot of hyperbolic discounting parameter estimated from experiment
data relative to the hypothetical investment question
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Note: For each investment level, the bottom bar corresponds to the minimum value of
the hyperbolic discounting parameter, while the top bar corresponds to the maximum
value. The box corresponds to the 25th to the 75th percentile values, with the median
value represented by the line that bisects the box. Outliers are represented by a dot.
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Appendix 2
Risk preference parameter estimation
Table 2.3 shows the entire payoff matrix for the experiment. The payoffs ranged
from a loss of 10 yuan to a gain of 850 yuan. Since our intent is to relate the risk
experiment results to the subject’s household’s forest management activities, we use a
relatively high maximum payoff of 850 yuan, which is roughly half a months pay in
rural China and corresponds more closely to the magnitude of monetary payoffs faced
by individuals in forest management decisions (CSY 2009). The average payoff in the
risk experiment was 27 yuan (inclusive of the 10 yuan participation compensation),
which is roughly half a single days wage in rural Fujian, China in 2008 (CSY 2009).
Note that in the risk experiment is possible for the subject to lose up to 10 yuan.
However, it would be unethical to ask rural households who participate in the
experiment to pay us if they incur the loss. To address this issue at the beginning of
the game we announce that there will be participation compensation of 10 yuan (which
is equivalent to the highest possible loss in the risk experiment). Liu et al. (2008)
follows a similar strategy to ensure the subjects are treated ethically. While Camerer
(2000) suggests that losses that are in fact net gains may be treated differently from
real losses, we believe that because the 10 yuan participation fee was pointed out at
the very beginning of the experiment, 30-45 minutes later when the subject got to
Series 3 the individual would not consider the 10 yuan as a windfall but rather earning
they had made for participating, and therefore treat the possible losses in the
experiment as true losses.
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In the payoff matrix (table 2.3) note that at first, the first column (Option A)
dominates the second column (Option B) in terms of expected payoff and variance in
the payoffs, but eventually, as the value of the high outcome in the second column
increases, the expected value of the second column starts to dominate (table 2.3). The
more risk averse individual would choose Option A longer before switching to Option
B. The point at which participants switch from Option A to Option B in Series 1 and 2
allows for the classification of an individual’s risk preferences as risk adverse, risk
neutral or risk seeking (the curvature of the value function) and to identify if the
subject tends to overweight low probabilities and underweight high probabilities (the
non-linear probability weighting parameter). The points at which participants switch
from Option A to Option B in Series 1, 2 and 3, jointly allow for the identification of
the loss aversion parameter.
Suppose an individual switched from Option A to Option B at question 7 in Series
1, question 7 in Series 2 and question 5 in Series 3. When a subject switches from Option
A to B at the seventh question in both Series 1 and Series 2, the following inequalities should
hold:

5(1-σ) + exp[-(-ln .3)α] (20(1-σ) -5(1-σ) ) > 2.5(1-σ) + exp[-(-ln .1)α] (62.5(1-σ) - 2.5(1-σ))
5(1-σ) + exp[-(-ln.3)α] (20(1-σ) - 5(1-σ) ) > 2.5(1-σ) + exp[-(-ln .1)α] (75(1-σ) - 2.5(1-σ))
15(1-σ) + exp[-(-ln .9)α] (20(1-σ) -15(1-σ) ) > 2.5(1-σ) + exp[-(-ln .7)α] (32.5(1-σ) - 2.5(1-σ))
15(1-σ) + exp[-(-ln .9)α] (20(1-σ) -15(1-σ) ) > 2.5(1-σ) + exp[-(-ln .7)α] (34(1-σ) - 2.5(1-σ))
The ranges of σ and α that satisfy the above inequalities are 0.26<σ<0.35 and
0.66<α<0.74. The approximate mid-points (σ, α) of these intervals are (0.30, 0.70).
Mid-points are taken for the later purpose of using the parameters as explanatory
variables in the regression models. When subjects do not switch, the appropriate
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boundaries are used to solve for the σ and α. Then with the values of σ and α, a set of
inequalities can be constructed for the switch point in series 3, and solved for upper
and lower bound on λ. We follow the same convention and take the mid-point as the
estimate of λ for use in regression models.
Appendix tables 2.1, 2.2, and 2.3 illustrate the combinations of approximate values
of σ (the curvature of an individual’s value function), λ (the probability sensitivity
parameter), and α (the loss aversion parameter), respectively. Looking at the
corresponding columns and rows in appendix tables 2.1, 2.2, and 2.3, you will find
that for this individual who switched at the seventh question the values for (σ, α) are
(0.30, 0.70) and for λ the lower bound is 2.26 and the upper bound 4.11, taking the
midpoint the value for λ is 3.2.
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Time preference parameter estimation
For our time preference experiment, we use a general model proposed by
Benhabib et al. (2007), which allows us to test exponential, hyperbolic, quasihyperbolic, and a more general form. Benhabib et al.’s (2007) model assigns a value
of reward y at time t according to yD(y,t) where:
yD(y,t) =



.1  1  0 -

1
123

, -

0


, -  0

(1)

The conventional time discounting parameter is r. The present-bias parameter is β, and
hyperbolicity of the discount function is described by θ. The model reduces to
exponential discounting when β=1 and θ=1. When β=1 and θ=2, the model reduces to
hyperbolic discounting. When θ=1 and β is free the model reduces to quasi-hyperbolic
discounting. When θ >2 and β is free, the model is “hyper-hyperbolic”, meaning that,
for example, the weight on future rewards drops even more steeply than in the
hyperbolic model. By using this specification, we can compare the three models at
once.
The probability of choosing immediate reward x over the delayed reward y in t
days is denoted by P(x>(y,t)). We use a logistic function to describe this probabilistic
relation as follows:
4  , -



1

56789:;<= >? 123

(2)

The variable µ is a response sensitivity or noise parameter. We estimate the
parameters r, β, θ, and µ in the above logistic function. For each subject, there are
thirty observations, one observation for just before the switching point and one
observation for just after the switching point for each of the fifteen series of questions.
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For example if a subject choose to receive 150 yuan in 6 months over 75 yuan today
(Plan A) and switched to Plan B when the payoff today increased to 100 yuan, then the
dependent variable for the first response is 1 and the dependent variable for the second
response is 0. The complete set of discounting choices is presented in table 1.
We estimated the above logistic function using non-linear least squares. In
addition, to estimating the full model above, we estimated the model with restrictions
for exponential discounting, hyperbolic discounting, and quasi-hyperbolic discounting.
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Appendix Table 2.1 Switching point (question) in Series 1 and 2 and the approximation of σ (parameter for the curvature of the power
value function)
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σ
Series
2
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
Never

Switching question in Series 1
1
-0.40
-0.35
-0.30
-0.20
-0.15
-0.10
0
0.10
0.15
0.20
0.25
0.35
0.40
0.45
0.50

2
-0.35
-0.30
-0.20
-0.15
-0.10
0
0.05
0.10
0.15
0.20
0.30
0.35
0.40
0.45
0.50

3
-0.30
-0.20
-0.15
-0.10
0
0.05
0.10
0.15
0.20
0.25
0.35
0.40
0.45
0.50
0.55

4
-0.25
-0.15
-0.10
0
0.05
0.10
0.15
0.20
0.25
0.30
0.35
0.45
0.50
0.55
0.60

5
-0.15
-0.10
0
0.05
0.10
0.15
0.20
0.25
0.30
0.35
0.40
0.50
0.55
0.60
0.65

6
-0.10
0
0.05
0.10
0.15
0.20
0.25
0.30
0.35
0.40
0.45
0.50
0.60
0.65
0.70

7
0
0.05
0.10
0.15
0.20
0.25
0.30
0.35
0.40
0.45
0.50
0.55
0.60
0.65
0.70

8
0.05
0.10
0.15
0.20
0.25
0.30
0.35
0.40
0.45
0.50
0.55
0.60
0.65
0.70
0.75

9
0.10
0.15
0.20
0.25
0.30
0.35
0.40
0.45
0.50
0.55
0.60
0.65
0.70
0.75
0.80

10
0.15
0.20
0.25
0.30
0.35
0.40
0.45
0.50
0.55
0.60
0.65
0.70
0.75
0.80
0.85

11
0.20
0.25
0.30
0.35
0.40
0.45
0.50
0.55
0.60
0.65
0.70
0.75
0.80
0.80
0.85

12
0.25
0.30
0.35
0.40
0.45
0.50
0.55
0.60
0.65
0.70
0.75
0.80
0.80
0.85
0.90

13
0.35
0.40
0.45
0.50
0.50
0.55
0.60
0.65
0.70
0.75
0.80
0.80
0.85
0.90
0.95

14
0.40
0.45
0.50
0.55
0.60
0.60
0.65
0.70
0.75
0.80
0.80
0.85
0.90
0.90
0.95

Never
0.45
0.50
0.55
0.60
0.65
0.65
0.70
0.75
0.80
0.85
0.85
0.90
0.95
0.95
0.95

Appendix Table 2.2 Switching point (question) in Series 1 and 2 and the approximation of α (probability sensitivity parameter in
Prelec’s weighting function)
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α
Series
2
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
Never

Switching question in Series 1
1
0.65
0.60
0.55
0.50
0.45
0.45
0.40
0.35
0.30
0.25
0.20
0.15
0.10
0.05
0.05

2
0.70
0.65
0.60
0.55
0.55
0.50
0.45
0.40
0.35
0.30
0.25
0.20
0.15
0.15
0.10

3
0.75
0.70
0.65
0.65
0.60
0.55
0.50
0.45
0.40
0.35
0.30
0.25
0.25
0.20
0.15

4
0.80
0.75
0.75
0.70
0.65
0.60
0.55
0.50
0.45
0.40
0.40
0.30
0.25
0.20
0.15

5
0.90
0.85
0.80
0.75
0.70
0.65
0.60
0.55
0.50
0.45
0.40
0.35
0.30
0.25
0.20

6
0.95
0.90
0.85
0.80
0.75
0.70
0.65
0.60
0.55
0.50
0.45
0.40
0.35
0.30
0.25

7
1.00
0.95
0.90
0.85
0.80
0.75
0.70
0.65
0.60
0.55
0.50
0.45
0.40
0.35
0.30

8
1.05
1.00
0.95
0.90
0.85
0.80
0.75
0.70
0.65
0.60
0.55
0.50
0.45
0.40
0.35

9
1.10
1.05
1.00
0.95
0.90
0.85
0.80
0.75
0.70
0.65
0.60
0.55
0.50
0.45
0.40

10
1.15
1.10
1.05
1.00
0.95
0.90
0.85
0.80
0.75
0.70
0.65
0.60
0.55
0.50
0.45

11
1.20
1.15
1.10
1.05
1.00
0.95
0.90
0.85
0.80
0.75
0.70
0.65
0.60
0.55
0.50

12
1.25
1.20
1.15
1.10
1.05
1.00
0.95
0.90
0.85
0.80
0.75
0.70
0.65
0.60
0.55

13
1.30
1.25
1.20
1.15
1.10
1.05
1.00
0.95
0.90
0.85
0.80
0.75
0.70
0.65
0.60

14
1.35
1.30
1.25
1.20
1.15
1.10
1.05
1.00
0.95
0.90
0.85
0.80
0.75
0.70
0.65

Never
1.40
1.35
1.30
1.25
1.20
1.15
1.10
1.05
1.00
0.95
0.90
0.85
0.80
0.75
0.70

Appendix Table 2.3 Switching point (question) in Series 3 and the approximation of λ (loss aversion parameter)
σ=0.55
Lower
bound

Upper
bound

σ=0.60
Lower
bound

Upper
bound

σ=0.65
Lower
bound

Upper
bound

σ=0.70
Lower
bound

Upper
bound

σ=0.75
Lower
bound

Upper
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bound
λ
1
-∞
0.36
-∞
0.35
-∞
0.34
-∞
0.33
-∞
0.32
2
0.36
1.38
0.35
1.37
0.34
1.35
0.33
1.33
0.32
1.32
3
1.38
1.82
1.37
1.84
1.35
1.86
1.33
1.88
1.32
1.91
4
1.82
2.24
1.84
2.24
1.86
2.25
1.88
2.26
1.91
2.28
5
2.24
3.88
2.24
3.94
2.25
4.02
2.26
4.11
2.28
4.21
6
3.88
4.95
3.94
5.02
4.02
5.1
4.11
5.2
4.21
5.3
7
4.95 13.44
5.02 13.51
5.1
13.6
5.2 13.73
5.3 13.89
8 13.44
∞ 13.51
∞
13.6
∞ 13.73
∞ 13.89
∞
Note: To find the mid-points for estimation, a value of 0 was used in place of -∞ and a value of 18 was used in place of + ∞.

Appendix Table 2.4 Discounting choices
Option A
Question Payoff
Time
1-1
60
2 weeks
1-2
60
2 weeks
1-3
60
2 weeks
1-4
60
2 weeks
1-5
60
2 weeks
2-1
60
3 months
2-2
60
3 months
2-3
60
3 months
2-4
60
3 months
2-5
60
3 months
3-1
60
6 months
3-2
60
6 months
3-3
60
6 months
3-4
60
6 months
3-5
60
6 months
4-1
150
2 weeks
4-2
150
2 weeks
4-3
150
2 weeks
4-4
150
2 weeks
4-5
150
2 weeks
5-1
150
3 months
5-2
150
3 months
5-3
150
3 months
5-4
150
3 months
5-5
150
3 months
6-1
150
6 months
6-2
150
6 months
6-3
150
6 months
6-4
150
6 months
6-5
150
6 months
7-1
15
2 weeks
7-2
15
2 weeks
7-3
15
2 weeks
7-4
15
2 weeks
7-5
15
2 weeks
8-1
15
3 months
8-2
15
3 months

Option B
Payoff Time
10
today
20
today
30
today
40
today
50
today
10
today
20
today
30
today
40
today
50
today
10
today
20
today
30
today
40
today
50
today
25
today
50
today
75
today
100
today
125
today
25
today
50
today
75
today
100
today
125
today
25
today
50
today
75
today
100
today
125
today
2.5
today
5
today
7.5
today
10
today
12.5
today
2.5
today
5
today
Table continued on
the next page.
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Appendix Table 2.4 [continued] Discounting choices
Option A
Question Payoff
Time
8-3
15
3 months
8-4
15
3 months
8-5
15
3 months
9-1
15
6 months
9-2
15
6 months
9-3
15
6 months
9-4
15
6 months
9-5
15
6 months
10-1
120
1 week
10-2
120
1 week
10-3
120
1 week
10-4
120
1 week
10-5
120
1 week
11-1
120
2 months
11-2
120
2 months
11-3
120
2 months
11-4
120
2 months
11-5
120
2 months
12-1
120
4 months
12-2
120
4 months
12-3
120
4 months
12-4
120
4 months
12-5
120
4 months
13-1
30
1 week
13-2
30
1 week
13-3
30
1 week
13-4
30
1 week
13-5
30
1 week
14-1
30
2 months
14-2
30
2 months
14-3
30
2 months
14-4
30
2 months
14-5
30
2 months
15-1
30
4 months
15-2
30
4 months
15-3
30
4 months
15-4
30
4 months
15-5
30
4 months

Option B
Payoff Time
7.5
today
10
today
12.5
today
2.5
today
5
today
7.5
today
10
today
12.5
today
20
today
40
today
60
today
80
today
100
today
20
today
40
today
60
today
80
today
100
today
20
today
40
today
60
today
80
today
100
today
5
today
10
today
15
today
20
today
25
today
5
today
10
today
15
today
20
today
25
today
5
today
10
today
15
today
20
today
25
today
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Appendix Table 2.5 First stage from IV-2SLS regressions for risk aversion and loss
aversion
Dependent variable:
Rank in village by net worth per capita
Male
Years of education
Age
Has off farm employment
Household size
Number of children/number of adults
Number in household who work
Distance to post office (km)
Distance to county seat (km)
Constant

Net worth per capita (1000s of yuan)
94.651
102.175
(8.74)***
(9.92)***
-1.363
-4.958
(0.12)
(0.48)
0.279
0.686
(0.23)
(0.57)
0.035
-0.176
(0.09)
(0.50)
1.934
-5.566
(0.24)
(0.70)
4.390
4.546
(1.32)
(1.43)
-12.816
-12.139
(15.30)
(0.83)
-5.357
-4.401
(1.29)
(1.11)
0.552
0.939
(1.11)
(1.63)
0.419
-0.416
(2.54)
(0.81)
-23.33
-1.631
(0.89)
(0.06)

Township fixed effects:
No
Yes
N
96
96
2
R
0.54
0.63
F-statistic
10.20
9.15
Note: Absolute value of robust t-statistic in parentheses. ***=significant at 1% level,
**=significant at 5% level, and *=significant at 10% level.
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Table 2.6 First stage from IV-2SLS regressions for hyperbolic discounting parameter
Dependent variable:
Rank in village by net worth per capita

Net worth per capita (1000s of yuan)
94.144
101.876
(8.43)***
(9.48)***
Male
-0.821
-4.651
(0.07)
(0.44)
Years of education
0.177
0.647
(0.14)
(0.52)
Age
-0.004
-0.192
(0.01)
(0.52)
Has off farm employment
1.978
-5.575
(0.24)
(0.69)
Household size
4.512
4.613
(1.33)
(1.42)
Number of children/number of adults
-13.904
-12.696
(0.89)
(0.85)
Number in household who work
-5.651
-4.539
(1.32)
(1.11)
Distance to post office (km)
0.609
0.986
(1.18)
(1.57)
Distance to county seat (km)
0.420
-0.437
(2.50)**
(0.82)
Risk aversion
0.944
0.517
(0.09)
(0.05)
Risk experiment earnings
-0.048
-0.023
(0.49)
(0.23)
Constant
-20.608
-0.215
(0.74)
(0.01)
Township fixed effects:
No
Yes
N
96
96
2
R
0.55
0.63
F-statistic
8.35
7.88
Note: Absolute value of robust t-statistic in parentheses. ***=significant at 1% level,
**=significant at 5% level, and *=significant at 10% level.
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Appendix Table 2.7 Risk preference elicitation in developing countries
Source
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Experiment Methodology

Findings

Binswanger (1980)

-India
-Tropical area,
characterized by
high climatic risk
for agriculture
-240 participants

Study Sample

-Given list of 8 choices; each with 50% probability (coin toss) but low payoff decreased
and high payoff increased as moved down the list
-Included one safe option where heads or tails resulted in Rs. 50
-There was a sequence of games over time and higher levels of payoffs
-Photographs of sums of money to be received indicated by coins placed in each field
were given several weeks prior to the experiment to help illiterate people understand

Nielsen (2001)

-Toliara province
of Madagascar
-70 households
across 6 villages

-Follow design of Binswanger (1980)
-Each participated in 4 experiments; 2 time preferences experiments (both hypothetical
payments); 2 risk preference experiments (1 hypothetical and 1 with real payoffs)
-Presented with series of 6 binary choices between two payoffs with 0.5 probability
-One experiment involved only gains, the other involved gains and losses

-Objective was to determine whether differences in
behavior between farmers of different wealth levels are
the consequence of different attitudes toward risk or of
different constraint sets such as limitations on credit or on
access to modern inputs
-Experimental measures of risk aversion indicate that at
higher payoffs virtually all individuals are moderately
risk averse with little variation according to personal
characteristics
-Wealth tends to reduce risk aversion slightly, but its
effect is not statistically significant
-Finds a linkage between asset poverty, time discounting
and environmental degradation in the form of
deforestation (and slash-and-burn agriculture)
-Finds empirical linkage between willingness to take risks
and willingness to delay

Barr (2003)

-Zimbabwe
-678 subjects
across 23 villages

-Follow design of Binswanger (1980)
-Presented with six gambles; each yields high or low payoff determined by guessing
which researcher’s hand contained a blue rather than yellow ball
-Risk-pooling introduced by giving subjects the next days choice list and allowing them
to form groups in which all winning would be shared equally between group members

Mette Wik et al. (2004)

-Northern Zambia
-110 participants
across 6 villages

Humphrey (2004)

-Uganda
-Two regions:
Sironko township
in Sironko District
and Bufumbo subcounty in Mbale
District

-Follow design of Binswanger (1980)
-Given choice between set of 6 games each with 50% probability of winning
-Played 7 games during the first visit and 6 more during a second visit two weeks later
(varied payoff levels between games)
-Paid randomly on several games
-Presented 12 pair-wise decisions between risky lotteries
-One question was randomly chosen for payment
-Also asked two hypothetical valuation tasks in terms of disease control decisions

-Finds that more extrinsic commitment is associated with
more risk pooling but that more information is associated
with less risk pooling
-In 4 of 5 villages networks of risk pooling contracts
during the experiment and the networks existing in real
life were significantly correlated
-Wealth indicator variables are found to be significant,
and partial relative risk aversion decreases as wealth
increases
-Females are found to be more risk averse than males
-Find that risk preferences of east Ugandan farmers
exhibit systematic and predictable deviations from
expected utility maximization; including: violations of the
independence and transitivity axioms of expected utility
theory, and reference-dependent preferences

Table continued on the next page.
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Experiment Methodology

Findings

Mosley and Verschoor
(2005)

-Uganda(205
participants)
-Ethiopia(100
participants)
-India(227
participants)

-Participants presented with various pairs of lotteries; one ‘risky’ with a higher expected
value but riskier than the other
-Paid randomly on 1 choice
-Additionally, asked two hypothetical questions to elicit certainty equivalents

Hamoudi and Thomas
(2006)

-Mexico
-1,253 participants
in 11 rural
communities in
the states of
Guanajuato and
Michoacan
-Four provinces in
China: Henan,
Shandong, Hebei
and Anhui
-320 participants

-Use modified design of Binswanger (1980)
-Use 6 questions with 50/50 probability including one safe choice
-With riskiest choice could win 540 pesos or lose 20 pesos (if lose, loss taken from
show-up fee)
-Choice presented in a circle, increasing risk as moved clockwise, high payoff would
increase while low payoff would decrease
-Paid randomly on 1 out of 5 preference tasks
-Use design of Tanaka et al. (2010)
-Payoffs ranged from lose 10 yuan to win 850 yuan

-Guizhou
province, China
-117couples

-Use procedure of Holt and Laury (2002)
-10 pair-wise choices
-Payoffs ranged from 1 to 38.5 yuan
-One question chosen randomly for payoff
-Have couples make decisions separately and then also together

-Examines all of the linkages in the ‘vicious circle of
poverty’
-Finds that there is very little relationship between risk
aversion and the income measure of poverty but there are
strong and significant linkages from low return on assets,
to asset levels, to ability to diversify and manage risk, to
income poverty
-It may be forward-looking perceptions of vulnerability to
risk on behalf of themselves and their families best
explain their attitudes of risk aversion, and thus help
determine their investment and diversification decisions,
capacity to manage risk, and ultimately whether they
remain in poverty
-Examine the relationship between inter-generational
transfers and attitudes towards risk
-Finds that inter-generational transfers are associated with
attitudes toward risk (although associations are mostly
weak or insignificant)
- Risk attitudes measured were correlated with actual
behaviors
-Examines role of risk attitudes in the decision to adopt a
new form of agricultural biotechnology
-Expands measure of risk preferences beyond expected
utility theory to incorporate prospect theory parameters
such as loss aversion and nonlinear probability weighting
-Farmers who are more risk averse or more loss averse
adopt the agricultural biotechnology (Bt cotton) later
-Farmers with small probability weighting parameters
adopt Bt cotton earlier
-On average individuals are risk averse
-Find spouses in richer households have more similar
individual risk attitudes
-Length of marriage has no impact on similarity
-A couples joint decision is typically closer t o the
husband’s individual decision
-Women with higher income, more years of education,
and communist party membership have a significantly
stronger influence on joint decisions

Liu (2008)

Carlsson et al. (2009)

Study Sample

Table continued on the next page.

Source

Experiment Methodology

Findings

-State of Amhara
in the highlands of
Ethiopia
-262 farmers in
seven local areas,
in five counties
and two zones

-Use design of Binswagner (1980) but frame choice sets to reflect real farming
decisions
-Use six farming systems, all having similar costs but different output levels depending
on 50% probability of good or bad harvest (based on coin toss)
-Use 5 experiment sets with 6 choices each; sets 2 to 5 derived by scaling up amounts of
set 1 by 5, 10, 20 and 30 ETB; set 5 was hypothetical
-After experiment with only gain-gain choices those who had made enough earnings
were asked to participate in experiment with gain-loss choices

-Examine 4 research questions: (a) How does the buildup
of wealth at very low income levels affect risk behavior?
(b) In very low-income rural settings, how does the
possibility of loss affect aversion to risk? (c) Do past
successes within risky environments affect subsequent
risk responses? (d) Do levels of potential gains and losses
affect responses to risk?
-Find high risk aversion and evidence that constraints
have important impacts on risk-averting behavior with
perhaps implication for long-term poverty

Bauer, Chytilová, and
Morduch (2010)

-Rural population
of Karnataka in
southern India
-573 subjects, 9
villages, 2 taluks
(Honavar and
Haliyal)
-35 people
selected in each
village by random
walk (90% of
invited
participated)

-Follow design of Binswagner (1980)
-Asked to select 1 out of 6 different gambles, each with a high and a low payoff with a
probability 0.5
-In each subsequent gamble expected value increased jointly with the variance
-Expected value of least risky gamble was Rs. 250, and higher payoff in most risky
gamble was Rs. 1000

-Used risk aversion to control for the curvature of utility
function, when examining determinants of savings and
borrowing behavior
-More risk averse females save a lower proportion of
savings at home and more outside of home
-More risk averse males borrow more

Gong et al. (2010)

-Yunnan Province
in southwestern
China
-300 households
across 30 villages

-Follow design of Holt and Laury (2002)
-Series of 10 lottery-choices (Option A and Option B), where probability of higher
payoff increased as participant moved down the list and Option B was more “risky”
than Option A since its payoffs (CNY 35 and CNY 5) are more variable than the
payoffs for Option A (CNY 20 and CNY 16)
-One question chosen randomly for payoff

Tanaka, Camerer, and
Nguyen (2010)

- Vietnam
-180 participants
across 4 villages in
the south and 4 in
the north

-Use modified design of Holt and Laury (2002)
-Use 3 series of paired lotteries, 35 choices in total
-Choice between lotteries (A and B)
-Probabilities stay the same in each series but payoffs increase as move down rows in
the lottery B column
-Monotonic switching is enforced
-One question chosen randomly for payoff

-Participants exhibit substantial risk aversion
-Risk aversion affects input intensity differently for
market-oriented versus subsistence farmers
-Risk aversion related with increasing use of pesticides by
market-oriented producers but a reduction of pesticide use
by subsistence farmers
-Market producers are more concerned with stabilizing
income, while subsistence producers are more concerned
with stabilizing production
- Results indicate that mean village income is related to
risk and time preferences
-See Appendix B, Table 1 and 2 for ,more details
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Study Sample

Yesuf and Bluffstone
(2009)

Appendix Table 2.8 Relationship between risk preferences and poverty
Source

Location and
Sample Size

Wealth Definition

Binswanger (1980)

India

-Use gross sales value
of physical assets

Nielsen (2001)

-Toliara province of
Madagascar
-70 households
across 6 villages

-Increase in cattle
holdings; Reduction in
cattle holding

Empirical Methods
-OLS with village fixed effects

-Income

-Estimated mean of discount rate
by sub-groups
-Ordered probit model

-Log of income per
capita
-Cash liquidity per
capita

-Northern Zambia
-110 participants
across 6 villages

Mosley and Verschoor
(2005)

-Uganda(205
participants)
-Ethiopia(100
participants)
-India(227
participants)

-Wealth (does not
explain how wealth is
defined)

-Four provinces in
China: Henan,
Shandong, Hebei and
Anhui
-320 participants

-Use wealth per capita,
where wealth is defined
as the value of durable
goods per capita
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Wik et al. (2004)

Liu (2008)

Income Definition

Note: Also creates an
index of perceived
vulnerability as a better
measure of poverty

-Income per capita

-Random effects interval regression
and pooled interval regression
model
-Use lower and upper boundaries of
the interval for risk aversion
-OLS
-Binary logistic regression (when
risk aversion is a RA1-6, where
RAi = 1 for participants who state a
preference for a risky lottery less
than i times)

-OLS

Findings
-At higher payoffs (approximately monthly labor
income) wealth does not appear to influence risk
aversion significantly, although at low game levels
such an effect appears to exist
-Respondents with a reduction in cattle holdings were
more risk averse
-Income positively related to risk aversion (opposite
of what you would except from expected utility
theory)
-Cattle assets did not have a significant influence on
risk aversion
-Found evidence of decreasing absolute risk aversion
when income per capita increases

-Only in Ethiopia are any of the risk aversion
measures correlated with income, and only RA2 at
the 10% level
-In Uganda per capita wealth is correlated with three
RA measures but not with any Arrow-Pratt measures
-The vulnerability index (when substituted for wealth
and income in the regressions) is significantly
correlated for all RA risk aversion measures, so it
may be subjective rather than objective factors that
drive attitudes towards risk (more vulnerable, more
risk averse in Uganda; more vulnerable, less risk
averse in India)
-Wealthier respondents were less risk averse
(significant at 10% level)
-Wealth did not have a statistically significant impact
on loss aversion or the probability weighting
parameter

Table continued on the next page.

Source
Yesuf and Bluffstone
(2009)

Tanaka, Camerer, and
Nguyen (2010)

Location and
Sample Size
Ethiopia

- Vietnam
-180 participants
across 4 villages in
the south and 4 in the
north

Wealth Definition

Income Definition

Empirical Methods
-Random effects model of risk
aversion

-Several indicators of
wealth: value of
domestic animals,
number of oxen, current
cash availability (annual
cash income – cash
expenditure), household
land area, and number
of cultivated plots
-Livestock is major
form of wealth

-Ordered probit marginal effects by
risk category
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-Total income
-Relative income
within the village
(subtracting the mean
and dividing by the
within-village
standard deviation)
-Village mean
income

-Non-linear estimations of the
logistic function, allowing the
discount rate and present bias
parameter to depend on
demographic variables
-Use instrumental variables
(rainfall and head of household
cannot work as instruments)
because results of Hausman and
Davidson-MacKinnon tests suggest
OLS is an inconsistent estimator

Findings
- All wealth indicators are negative and significant,
indicating that wealth is correlated with lower risk
aversion
- Wealth accumulation tends to reduce severe and
extreme risk aversion and moves respondents into
less risk-averse categories

-Household income is not significantly correlated
with risk aversion or loss aversion
-Mean village income is highly correlated with loss
aversion but not risk aversion (people in poor villages
are not necessarily afraid of uncertainty, in the sense
of income variation; instead, they are averse to loss)

Appendix Table 2.9 Time preference elicitation in developing countries
Source
Pender (1996)

Godoy et al.
(1998)
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Holden, Shiferaw,
and Wik (1998)

Location and
Sample Size
-Andhra Pradesh,
India
-96 participants, 2
villages (1989)
-72 participants in
follow-up (1991)

-Chimane
Amerindian
households in 18
villages in the
Bolivian rainforest
-209 participants
-Indonesia(41
participants)
-Zambia (86
participants)
-Ethiopia (120
participants)

Godoy, Kirby, and
Wilkie (2001)

-Bolivian lowlands
-443 participants
across 42 villages

Nielsen (2001)

-Toliara province of
Madagascar
-70 households
across 6 villages

Experiment Methodology

Findings

-Each participated in 3 experiments (6 variations of experiments used)
- Presented with a series of 8 to 10 binary choices between a specified amount of
rice to be received at a particular date and alternative amount to be received at
some other date
-Each choice presented on a separate card
-One card randomly selected for payment
-Time frames ranged from 7, 12, 19 and 24 months; reference point was 1 month,
13 months or 25 months
-Follow-up experiments conducted in 1991

-Find that minimum discount rates in all experiments were
higher than the maximum interest rates paid by most
respondents
-Use experiment data and credit market data to test three
models of credit markets : (1) the permanent income model,
(2) upward sloping credit supply to individual borrowers, and
(3) constrained credit due to imperfect enforcement
-Rejects the permanent income model
-Discount rate data are consistent with (2) and (3), while the
credit market data are consistent with a combination of (2)
and (3)
-The average impatience of the household heads was
associated with less deforestation

-Twenty minutes into an interview asked participants “We realize you may be
getting tired from answering questions. We would like to give you a rest. Would
you like to have one candy now or two candies at the end of the interview?”
-If participant said no, then asked “One now or three at the end?”
-Then delivered candy at the appropriate time
-Each participant asked “If you were told you have the choice between an amount
of money today (PV) and the amount (FV) in one year, how large would the
amount PV have to be for you to prefer it instead of FV in one year?”
-Question was repeatedly asked lowering the PV until a cut-off point was
identified
-In Indonesia and Ethiopia used cash value and in Zambia used both cash and
maize; however, questions were hypothetical
-Each asked 9 questions about a small reward today or larger reward at a specified
delay (7 to 162 days)
-Carried out experiment half way through field work to ensure delivery of future
reward at specified time
-Each participated in 4 experiments; 2 time preferences experiments (both
hypothetical payments); 2 risk preference experiments (1 hypothetical and 1 with
real payoffs)
-Presented with series of 6 binary choices between payoff today and 1 year from
now
-One experiment involved only gains, the other involved gains and losses

-Discount rates found to be very high
-Market imperfections (credit and insurance markets) led to
variation in discount rate
-Poverty in assets, or cash liquidity constraints, was leading to
or correlated with higher rates of time preference
-In Zambia estimates of risk preferences were also estimated;
more risk averse people tended to have lower discount rates
-Rates of time preference had a small economic and statistical
effect on the use of natural resources (old-growth forest,
fallow forests, fish, and game)
-Finds a linkage between asset poverty, time discounting and
environmental degradation in the form of deforestation (and
slash-and-burn agriculture)
-Finds empirical linkage between willingness to take risks and
willingness to delay

Table continued on the next page.

Source
Pendleton and
Howe (2002)

Kirby et al. (2002)

Anderson et al.
(2004)
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Casse et al. (2005)

Hamoudi and
Thomas (2006)

Location and
Sample Size
-Bolivian lowlands
-Sub-sample from
Godoy et al.’s
(2001) data
-209 participants
across 18 villages
included in data set
-Beni, Bolivia
-154 Tsimane’
Amerindians from
53 households
across 2 villages
along the River
Maniqui in the
tropical rainforest
-Vietnam
-Two villages in the
region of Hanoi
city, one considered
a rural commune
(Thach Ban) and the
other considered a
urban commune
(Quynh Mai)
-Toliara province of
Madagascar
-74 participants
across 6 villages
(part of larger
sample of 240
households across
20 villages)
-Mexcio
-1,253 participants
in 11 rural
communities in the
states of Guanajuato
and Michoacan

Experiment Methodology

Findings

-Data collected by Godoy et al. (2001)

-Patient farmers clear more forest than impatient farmers
-Similar coefficients on impatience for clearance of oldgrowth and secondary-growth areas but only significant for
secondary growth

-Participants given a list of 8 choices between X today and X+Y in the future
-Future time frames ranged from 7 to 157 days
-Participant were also given a list of 8 choices between a smaller number of candy
today and a larger numbers of candy in the future
-Conducted the experiments quarterly over the course of 1 year

-Discount rates increased with age, decreased with
educational levels and literacy, and tended to decrease as
recent income rose
-Discount rates were not associated with wealth, nutritional
status, or moderate drug use
-Low but reliable correlations between discount rates across
quarters, suggesting that a person’s discount rate is a
somewhat stable characteristic

-Asked respondents to imagine that they had the opportunity to receive a loan
form a local NGO and that they had the choice of paying back the loan
immediately or postponing the payment to a later date, at which time they would
have to pay a larger amount
-9 questions
-Future times included: 1 day, 3 months or 1 year
-Hypothetical question

-Trade-offs between today and tomorrow are different from
trade-offs between any other 24-hour period
-Examines correlations between discount rate and household
characteristics
-Find no relationship between income or gender and discount
rate, an inverse correlation between age and discount rate
-Find that those living in rural area have significantly higher
discount rates

-Each participant asked to choose among six hypothetical options
-Options were between for example “X payment now or X+Y payment for one
year later?”

-High rates of time preference found

-Use 10 questions; “Receive X today or X+Y in the future (1 and 2 months; 3
years?”
-Those subjects who opted for future payoff were given contact information, a
postcard to tell them if they moved and a written pledge that the surveyor would
return on the specified date with the specified amount

-Examine the relationship between intergenerational transfers
and time preference
-Male adults who are more patient are more likely to support
parents
-Both mothers and fathers who are more patient appear to
invest more in their children
-Time preference measures collected were correlated with
actual behaviors

Table continued on the next page.

Source
Gunatilake,
Wickramasinghe,
and
Abeygunawardena
(2007)

Yesuf and
Bluffstone (2008)

Bauer and
Chytilová (2008)

Location and
Sample Size
-Sinharaja Man and
Biosphere Reserve
in Sri Lanka
-180 participants
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-State of Amhara in
the highlands of
Ethiopia
-262 farmers in
seven local areas, in
five counties and
two zones
-Rural population in
Mukono district,
southern Uganda
-910 participants,
10 villages

Experiment Methodology

Findings

-First conducted a survey to calculate the value of non-timber forest products
(NTFP) collected by the household in the previous year
-Then asked hypothetical stated preference survey question
-If the Forest Department (FD) told them that they could not collect any NTFP for
1 year and that they would be compensated for the NTFP they did not harvest but
that the payment would be delayed X months due to administrative problems.
How much would the FD have to pay you if payment was made exactly X months
from the due date?
-Four experiment sets; each with choice between X amount today or Y amount in
the future (3,6, and 12 months); amounts were either ETB 15 or 40 ($1.76 and
$4.70)
-Each choice set presented on a card and recorded on the card, after 28 cards
completed one was chosen at random for payment

-Investigate impact of time preference on NTFP harvesting,
using a simultaneous question model
-Villagers discount future consumption at an average rate of
24%, which is above existing market rate of interest for bank
loans (18.5%)
-Individuals with a higher rate of time preference harvest
more forest resources

-Asked "Would you prefer Ush 200,000 today or Ush 250,000 in one year?"
-Asked 5 questions, each time increasing the future payment
-Hypothetical survey questions

-Examine causal impact of education on subject discount rates
using instrumental variables (varying school frequency in
different villages and number of school-age years that overlap
with the era of Idi Amin)
- Find that for men education has significant impact on
discount rate
-Integrate experimental measures of time discounting and risk
aversion with survey data on financial activity to identify time
inconsistencies between current and future questions
-Identify 1/3 of population exhibits choices consistent with
hyperbolic discounting (discount future more heavily when
asked a series of questions about consumption now vs. in 3
months, relative to discounting in similar questions about
consumption in 12 vs. 15 months)
-Women with hyperbolic preferences save less at home, save
less in total levels and are more likely to borrow generally but
to do so through microcredit institutions specifically

Bauer, Chytilová,
and Morduch
(2010)

-Rural population of
Karnataka in south
India
-573 participants, 9
villages, 2 taluks
(Honavar and
Haliyal)
-35 people selected
in each village by
random walk (90%
of invited
participated)

- Asked “Would you rather consume Rs. 250 tomorrow or X+Y in t months?"
-Asked 2 sets of 5 questions each
-In one set t=3 and in the other t=15 months
-Shifted future question exactly 1 year to avoid any seasonality
-In current question included 1 day time delay to lower credibility and higher
transaction costs associated with future payments
-Real monetary rewards with stakes as large as a week’s wage (min Rs. 250, max
Rs. 375)

Tanaka, Camerer,
and Nguyen
(2010)

- Vietnam
-180 participants
across 4 villages in
the south and 4 in
the north

-Subjects are asked to make 75 choices between smaller rewards delivered today
and larger rewards delivered at a specified time in the future
-Future times include: 3 days, 1 week, 2 weeks, 1, 2 and 3 months
-Payment varied between 30,000 to 300,000 dong (15 days wage in rural north)
- Enforced monotonic switching within question sets
-A single question was selected at random for payment
-Before experiment selected trusted agent to deliver the future payments

-Find that median discount rate for each set of experiments is
high (more than double the average interest rate on
outstanding debt)
-Discount rate varied systematically with wealth (physical
asset) and risk preferences

-Results indicate that mean village income is related to risk
and time preferences
-See appendix table 2.10

Appendix Table 2.10 Relationship between time preference and poverty
Source
Pender (1996)

Location and
Sample Size
-Andhra Pradesh,
India
-96 participants, 2
villages (1989)
-72 participants in
follow-up (1991)

Wealth Definition

-Assets include: land,
buildings, livestock, farm
implements, stocks of
agricultural products, inputs,
household items and consumer
durables, and financial assets
-Labor force per capita
-Savings last year per capita
(Indonesia)
-Number of oxen (Ethiopia)
-Former land ownership in
Indonesia before transferred to
Sumatra (past wealth)

Nielsen (2001)

-Toliara province of
Madagascar
-70 households
across 6 villages

-Increase in cattle holdings;
reduction in cattle holding

-Beni, Bolivia
-154 Tsimane’
Amerindians from 53
households across 2
villages along the
River Maniqui in the
tropical rainforest

-Log of the value of physical
assets
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-Indonesia(41
participants)
-Zambia (86
participants)
-Ethiopia (120
participants)

Empirical Methods

Findings

-Maximum likelihood estimations

-Use household’s net wealth
per capita defined as total value
of assets minus debts

Holden, Shiferaw,
and Wik (1998)

Kirby et al. (2002)

Income Definition

-Uses Hausman’s procedure
(Hausman, 1978) to test the
assumption that wealth is an
exogenous variable and cannot
reject exogeneity of net wealth at
the 5% level in any of the
regressions
-Total income per capita
-Net cash liquidity per capita
(income minus expenditure)

-OLS

-Income

-Estimated mean of discount rate
by sub-groups

-Wealthier respondents had lower
discount rates in all experiments,
although only statistically significant in
3 experiments
-Size of wealth effect is substantial,
implying an increase of Rs 10,000 net
wealth per capita results in as much as a
22 percentage point reduction in the
discount rate
-Indonesia: current liquidity had a
significant positive correlation with the
discount rate; income per capita had a
negative (but insignificant) relationship
with the discount rate; savings last year
had a significant positive correlation
with the discount rate
-Zambia: Total income and labor force
per capita had no significant correlation
with discount rates; cash liquidity
significant positive relationship
-Ethiopia: Oxen wealth had a
significant correlation with discount
rate; total income per consumer unit
had a significant negative relationship
with discount rate
-Respondents with increases in cattle
stock demonstrate significantly lower
discount rates

-Ordered probit model
-Log of cash received during
previous month

-OLS
-Discount rates were regressed on
each explanatory variable, both
separately and in multivariate
analyses that included together the
explanatory variable, gender and
age
-Focus on simple regressions

-Found an inverse relationship between
discount rates and income, but no
relationship with wealth

Table continued on the next page.

Source
Anderson et al.
(2004)

Gunatilake,
Wickramasinghe,
and
Abeygunawardena
(2007)
Yesuf and
Bluffstone (2008)

Location and
Sample Size

Wealth Definition

-Vietnam
-Two villages in the
region of Hanoi city,
one considered a
rural commune
(Thach Ban) and the
other considered a
urban commune
(Quynh Mai)
-Sinharaja Man and
Biosphere Reserve in
Sri Lanka
-180 participants
Ethiopia
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Bauer and Chytilová
(2008)

Mukono district,
southern Uganda

Bauer, Chytilová,
and Morduch (2010)

Karnataka in
southern India

-Use wealth indicators such as
value of capital stock, number
of oxen and land size

-Wealth index calculated by
principal component analyses
from questions on type of
house, electricity connection,
land ownership and dummies
for possession of 14 types of
household equipment

Income Definition

Empirical Methods

Findings

-Household monthly income

-Correlation analysis
-Categorical comparison

-No relationship between income and
discount rates

-Total income

-OLS

-Individual rate of time preference
declines when total income increases

-Use cash liquidity (difference
between all sources of cash
revenue and cash expenditure)

-Interval regression model (due to
right- censored, left-censored and
interval discount rates)

-Use profession as a proxy of
income
-Self-employed farmers and
non-farm workers (drivers,
shopkeepers vs. employed
individuals (teachers,
employees of public bodies or
NGOS) and students

-Examines average discount rates
across profession groups
-OLS, clustering at village level

-Farm households with relatively better
stock of capital, bigger farm sizes, and
a larger number of oxen are likely to
have relatively low discount rate
-Insignificant effect of cash liquidity
-Individuals facing less income
pressures discount less when looking at
average discount rates across profession
groups
-From OLS, some evidence that
employed females discount more,
however no other significant impact of
profession on time preference
Wealth is not correlated with the
discount rate

OLS, clustering at village level

Table continued on the next page.

Source
Tanaka, Camerer,
and Nguyen (2010)

Location and
Sample Size
- Vietnam
-180 participants
across 4 villages in
the south and 4 in the
north

Wealth Definition

Income Definition
-Total income
-Relative income within the
village
-Village mean income

Empirical Methods

Findings

-Non-linear estimations of the
logistic function, allowing the
discount rate and present bias
parameter to depend on
demographic variables
-Use instrumental variables
(rainfall and head of household
cannot work) because results of
Davidson-MacKinnon test suggest
OLS is an inconsistent estimator

-Mean village income is related to time
preferences
-Mean village income is correlated with
lower discount rates (people living in
wealthy villages are more patient)
-Household income is correlated with
patience
-People are present biased regardless of
their income levels and economic
environments
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MANUSCRIPT 3
Forest Tenure Reform and Household Wealth: Insights from China

3.1 Abstract
This paper examines the effect of forest tenure reform on household wealth in
Fujian Province, China, where a large-scale reform of property rights began in 2003.
We use a balanced panel survey data set that contains data for three years: 2000
(before the reform), 2005 and 2008 (after the reform) in a fixed effect model to
identify the impact of the reform on wealth. We find weak evidence that the forest
tenure reforms had a positive effect on household wealth. Specifically, increased
tenure security in the form of a forest certificate increased net worth per capita by 42%
between 2000 and 2008. To further examine the source of increased wealth, we also
examine the effect of the reform on household forest use. Results suggest that forest
certification increased bamboo revenue, while obtaining a new plot (without a forest
certificate) increased non-timber forest product revenue, although these results are
statistically weak. Overall this paper provides weak evidence that forest tenure reform
garners potential for improving poor rural households’ livelihoods in China.

3.2 Introduction
Many people living in or near forests in developing countries are poor (Sunderlin
et al. 2007). For example, in China, Zhou and Veeck (1999) observed that many
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counties with abundant forest also were categorized as being severely poor. In India,
approximately 275 million people live in or near forests and depend on them for their
income. These people are disproportionally ‘tribal’ ethnic minorities, who are among
the poorest and most vulnerable people in India (Mehta & Shah 2003; World Bank
2006). Similar observations have also been made in Cambodia (Dasgupta et al 2005),
Vietnam (Muller et al. 2006) and Brazil (Sunderlin et al. 2007). Overall there are
hundreds of millions of people who depend on forests for their livelihood (Byron &
Arnold 1999; Calibre Consultants and Statistical Services Centre 2000).1
The correlation between people living in poverty and their dependence on forest
resources, combined with the continued deforestation in the world, has stimulated a
call from international institutions, NGOs, and community organizations, for pro-poor
forestry policies in the last decade (Wunder 2001; FAO 2003; Sunderlin et al. 2005;
Hobley 2007; FAO 2009). Amongst the various pro-poor forestry polices that have
been recommended, one that has received notable attention and gained momentum in
implementation is forest tenure reform. Property rights to ownership and use of forest
resources are often contested, overlapping or unenforced, leaving households with
insecure ownership and use rights to forest resources. This insecurity undermines
sound forest management, for without secure rights forest holders have few incentives
to invest in managing and protecting their forest resources. These realizations have
stimulated the recent trend in forest policy toward strengthening property rights for
forest resources by transferring property rights from the state to communities and
individuals, giving them defined rights to manage and use forest resources (Edmonds
2002; FAO 2003; Ellsworth and White 2004).
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In this paper, we assess the impact of forest tenure reforms on household wealth in
Fujian, China, where an extensive forest tenure reform, aimed at transferring the
responsibility of forest planting and management from the collective (by townships
and villages) to households began in 2003. China implemented the reform with the
objectives of increasing forest coverage, increasing farmers’ enthusiasm for forest
management and investment, and improving farmers’ livelihoods (Liu and Lixia
2009). China’s collectively owned forests total approximately 100 million hectares
and are home to more than 400 million people, which arguably makes these reforms
the largest one undertaken in modern times both in terms of forest area and people
affected (Xu et al. 2010). By 2006, about 70% of collective forests had been allocated
to households (Xu et al. 2010). Recent guidelines issued by the CPC Central
Committee and State Council suggest that China is going to continue further with the
privatization of forest land (Shen et al. 2009). As such, it is important that we examine
the effect of China’s forest tenure reform on rural households, many of whom despite
China’s recent rapid economic growth remain in poverty. Lessons learned will be of
significant value to China and to other developing countries as they too design policy
to address the interrelated problems of deforestation, insecure forest tenure, and
poverty in their countries.
To assess the tenure reform’s progress towards meeting its objective of improving
farmers’ livelihoods, we use a panel survey data set collected among 103 households
in 2006 and 2009, which contains pre- and post-reform, quantitative and qualitative
data for three years: 2000 (before the reform), 2005 and 2008 (after the reform). To
identify the effect of the reform on wealth, we use a fixed effects model.
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Results provide statistically weak evidence that the forest tenure reforms have had
a positive effect on household wealth in our study area. Specifically, increased tenure
security in the form of a forest certificate increased net worth per capita. This positive
forest certification effect on wealth was larger in magnitude when the forest certificate
was on a plot that a household had already been managing than when the forest
certificate accompanied a new plot that a household received as a result of the reform.
To gain insight into the mechanism through which tenure reform leads to increased
wealth, we also examine the effect of the tenure reform on households’ forest use.
Specifically, we examine changes in household revenue per capita from the sale of
non-timber forest product (NTFP) and total revenue from the sale of bamboo, as
households were relatively more engaged in these two forest income generating
activities than in the sale of timber. The results suggest that forest certification had a
positive effect on total bamboo revenue, while it did not have a significant effect on
NTFP revenue. Obtaining a new plot (without a forest certificate) resulted in an
increase in NTFP revenue per capita, while it did not have a significant effect on
bamboo revenue.
This paper proceeds as follows. The first section gives an overview of the forest
tenure reform history in China, with an emphasis on the recent tenure reforms in
Fujian, China. The next section explains the data collection procedures, gives a
description of the data and reports a preliminary examination of the impact of the
forest tenure reform on households’ livelihoods using descriptive statistics. Then the
empirical framework is outlined, followed by the results and a concluding section.

172

3.3 China’s Forest Tenure Reform

This paper examines the impact of tenure reforms on wealth in the context of
China, specifically in Fujian Province. China’s forest area accounts for 4.5 percent of
the world’s total. China has two main categories of forest landownership.
Approximately 42 percent of forest land in China is owned by the state and the rest is
owned by the collective (Liu and Lixia 2009). Since the early 1950s, forest tenure and
management policies of China’s collective forests have undergone fundamental
changes. Collectivization of non-state owned forests began in 1956, and remained
dominant until the reforms of the 1980s (Xu and Jiang 2009). Under collectivization,
administrative villages, usually comprised of a number of natural villages or clusters
of families, functioned as the legal owners of collective forests, and households had
little active participation in management. For households there were no links between
or among their rights to forests, their responsibility for forest establishment and
management, and their benefits from forests (Dachang 2001).
The first major wave of reforms in China’s collective forests began in 1981, and
was aimed at transferring the responsibility of forest planting and management from
the collective to households (Miao and West 2004). By 1986, nearly 70% of the
collectively owned forest land had been transferred to rural household management
(Xu and Jiang 2009). In 1987, however, due to unsustainable logging the government
reverted a large portion of forest land under household management back to collective
management (Hyde et al. 2003).
By 1986, while 70% of the collectively owned forest land in China had been
transferred to rural household management, in Fujian only 32% of the collective forest
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land had been distributed for household management (CFYB 1987). This low
percentage of forest land under household management was due to the fact that Fujian
had not fully participated in the first round of the tenure reforms in the 1980s. Instead,
the provincial government in Fujian had implemented a shareholding system to keep
forests under collective management while distributing “paper shares” of collective
forests based on family population. In Fujian, forest land was not actually physically
distributed, rather only dividends from the forest were distributed to households.
At first, Fujian’s shareholding system was highly regarded by forest administrators
for its ability to maintain forests under collective management but fifteen years after
establishment of the system, two issues became increasingly evident (Xu and Jiang
2009). First, forestry’s contribution to rural incomes was negligible in spite of the fact
that forest land occupies more than 60% of the total provincial land area and 80% of
rural land area (Qin 2008). Second, enforcing forest conservation had become
increasingly difficult for local forest authorities due to lack of cooperation from
farmers. For example, the severity of forest fire incidents grew over the course of the
1990s, and there is anecdotal evidence that many of the fires were caused by farmers
(Xu and Jiang 2009).
Under these circumstances, in 2003 the second wave of reforms was officially
approved by the provincial government in Fujian province.2 In this second wave of
reforms, Fujian, the largest but once resistant collective forest province, adopted forest
tenure reforms aimed at individualization of forest land. The decisions regarding forest
land reallocation during this reform required a 2/3 majority vote by the village
representative committees or by village assemblies. Redistribution of plots was
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accompanied by legal contracts and forest certificates with extended contract periods
of 30 to 70 years, whereas previously contract periods had only been 5 to 15 years
(Liu and Lixia 2009). Furthermore, adoption of the Rural Land Contract Law allowed
for the expansion of rights under the new forest certificates to include those of land
transfer, inheritance and mortgaging (Xu and Jiang 2009).
In mid-2003, the central government announced the “Resolution of Development
of Forestry.” This forest policy aimed to reduce the growing rural-urban economic
disparities in China and to increase domestic forest production by distributing stronger
forest use and management rights to households (Xu et al. 2010). Since 2003, fourteen
other provinces have initiated reforms aimed at both delegating collective-owned
forest land to direct household management and strengthening property rights with
forest certificates for both households already managing forest plots individually and
for new forest plots distributed to households.
About 70% of collective forests had been allocated to households by 2006 (Xu et
al. 2010). Recent guidelines issued by the CPC Central Committee and State Council
suggest that China is going to further privatize forest land (Shen et al. 2009). As such,
it is important that to examine the effect of China’s forest tenure reform on rural
households, many of whom despite China’s recent rapid economic growth remain in
poverty. Xu and Jiang (2009) report that household net income as a whole has
increased from 2000 (before the reform) to 2006 (after the reform) based on a
household survey of 3,180 households across 8 provinces, where the reform had been
implemented in China. Furthermore, in provinces that had a shift in rights towards
households (Fujian, Jiangxi, Zhejiang, Hunan, Liaoning, Shandong and Yunnan
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Province), Xu and Jiang (2009) report that there was an increase in the share of
household income generated from forestry, and where rights were shifted back
towards the collective (Anhui), the share of household income from forestry
diminished. In Fujian, the site of our study, forestry’s share in household income
increased 3.71% between 2000 and 2006 in Fujian (Xu, White, and Lee 2010). While
this suggests that forestry income has become more important to households as a result
of the reform, further analysis is needed to identify a causal effect between the forest
tenure reform and changes in household income. From these statistics, we are unable
to determine if the changes in forest income are a result of households receiving forest
certificates for plots they were already managing, new plots with forest certificates or
new plots without forest certificates. In this study, we aim to disentangle the causality
between the forest tenure reform (stronger rights from forest certificates and increased
forest area from new plots distributed during the reform) and changes in household
wealth, as well as changes in revenue from the sale of NTFP and bamboo.

3.4 Data, Definitions, and Descriptive Statistics

The household panel data set contains pre- and post-reform, quantitative and
qualitative data for 104 households spanning two counties, Sanming City and Datian
County, and 10 villages in Fujian Province for three years: 2000 (before the reform),
2005 and 2008 (after the reform). Survey data for the years 2000 and 2005 were
collected in 2006 by a research team from Peking University, Gothenburg University
and Forest Trends. The 2006 survey team conducted interviews in three townships,
each with two villages and ten households in each village—for a total of 600
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households. In 2009, two of the twelve counties were randomly chosen and efforts
were made to conduct a follow-up survey with the 120 households in those counties
that had been included in the previous survey.
During the 2009 follow-up survey, 104 of the 120 households included in the
previous survey were located. The 104 located households were asked to complete the
survey. All households completed the survey. Each household was paid 15 yuan
compensation for completing the survey.3
We construct a balanced panel data set by using only those households that were
included in both survey years, so that we have pre- and post- reform data for every
household in the analysis. Ten households, that had no forest land area, as well as no
forest income, in any of the survey years are excluded from the analysis. Seven
households for which there was missing data that was essential to this analysis are also
discarded. This results in a sample size of 87 households.
In 2000, average household size in the sample was 4.9 people (table 3.1). Only two
of the 87 households had a female head of household. On average the head of
household was 46.43 years old and had 5.09 years of education. The typical household
managed 0.59 hectares of forest land per capita and had a crop production area (area
of production multiplied by the number of times harvested) of 0.08 hectares per capita.

Changes in forest tenure
Prior to the recent forest tenure reform, 96.6% of the households in our balanced
panel data set had already been managing forest plots. We will refer to each of these
plots as pre-FTR plots. The reform impacted household forest plot structure in a
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variety of ways. First, a household may have gotten a forest certificate for a pre-FTR
plot (23% of households by 2008). Second, a new forest plot (new plot) may have
been distributed to the household (24% of households by 2008). Third, the household
may have been distributed a new plot, along with a forest certificate for the new plot
(7% of households by 2008). Lastly, in some cases households may have experienced
one or more of these changes to their forest plot tenure structure (51% of households
by 2008). To summarize, households’ forest plots can be categorized into four
categories: 1) pre-FTR plots without a forest certificate; 2) pre-FTR plots with a forest
certificate; 3) new plots without a forest certificate; and 4) new plots with a forest
certificate. In each year, a given household’s total forest area will be distributed
amongst one or more of these four categories.
Figure 3.1 depicts changes the forest plot tenure structure of households in our
sample. In 2000, the total forest land area managed by the households in our sample
was 216.1 hectares. By 2008, the total forest land area managed by the households in
our sample had risen only slightly to 219.3 hectares, of which 66.7 hectares was
managed by a household with a forest certificate for that forest land and 42.4 hectares
that had been distributed to households as a new forest plot area during the reform.
Wealth
Our primary interest is to assess the impact of the forest tenure reform on
household wealth. To measure household wealth we use net worth per capita, which is
equal to total assets minus total liabilities. Household assets include: the value of
consumer durables, productive assets, and livestock; savings held in bank accounts;
loans provided to others; and other investments and deposits. Liabilities include loans
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for both productive and non-productive purposes. Values for the years 2005 and 2008
are adjusted for inflation using the rural consumer price index for Fujian Province,
China (China Statistical Yearbook, 2009). Between 2000 (before the reform) and
2008 (after the reform), net worth per capita more than doubled, increasing from 1,360
to 3,349 yuan (table 3.2).
As a preview to more rigorous estimates of the effect of the forest tenure reform on
wealth, we examine the mean net worth per capita for three discrete measures of
household forest tenure reform status: 1.) whether or not a household received a forest
certificate for at least one plot, 2.) whether or not a household received at least one
new plot, and 3.) whether or not a household experienced at least one of these two
events. Interestingly, we see that those households that got a forest certificate for at
least one plot between 2000 and 2008 had a lower average net worth per capita in
2000 and experienced a proportionally larger increase in net worth per capita than
those households that did not get a forest certificate (figure 3.2, panel a). On average,
those households that received a forest certificate for at least one plot experienced a
233% increase in net worth per capita, whereas those that did not receive a forest
certificate for any plots experienced only a 128% increase. A similar pattern holds
when we examine the other two discrete measures of household forest tenure reform
status (figure 3.2, panel b and c). While these differences are noticeable, there is no
statistically significant difference in the means (in any year) nor in the change in the
means (between 2000 and 2008) when households are grouped by these discrete
measures of household forest tenure status. The mean comparison suggests that the
forest tenure reform has not had an effect on the growth in net worth per capita.
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Forest Use
As an extension to the analysis of the affect of the forest tenure reform on
household wealth, we also examine the affect of the reform on household forest use.
Households use their forest resources as both an income source (sale of bamboo,
timber and non-timber forest products (NTFP)) and to meet their personal needs for
forest products (table 3.3). On average 25% of households engaged in the harvesting
and sale of bamboo each year. Between 2000 (pre-reform) and 2008 (post-reform), the
mean bamboo revenue increased by 141.8 yuan per capita (table 3.3). The percentage
of households selling NTFP (e.g., bamboo shoots, tea, nuts, mushrooms, products for
medicinal use, etc.) increased from 23% in 2000 to 71% in 2008 and the mean NTFP
revenue increased by 627.9 yuan per capita. Similarly, there has been an increase in
revenue from timber. However, only a very small percentage of households (0-3%)
reported revenue from timber in any of the survey years.
Households also harvest forest products for their own use. The primary forest
product harvested for own use is firewood (51% of households in 2000), followed by
bamboo (29%) and timber (3%).4 Interestingly, there was an increase in the percentage
of households that collected firewood but there was a decrease in the average
kilograms per capita collected by each household between 2000 and 2008. Also, there
was a decrease in the percentage of households harvesting bamboo for own use from
29% in 2000 to 14% in 2008.
Next, we examine changes in revenue from the sale of bamboo and NTFP. These
two revenue sources are worth examining because a larger proportion of households
derive income from these two activities relative to the sale of timber. Furthermore,
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while most information on forest activities in the data set is limited to the years 2000,
2005 and 2008, data for bamboo revenue are available for each year from 2000 to
2008. The nine years of observations for bamboo revenue will allow us to exploit the
variation in the length of time between planting and harvesting. Bamboo can be
harvested yearly or biennially. However, bamboo culms attain their maximum quality
(in terms of strength and flexibility) and economic value after about seven years
(Coggins 2000).
We examine the mean NTFP revenue per capita and the total bamboo revenue for
the same three discrete measures of household forest tenure reform status, as we
examined for wealth above. Interestingly, when we examine the change in bamboo
revenue per capita based on whether or not the household received at least one forest
certificate, those households that got a forest certificate for at least one plot between
2000 and 2008 experienced a 209% increase in their NTFP revenue, while those that
did not experienced a much higher increase of 426% in their NTFP revenue (figure
3.3, panel a). A similar pattern holds when we examine the other two discrete
measures of forest tenure reform household status (figure 3.3, panel b and c).
Figure 3.4 displays the trend in mean total bamboo revenue by each of the three
discrete measures of household forest tenure reform status. Interestingly, we see that
the trends for each forest tenure reform category are more divergent from each other
after 2003 (the official start year of the reform). Specifically, after 2003 those that get
a forest certificate for at least one plot tend to have a higher average total bamboo
revenue than those that do not get a forest certificate (figure 3.4, panel a). However,
those that got at least one new plot have a lower average total bamboo revenue in each
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year between 2005 and 2008 than those that did not get a new plot (figure 3.4, panel
b). When we examine the trend for those that got at least one new plot or one forest
certificate, we see that those households that did also have a lower average total
bamboo revenue in each year between 2005 and 2008 than those that did not (figure
3.4, panel c).
While these differences in both NTFP and bamboo revenue are noticeable, there is
no statistically significant difference in the change (from 2000 and 2008) in the means
between households grouped according to these discrete measures of household forest
tenure status. This suggests that the forest tenure reform has had no effect on
household revenue from NTFP and bamboo.
Measuring household forest tenure reform status
Although our descriptive analysis suggests that the forest tenure reform has not
had an impact on wealth, NTFP revenue per capita, or total bamboo revenue, it may be
that the discrete measures used to capture household forest tenure status do not fully
capture the magnitude of changes in a household’s forest plot tenure structure. For
instance, with a discrete measure of whether or not a household received a new plot, a
household that received a new plot with an area of 5 hectares would be categorized in
the same way as a household that received a new plot with an area of 0.01 hectares.
However, it is likely that acquiring a new plot with an area of 5 hectares would have a
greater impact on a household’s wealth and forest product revenue than a plot with an
area of only 0.01 hectares. Therefore, in our empirical analysis each plot in each year
is identified as belonging to one of the following four categories: 1) pre-FTR plots
without a forest certificate; 2) pre-FTR plots with a forest certificate; 3) new plots
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without a forest certificate; and 4) new plots with a forest certificate. In each year, a
given household’s total forest area will be distributed amongst one or more of these
four categories (table 3.4).

3.5 Empirical Strategy
Our main objective is to identify how the forest tenure reform affected household
wealth. In order to do so, we must address the concern that changes in household
wealth could be due to factors other than the changes in household forest plot tenure
structure. For example, changes in household wealth between 2000 and 2008 could be
due to unobservable time-invariant variables (e.g., household’s entrepreneurial drive
or location factors that affect forest productivity) or unobservable variables that
change over time (e.g., increased forest productivity due to favorable weather
conditions). Furthermore, changes in a household’s wealth that had an increase in plot
area with a forest certificate and/or a new plot relative to those that did not could be
due to initial differences in observed (e.g., education of the head of household) and
unobserved characteristics (e.g., entrepreneurial ability) between the two. Without
controlling for this we risk incorrectly attributing differences in wealth between those
households that experienced a change in their forest plot tenure structure to those that
did not experience a change in its forest plot tenure structure, when in fact they are due
to initial differences between the two groups.
To address these concerns, we use three years of balanced household panel data in
a fixed effect model, which allows us to control for time-invariant observable and
unobservable variables. The limitation of approach is that it does not allow us to
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control for time-variant unobservable variables or for possible self-selection of
households into acquiring a forest certificate or a new plot during the reform.
As an extension to the analysis, we also examine the effect of the reform on
households’ bamboo and NTFP revenue. To do so, we must again address the concern
that changes could be due to factors other than the changes in household forest plot
tenure structure, and additionally we must address possible selection bias (i.e., factors
that are inherently different about those households that engage in NTFP or bamboo
sales and those that do not). For example, on average only 26% of households engaged
in the sale of bamboo. Therefore, our dependent variable (bamboo revenue) is
censored (i.e. a positive outcome is not observed for many households) and ordinary
least squares estimation will produce biased parameter estimates. To address this
issue, we use Heckman’s two-stage estimation procedure for panel data that uses the
Inverse Mill’s Ratio to take into account selection bias (Wooldridge 1995). In the first
stage, we use a probit model to estimate the likelihood of a household engaging in
sales of each forest product. The estimated parameters are then used to calculate an
Inverse Mill’s Ratio for each forest product and year. We then include the Inverse
Mill’s Ratio as an explanatory variable in the fixed effects estimations to capture the
selection effect.
Empirical Model
The base estimate (model 1) of the forest tenure reform effect is obtained from the
ordinary least squares estimation:
net worthit = β0 + β1(preFTRplot_FCit) + β2(newplot_FCit)
+ β3(newplot_noFCit) + β4(year2005t) + β5(year2008t)
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+ β6(FCi)+ β7(newploti) + eit

(1)

where net worthit is the net worth per capita (yuan) of household i in year t.
preFTRplot_FCit is the total area per capita of household i’s pre-FTR plots that have a
forest certificate in year t. newplot_FCit is the total area per capita of household i’s
new plots that have a forest certificate in year t. newplot_noFCit is the total area per
capita of household i’s new plots that do not have a forest certificate in year t. The
coefficients on preFTRplot_FCit, newplot_FCit, and newplot_noFCit are the estimated
forest tenure reform effects, which provide a measure of the conditional average
difference in household wealth for changes in households’ per capita area of plots
with a forest certificate, new plots with a forest certificate and new plots without a
forest certificate, respectively. The coefficients on year2005t and year2008t control
for any systematic differences for years 2005 and 2008, respectively. FCi is a dummy
variable that is equal to one if household i had a forest certificate for any plot in any
year. The coefficient on FCi controls for characteristics that may differ between
households that received a forest certificate for at least one plot during the recent
tenure reform and those that did not. newploti is a dummy variable that is equal to one
of household i had a new plot in any year. The coefficient on newploti controls for
characteristics that may be different between those households that received a new
plot during the recent tenure reform and those that did not.
In addition to the base model (1), we estimate the model controlling for the value
of the dependent variable, household net worth per capita, in the base year, 2000
(model 2). And in model (3) we add other base year demographic controls, including:
household size; head of household’s education level and age; and the number of
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household members who work, as well as household total area of pre-FTR plots
without forest certificates and total area of crop production (area of production
multiplied by the number of harvests) in each year.5 In models (4), (5) and (6), we add
township, village and household fixed effects, respectively.
As an extension to the analysis of the effect of the forest tenure reform on
household wealth, we also estimate the effect of the reform on household NTFP and
bamboo revenue. To estimate the effect of the forest tenure reform on household
NTFP and bamboo revenue, we use Heckman’s two-stage estimation procedure for
panel data, which uses the Inverse Mill’s Ratio to take into account selection bias
(Wooldridge 1995). In the first stage, we use a probit model to estimate the likelihood
of a household engaging in sales of each forest product.6 As explanatory variables in
the probit model, we include the number of households that sold each forest product in
each year in the village and households’ total forest area per capita. We use the
number of households that sold each forest product in each year in the village as the
exclusion restriction (i.e., the variable that is included in the first stage probit model
but omitted from the second stage outcome estimation). This variable is likely to
impact the decision of a household to sell (or not sell) a forest product but is unlikely
to impact the household’s decision of what quantity to sell. The estimated parameters
from the probit are used to calculate an Inverse Mill’s Ratio (i.e., the error from the
Probit equation explaining selection) for each forest product and year. We then include
the Inverse Mill’s Ratio as an explanatory variable in the fixed effects estimations to
capture the selection effect.
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To estimate the effect of the forest tenure reform on bamboo revenue, we also
include a dummy variable for each year from 2001 to 2008 to control for systematic
differences in each year because we have bamboo revenue data for all year from 2000
to 2008. Lastly, in models (3) thru (5) above for the effect of the forest tenure reform
on wealth and NTFP revenue we control for the total area of crop production in each
year. However, we do not have the total area of crop production data for each year
from 2000 to 2008, and so instead here we control for the total area of crop production
in the base year (2000).

3.6 Empirical Results
Overall we find statistically weak evidence that the forest tenure reform has
increased household wealth (table 3.5).7 Specifically, forest certification of a plot that
a household had already been managing prior to the reform had the most consistent
and largest positive effect on household net worth per capita. In all models the
coefficient on preFTRplot_FCit is positive (table 3.5, row 1). In models (4) and (5)
that included township and village fixed effects, respectively, the coefficients on
preFTRplot_FCit are statistically significant at the 10% level, while in the remaining
models, (1) to (3) and (6), they are statistically significant at the 15% level. The
coefficient on preFTRplot_FCit in model (6), which includes household fixed effects,
suggests that for a one hectare per capita of pre-FTR land area that receives a forest
certificate the effect is an increase in net worth per capita of 5,650 yuan. Households
on average received forest certificates for 0.14 hectares of their forest land, his implies
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that stronger property rights in the form of a forest certificate have increased
household wealth on average by 42% (i.e., on average 5.2% per year).
Receiving a new plot with a forest certificate also had a positive effect, however
the evidence is weaker. In all models the coefficients on newplot_FCit is positive
(table 3.5, row 2) but has a lower magnitude (328 to 820 yuan) than the coefficients on
preFTRplot_FCit (2923 to 5650 yuan). In models (3) thru (5) the coefficients on
newplot_FCit are statistically significant at the 10% level or above, while the
remaining models are insignificant. This suggests that there is also a positive effect on
wealth when households receive a new plot with a forest certificate, however, the
effect is not as large as the effect of forest certification of pre-FTR plots.
Finally, although the coefficient on newplot_noFCit was positive in each model,
receiving a new plot without a forest certificate did not have a statistically significant
effect on household net worth per capita (table 3.5, row 3).
Impact on non-timber forest product sales
The results suggest that forest certification of a forest plot had no effect on
household NTFP revenue per capita, as the coefficients on preFTRplot_FCit or
newplot_FCit in each model (except for the coefficient on newplot_FCit in model 1)
are not statistically significant (table 3.6, rows 1 and 2).8 However, receiving a new
plot without a forest certificate as a result of the reform had a positive effect on
households’ bamboo revenue per capita (table 3.6, row 3). The coefficient in each
model on newplot_noFCit is positive, and it is significant at least at the 10% level in
models (1) and (5) and at least at the 20% level in models (4) and (6). The coefficient
on newplot_noFCit in model (6), which includes household fixed effects, suggests that
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for a one hectare area per capita increase in forest land (without a forest certificate) the
effect is an increase in household NTFP revenue per capita of 1,474 yuan.
Impact on bamboo sales
The results suggest that forest certification of a plot that a household had already
been managing prior to the reform has a positive effect on total bamboo revenue,
while receiving a new plot with a forest certificate has a negative effect on total
bamboo revenue (table 3.7). However, the evidence in both cases is statistically weak.
In all models the coefficient on preFTRplot_FCit is positive, however it is only
statistically significant in model (3) and (6) at the 5% and 20% level (table 3.7, row 1).
And in all models the coefficient on newplot_FCit is negative but it is only
statistically significant in model (3) at the 5% level (table 3.7, row 2). There is no
evidence of an effect of receiving a new plot without a forest certificate on bamboo
sales (tables 3.7, row 3).
Additionally, the coefficients on each year dummy from 2005 to 2008 capture an
interesting effect, as they are positive and statistically significant at the 1% level in all
models. This suggests that there is something different about those years with regards
to bamboo sales revenue. This may be a result of the enthusiasm of farmers, forest
farms and forestry authorities that have been engaging in the expansion of both fruit
and nut trees and bamboo plantations over the last two decades, as they are considered
more profitable than conventional timber plantations and have a less burdensome more
transparent taxation system (Perez et al. 2004).
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3.7 Conclusion
Over the last decade there has been a call from international institutions,
NGO’s, and community organizations, for pro-poor forestry policies (Wunder 2001;
FAO 2003; Sunderlin et al. 2005; Hobley 2007; FAO 2009). Amongst the various propoor forestry policies that have been recommended one that has received notable
attention and gained momentum in implementation is forest tenure reform (Edmonds
2002; FAO 2003; Ellsworth and White 2004). The hope is that when communities and
individuals receive stronger rights to ownership and use of forest resources, those
rights will give them an incentive to invest in managing and protecting those
resources, and in doing so will also allow poor, rural households to improve their
livelihoods.
In this paper, we examined the impact of forest tenure reform on household wealth
in Fujian Province, where a large-scale reform of forest land tenure began in 2003.
Empirically, we used a balanced household panel data set among 87 households. We
examined the effect of the reform on net worth per capita as a measure of wealth. Then
as an extension we also examined the effect of the reform on total bamboo sales.
Changes in household forest tenure structure were captured by three variables: the
total area of pre-FTR plots with a forest certificate; the total area of new plots with a
forest certificate, and the total area of new plots without a forest certificate. To
identify the effect of the reform on net worth per capita, NTFP revenue per capita, and
total bamboo revenue, we used a fixed effects model. Additionally, to identify the
effect of the reform on total bamboo sales, we used a two-step Heckman selection
approach for panel data to take into account the effect of selection into engaging in the
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sale of NTFP or bamboo.
Results suggest that more secure tenure, resulting from the distribution of forest
certificates, increased household wealth, although the evidence is statistically weak.
This positive forest certification effect was stronger on plots that households had been
managing prior to the recent reform than it was on new plots households received
during the reform. After identifying a positive effect of the forest tenure reform on
wealth, we examined its effect on households’ revenue from the sale of forest
products. Households were relatively more engaged in the sale of NTFP and bamboo
than in the sale of timber. Therefore, we examined changes in household revenue per
capita from the sale of NTFP and in total revenue from the sale of bamboo. The results
suggest that forest certification of a plot that a household had already been managing
prior to the reform had a positive effect on total bamboo revenue but no significant
effect on NTFP revenue. Conversely, receiving a new plot without a forest certificate
had no significant effect on bamboo revenue, while it had a positive effect on NTFP
revenue.
While the reason behind the differing effects of receiving a forest certificate or a
new plot is a question for future analysis, a potential hypothesis is that the differing
effects may be due to differences in forest stock quantity, quality or type on new plots
relative to plots that households had already been managing. Testing this hypothesis
would require an analysis at the plot level; however, we do not have bamboo revenue
data at the plot level to support such an extension of this analysis.
This paper provides statistically weak evidence that the forest tenure reform has
had a positive effect on household wealth in our study area. While the sample is very
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small, relative to the number of households affected by the forest tenure reform in
China and China is a large diverse country, this paper does suggest that the forest
tenure reform garners potential for improving poor rural households’ livelihoods. In
particular, since only 30% of all forest plots had forest certificates, expanding such
certification could potentially increase household wealth. It is likely that with forest
plot certification, tenure security will be enhanced. And increased tenure security will
stimulate households’ investment in their forest plots, improving their livelihoods.
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Endnotes
1

It is difficult to be specific about the number of people dependent on forests because

it depends on the definition of dependent. See Byron and Arnold (1999) and Calibre
Consultants and Statistical Services Centre (2000) for summaries of existing estimates
in the literature.
2

While the Fujian provincial government formally approved the reform in 2003,

precedents had already been established in 1998 in Hongtian Village, Yongan County
of Fujian Province when a rural village suffering from severe deforestation due to
ineffective collective management, decided to reform forest tenure. Another village, in
2002 individualized user rights to villagers (those that accepted the forest user rights
were required to pay a land rental fee to the villages) and sold some of the forest to
people outside the village to help eliminate village debt (Xu and Jiang 2009).
3

1 USD ≈ 6.83 yuan (August 1, 2009).

4

Households also collected NTFP for their own use but due to the diversity of

products and units, we have not summarized them here.
5

In the year 2000, household total area of pre-FTR plots is equal to the household

total forest plot area. In year 2005 and 2008, a household’s total area of pre-FTR plots
changes depending on if it received a forest certificate for a pre-FTR plot or if it
received a new plot with or without a forest certificate.
6

Results from the probit models are presented in appendix table 3.1 and 3.2.

7

Table 3.5 summarizes results for the variables of interest. Appendix table 3.3 show

results with coefficients for all household level control variables.
8

Table 3.6 summarizes results for the variables of interest. Appendix table 3.4 shows

results with coefficients for all household level control variables.
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Table 3.1 Descriptive statistics for the year 2000
Std.
Variable
Mean
Dev.
Net worth per capita (yuan)
1,359.56 6,300.70
Household size
4.90
1.58
Number in household who work
2.79
1.26
Head of household age (years)
46.43
12.19
Head of household education level (years)
5.09
3.12
Total forest area (ha/capita)
0.59
1.28
Total crop production area (ha/capita)
0.08
0.06
Note: n=87 households. 1 USD ≈ 6.83 yuan (August 1, 2009).
Source: Authors’ data.
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Min
-5,000.00
2
1
26
0
0
0

Max
5,0680.98
9
6
80
11
6.88
0.29

Table 3.2 Descriptive statistics for wealth by year

Net worth per capita (yuan)

Mean
1360
1574
3349
+1989

Year
2000
2005
2008

∆ between 2000 and 2008

Std.
Dev.
6301
6625
11142
1989

Min
-5000
-6640
-9744
-47186

Max
50681
54997
69728
64853

Note: n=87 households. Values for the years 2005 and 2008 are adjusted for inflation using
the rural consumer price index for Fujian Province, China (China Statistical Yearbook, 2009).
1 USD ≈ 6.83 yuan (August 1, 2009
Source: Authors’ data..
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Table 3.3 Forest use and change in use between 2000 (pre-reform) and 2008 (postreform)

Unit

2000

2008

2000

2008

Mean of
changes
between 2000
and 2008

Revenue from sale of:
Bamboo

yuan/capita

26%

24%

207.25
(166.28)

814.30
(1028.65)

141.76
(562.25)

Timber

yuan/capita

0%

3%

N/A
N/A

13835.05
(23269.90)

477.07
(4346.62)

Non-timber forest products

yuan/capita

23%

71%

2483.22
(6801.84)

3654.00
(9767.74)

627.90
(4366.50)

Net income from sale of:
Bamboo

yuan/capita

26%

24%

176.94

757.31

136.02

(182.67)

(897.50)

(494.24)

N/A
N/A

11823.70
(19786.18)

407.72
(3702.27)

Percent engaging
in activity

Mean (based on those
engaging in activity)

Timber

yuan/capita

0%

3%

Harvested for own use:
Bamboo

sticks/capita

29%

14%

3.34

7.90

0.132

2%

(2.79)
0.95

(16.36)
0.58

(6.65)
-0.012

77%

(0.60)
687.14

(0.12)
400.26

(0.22)
-39.28

Timber
Firewood

m3/capita
kilogram/capita

3%
51%

(1395.56)
(494.24)
(1031.20)
Notes: n=87 households. Values for the year 2008 where the unit is yuan/capita are adjusted for inflation using the
rural consumer price index for Fujian Province, China (China Statistical Yearbook, 2009). Mean of changes
between 2000 and 2008 are calculated by subtracting the 2000 value from the 2010 value for each of the 87
households and then taking the mean. Net income is calculated by subtracting total harvesting costs from total
revenue. Harvesting costs include hired labor, rental of machines, felling design, transportation, taxes, and fees but
do not include family labor. Standard deviations are in parentheses. 1 USD ≈ 6.83 yuan (August 1, 2009).
Source: Authors’ data.
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Table 3.4 Changes in household forest tenure plot structure

Forest plot category

Percent of
households
with plot area
in category

Mean area
(ha/capita)

Std.
Dev.

Min

Max

2000
Pre-FTR plot without a FC

96.6%

0.574

1.259

0

6.883

Pre-FTR plot with a FC

0

0

0

0

0

New plot without a FC

0

0

0

0

0

New plot with a FC
All forest plots

0
96.6%

0
0.574

0
1.259

0
0

0
6.883

2005
Pre-FTR plot

75%

0.475

1.192

0

6.883

Pre-FTR plot with a FC

22%

0.122

0.546

0

4.487

New plot

21%

0.099

0.420

0

3.033

New plot with a FC
All forest plots

5%
100%

0.068
0.763

0.557
1.444

0
0

5.167
6.883

Pre-FTR plot

68%

0.340

0.898

0

6.883

Pre-FTR plot with a FC

23%

0.145

0.552

0

4.487

New plot

24%

0.115

0.445

0

3.033

New plot with a FC
All forest plots

7%
94%

0.033
0.633

0.230
1.142

0
0

2.067
6.883

2008

Note: Forest certificate abbreviated to FC. Forest tenure reform abbreviated to FTR.
Source: Authors’ data.

200

Table 3.5 Effects of the forest tenure reform on wealth
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Dependent Variable: Net worth (yuan/capita)
Model:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
Total area of pre-FTR plots with a FC (ha/capita)
3,002.62
2,923.49
3,144.39
3,339.07
3,343.94
5,650.99
(1.62)
(1.57)
(1.61)
(1.69)*
(1.68)*
(1.55)
Total area of new plots with a forest FC (ha/capita)
302.01
257.41
587.26
820.12
648.10
328.09
(1.04)
(0.96)
(1.67)*
(2.04)**
(1.71)*
(0.56)
Total area of new plots without a FC (ha/capita)
6,519.32
5,610.59
5,254.51
5,087.67
5,037.21
4,975.39
(1.28)
(1.09)
(1.01)
(0.95)
(0.94)
(0.84)
Dummy = 1 if the year is 2005
-814.87
-712.47
-765.766
-759.16
-777.72
-563.33
(0.71)
(1.01)
(1.08)
(1.02)
(1.04)
(0.68)
Dummy = 1 if the year is 2008
792.95
910.524
955.10
984.85
965.34
1,433.06
(0.68)
(0.86)
(0.96)
(0.99)
(0.98)
(1.42)
Dummy = 1 if household has at least 1 new plot in any year
-1,026.73
-658.96
-629.23
-306.57
133.63
(1.12)
(0.83)
(0.76)
(0.43)
(0.18)
Dummy = 1 if household has at least 1 plot with a FC in any year
-1,139.13
-700.91
-784.28
-1,310.43
-1,427.50
(1.58)
(1.20)
(1.33)
(1.61)
(1.13)
Net worth in 2000 (yuan/capita)
0.66
0.61
0.58
0.60
(3.08)***
(2.92)***
(2.77)***
(2.77)***
Constant
2,039.65
894.28
4,051.212
4,915.49
4,093.74
(2.18)**
(2.25)**
(1.79)*
(1.77)*
(1.80)*
N
261
261
261
261
261
261
0.10
0.35
0.37
0.38
0.38
0.52
R2
Yes
Yes
Yes
Household characteristics:
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Fixed effects:
No
No
No
Township
Village
Household
Fixed effect type:
Note: Forest certificate abbreviated to FC. Forest tenure reform abbreviated to FTR. Values for the years 2005 and 2008 are adjusted for inflation using the rural consumer price
index for Fujian Province, China (China Statistical Yearbook, 2009). Household characteristics control variables in models (3) to (5) include the following variables for the year
2000: household size, head of households’ education level and age, and the number of household members who work, as well as the total area of pre-FTR plots without a FC and
the total area of crop production in each year. Model (6) includes only the total area of pre-FTR plots without a FC and the total area of crop production in each year as control
variables. Robust t-statistics are in parentheses. * significant at the 10% level; ** significant at the 5% level; *** significant at the 1% level.
Source: Authors’ data.

Table 3.6 Effects of the forest tenure reform on non-timber forest product revenue
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Dependent Variable: Non-timber forest product revenue (yuan/capita)
Model:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
Total area of pre-FTR plots with a FC (ha/capita)
2,046.42
2,274.99
1,228.47
1,350.06
1,319.21
10,270.98
(0.87)
(0.95)
(0.57)
(0.62)
(0.58)
(0.60)
Total area of new plots with a forest FC (ha/capita)
-4,092.46
-2,857.37
-2,042.04
-2,221.45
-2,597.95
-69,184.37
(1.93)*
(1.27)
(1.01)
(1.02)
(1.11)
(0.69)
Total area of new plots without a FC (ha/capita)
7,414.64
1,200.47
1,567.79
1,890.45
3,087.09
1,474.69
(2.90)***
(1.29)
(1.24)
(1.59)
(1.92)*
(1.44)
Dummy = 1 if the year is 2005
-2,352.53
335.02
28.71
-784.48
-1,002.07
-536.48
(1.27)
(0.32)
(0.02)
(0.49)
(0.67)
(0.46)
Dummy = 1 if the year is 2008
-1,736.00
1,014.04
689.68
776.43
607.73
1,555.88
(0.91)
(0.94)
(0.50)
(0.58)
(0.53)
(0.90)
Dummy = 1 if household has at least 1 new plot in any year
1,189.62
613.45
932.95
2,400.96
2,879.08
(0.66)
(0.36)
(0.55)
(1.11)
(1.24)
Dummy = 1 if household has at least 1 plot with a FC in any year
-130.08
-932.15
-648.20
488.36
604.35
(0.09)
(0.68)
(0.48)
(0.48)
(0.61)
Non-timber forest product revenue in 2000 (yuan/capita)
0.96
0.91
0.87
0.76
(9.69)***
(6.78)***
(6.36)***
(3.96)***
Inverse Mill’s ratio
-2,652.86
-1,858.43
-2,242.50
90.25
-103.90
-575.27
(1.45)
(1.22)
(1.18)
(0.06)
(0.08)
(0.20)
Constant
4843.68
2079.22
2369.69
-4262.89
-4623.87
(2.17)**
(1.34)
(0.36)
(0.83)
(1.22)
N
129
129
129
129
129
129
R2
0.19
0.36
0.38
0.43
0.44
0.74
Yes
Yes
Yes
Household characteristics:
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Fixed effects:
No
No
No
Township
Village
Household
Fixed effect type:
Note: Forest certificate abbreviated to FC. Forest tenure reform abbreviated to FTR. Values for the years 2005 and 2008 are adjusted for inflation using the rural consumer price
index for Fujian Province, China (China Statistical Yearbook, 2009). Household characteristics control variables in models (3) to (5) include the following variables for the year
2000: household size, head of household’s education level and age, and the number of household members who work, as well as the total area of pre-FTR plots without a FC and
the total area of crop production in each year. Model (6) includes only the total area of pre-FTR plots without a FC and the total area of crop production in each year as control
variables. Robust t-statistics are in parentheses. * significant at the 10% level; ** significant at the 5% level; *** significant at the 1% level.
Source: Authors’ data.

Table 3.7 Effects of the forest tenure reforms on total bamboo revenue
Dependent variable: Total bamboo revenue (yuan)
Model:
Total area of pre-FTR plots with a FC (ha/capita)
Total area of new plots with a FC (ha/capita)
Total area of new plots without a FC (ha/capita)
Dummy = 1 if household has at least 1 new plot in any year
Dummy = 1 if household has at least 1 plot with a FC in any year

203

(1)
296.81
(1.09)
-5434.02
(1.21)
-45.18
(0.23)
42.53
(0.09)
-221.69
(0.54)

(2)
289.15
(1.07)
-5360.35
(1.23)
-33.34
(0.17)
20.85
(0.04)
-171.80
(0.40)
0.24
(1.20)

487.46
(1.26)
271.98
(1.36)
1024.07
(2.22)**
1380.29
(1.06)
1303.33
(3.71)***
1967.08
(3.55)***
1739.41
(3.58)***

533.55
(1.39)
297.38
(1.63)
1097.13
(2.42)**
1405.01
(1.08)
1402.60
(4.12)***
2071.97
(3.83)***
1854.96
(3.78)***

Total bamboo revenue in 2000
Total area of pre-FTR plots without a FC (ha/capita)
Dummy =1 if the year is 2001
Dummy = 1 if the year is 2002
Dummy =1 if the year is 2003
Dummy = 1 if the year is 2004
Dummy = 1 if the year is 2005
Dummy =1 if the year is 2006
Dummy = 1 if the year is 2007

(3)
459.50
(2.03)**
-8609.17
(2.25)**
-149.83
(0.79)
-288.34
(0.71)
-135.43
(0.35)
0.47
(2.30)**
190.06
(4.05)***
209.71
(0.58)
240.61
(0.92)
791.73
(1.87)*
1510.18
(1.17)
1262.39
(3.98)***
2113.13
(3.89)***
1831.88
(3.97)***

(4)
286.13
(1.16)
-4708.40
(1.05)
-230.93
(1.26)
-353.66
(0.73)
657.44
(1.40)
0.266
(0.83)
148.57
(3.01)***
230.29
(0.63)
223.96
(0.81)
851.71
(2.04)**
1520.47
(1.16)
1480.79
(4.36)***
2284.96
(4.20)***
2085.29
(4.30)***

(5)
257.90
(1.01)
-3659.83
(0.81)
-217.62
(1.18)
-490.75
(1.01)
814.93
(1.82)*
0.31
(0.96)
120.54
(2.19)**
113.19
(0.31)
174.16
(0.59)
740.19
(1.72)*
1538.32
(1.17)
1492.19
(4.17)***
2218.46
(4.21)***
2008.44
(4.23)***

(6)
3823.95
(1.43)
-42893.60
(0.80)
15.02
(0.10)

-35.31
(0.08)
40.43
(0.09)
116.17
-0.260
1490.95
(1.16)
1356.95
(3.20)***
2192.33
(4.35)***
2174.54
(3.94)***

Table continued on the next page.

Table 3.7 [Continued] Effects of the forest tenure reforms on total bamboo revenue
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
2411.15
2495.18
2665.31
2874.32
2861.10
2941.85
(5.18)***
(5.54)***
(7.52)***
(7.41)***
(6.91)***
(5.68)***
Inverse Mills Ratio
-855.64
-826.32
-732.90
-475.30
-83.24
241.15
(2.59)**
(2.49)**
(2.31)**
(1.18)
(0.16)
(0.57)
Constant
1584.61
1351.46
3157.85
2633.68
1675.37
(5.03)***
(3.44)***
(3.83)***
(2.76)***
(1.63)
N
199
199
199
199
199
199
R2
0.14
0.15
0.28
0.30
0.31
0.55
No
No
No
Fixed effects:
Yes
Yes
Yes
Fixed effects type:
Township
Village
Household
Note: Model (4) and (5) add township and village fixed effects, respectively, to model (2). Model (6) adds household fixed effects to model (2) and does not include the household
characteristic controls from the base year (2000), the dummy indicating if a household had at least one new plot in any year, nor the dummy indicating if a household had at least
one plot with a forest certificate in any year. All models also control for the inverse mills ratio for each year from 2000 to 2008. Values for the years 2001 to 2008 are adjusted for
inflation using the rural consumer price index for Fujian Province, China (China Statistical Yearbook, 2009). Forest certificate abbreviated to FC. Forest tenure reform abbreviated
to FTR. Robust t-statistics are in parentheses. * significant at the 10% level; ** significant at the 5% level; *** significant at the 1% level.
Source: Authors’ data.
Model:
Dummy = 1 if the year is 2008
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Figure 3.1 Change in forest tenure plot structure
250
216.1
200
170.6
150
124.3

Total forest area
(hectares)
100

52.7

45.5
50

28.2

25.2

14.0

13.8
0
2000

2005

2008

Pre-FTR plot without a FC

Pre-FTR plot with a FC

New plot without a FC

New plot with a FC

Note: Forest certificate abbreviated to FC. Forest tenure reform abbreviated to FTR
Source: Authors’ data.
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Figure 3.2 Mean net worth per capita by household forest tenure reform status
Panel A. Mean net worth per capita by whether or not a household got a forest certificate
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Panel B. Mean net worth per capita by whether or not a household got a new plot
6000

5105

5000
Mean
net worth
(yuan/capita)

4000
3000
2000

1985

2377

1484

1135

1000

831

0
Housholds that did not Households that got at
get a new plot (n=56) least one new plot (n=31)
2000

2005

2008

Panel C. Mean net worth per capita by household forest tenure reform participation status
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Note: Forest certificate abbreviated to FC. Values for the years 2005 and 2008 are adjusted for inflation
using the rural consumer price index for Fujian Province, China (China Statistical Yearbook, 2009).
1 USD ≈ 6.83 yuan (August 1, 2009).
Source: Authors’ data.
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Figure 3.3 Mean non-timber forest product revenue per capita by household forest tenure
reform status
Panel A. Mean NTFP revenue per capita by whether or not a household got a forest certificate
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Panel C. Mean NTFP revenue per capita by household forest tenure reform participation status
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Note: Forest certificate abbreviated to FC. Non-timber forest product abbreviated to NTFP. Values for the years
2005 and 2008 are adjusted for inflation using the rural consumer price index for Fujian Province, China (China
Statistical Yearbook, 2009). 1 USD ≈ 6.83 yuan (August 1, 2009).
Source: Authors’ data.
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Figure 3.4 Mean total bamboo revenue by household forest tenure reform status
Panel A. Mean total bamboo revenue by whether or not a household gets a forest certificate
for at least one forest plot during the forest tenure reform
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Panel B. Mean total bamboo revenue by whether or not a household gets at least one new plot
during the forest tenure reform
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2008

Panel C. Mean total bamboo revenue by household participation status in the forest tenure
reform
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Note: Forest certificate abbreviated to FC. Values for the years 2001 to 2008 are adjusted for inflation using the
rural consumer price index for Fujian Province, China (China Statistical Yearbook, 2009). 1 USD ≈ 6.83 yuan
(August 1, 2009).
Source: Authors’ data.
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Appendix 3
Appendix Table 3.1 Probit regression results for participation in non-timber forest
product sales
Dependent variable: Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if
total non-timber forest product revenue (yuan/capita) > 0
2000
2005
2008
0.497
0.3145
0.3459
(3.89)*** (4.36)*** (4.61)***
Total forest area (hectares/capita)
-0.388
0.174
0.219
(1.10)
(1.46)
(0.96)
Constant
-1.641
-1.08
-1.303
(4.64)*** (3.19)*** (3.22)***
N
87
87
87
Pseudo R2
0.22
0.26
0.32
Note: Non-timber forest products abbreviated as NTFPs Robust t-statistics are in parentheses. * significant at the
10% level; ** significant at the 5% level; *** significant at the 1% level.
Source: Authors’ data.
Number of households in the village that sold NTFPs
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Appendix Table 3.2 Probit regression results for participation in bamboo revenue
Dependent variable: Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if bamboo revenue > 0
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
0.422
0.459
0.424
0.440
0.484
0.377
(4.89)***
(4.86)***
(3.94)***
(5.13)***
(4.44)***
(5.61)***
Total forest area (hectares/capita)
-0.068
-0.054
0.001
-0.027
-0.037
-0.015
(0.65)
(0.61)
(0.02)
(0.41)
(0.42)
(0.35)
Constant
-1.631
-1.879
-1.670
-1.896
-1.851
-1.552
(4.96)***
(5.08)***
(5.14)***
(5.08)***
(4.84)***
(4.95)***
N
87
87
87
87
87
87
Pseudo R2
0.32
0.38
0.19
0.41
0.31
0.37
Log Likelihood
-34.103
-28.424
-37.907
-28.608
-30.644
-36.462
Note: Robust t-statistics are in parentheses. * significant at the 10% level; ** significant at the 5% level; *** significant at the 1% level.
Source: Authors’ data.
Number of households in the village that sold bamboo

2006
0.360
(4.58)***
-0.067
(0.73)
-1.514
(5.17)***
87
0.292
-32.350

2007
0.344
(4.74)***
-0.066
(1.15)
-1.343
(5.14)***
87
0.28
-37.57

2008
0.383
(4.67)***
-0.038
(0.57)
-1.601
(4.99)***
87
0.29
-34.32
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Appendix Table 3.3 Effects of the forest tenure reform on wealth
Dependent variable: Net worth (yuan/capita)
Model:
Total area of pre-FTR plots with a FC (ha/capita)

(1)
3,002.60
(1.62)
302.01
(1.04)
6,519.32
(1.28)
-814.87
(0.71)
792.95
(0.68)
-1,026.73
(1.12)
-1,139.13
(1.58)

(2)
2,923.49
(1.57)
257.41
(0.96)
5,610.59
(1.09)
-712.47
(1.01)
910.52
(0.86)
-658.96
(0.83)
-700.91
(1.20)
0.66
(3.08)***

(3)
3,144.39
(1.61)
Total area of new plots with a forest FC (ha/capita)
587.26
(1.67)*
Total area of new plots without a FC (ha/capita)
5,254.51
(1.01)
Dummy = 1 if the year is 2005
-765.77
(1.08)
Dummy = 1 if the year is 2008
955.10
(0.96)
Dummy = 1 if household has at least 1 new plot in any year
-629.23
(0.76)
Dummy = 1 if household has at least 1 plot with a FC in any year
-784.28
(1.33)
Net worth in 2000 (yuan/capita)
0.61
(2.92)***
Household size in 2000
-863.08
(2.05)**
Head of household age in 2000 (years)
-12.65
(0.36)
Head of household education level in 2000 (years)
34.10
(0.28)
Number of household members who work in 2000
371.19
(1.09)
Total area of pre-FTR plots without a FC (ha/capita)
406.85
(0.98)
Total area of crop production (ha/capita)
3733.63
(0.59)
Constant
2,039.65
894.28
4,051.21
(2.18)**
(2.25)**
(1.79)*
N
261
261
261
0.10
0.35
0.37
R2
Fixed effects:
No
No
No
Fixed effect type:
Note: Forest certificate abbreviated to FC. Forest tenure reform abbreviated to FTR. Values for the years 2005 and
2008 are adjusted for inflation using the rural consumer price index for Fujian Province, China (China Statistical
Yearbook, 2009). Robust t-statistics are in parentheses. * significant at the 10% level; ** significant at the 5%
level; *** significant at the 1% level.
Source: Authors’ data.

Table continued on the next page.
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Appendix Table 3.3 [Continued]. Effects of the forest tenure reform on wealth
Dependent variable: Net worth (yuan/capita)
Model:
Total area of pre-FTR plots with FC (ha/capita)

(4)
(5)
(6)
3,339.07
3,343.94
5,650.99
(1.69)*
(1.68)*
(1.55)
Total area of new plots with FC (ha/capita)
820.12
649.00
328.09
(2.04)**
(1.71)*
(0.56)
Total area of new plots without FC (ha/capita)
5,087.67
5,037.21
4,975.39
(0.95)
(0.94)
(0.84)
Dummy = 1 if the year is 2005
-759.16
-777.72
-563.33
(1.02)
(1.04)
(0.68)
Dummy = 1 if the year is 2008
984.85
965.34
1,433.06
(0.99)
(0.98)
(1.42)
Dummy = 1 if household has at least 1 new plot in any year
-306.57
133.63
(0.43)
(0.18)
Dummy = 1 if household has at least 1 plot with a FC in any year
-1,310.43
-1,427.50
(1.61)
(1.13)
Net worth in 2000 (yuan/capita)
0.58
0.60
(2.77)***
(2.77)***
Household size in 2000
-812.15
-738.81
(1.74)*
(1.68)*
Head of household age in 2000 (years)
-8.35
3.95
-0.23
-0.11
Head of household education level in 2000 (years)
86.84
126.98
-0.64
-0.71
Number of household who work in 2000
239.06
88.49
-0.65
-0.29
Total area of pre-FTR plots without a FC (ha/capita)
566.25
511.81
3396.87
-1.28
-1.07
-1.06
Total area of crop production (ha/capita)
3082.39
4454.53
-4140.63
-0.45
-0.56
-0.38
Constant
4,915.49
4,093.74
(1.77)*
(1.80)*
N
261
261
261
R2
0.38
0.38
0.52
Fixed effects:
Yes
Yes
Yes
Fixed effects type:
Township
Village
Household
Note: Forest certificate abbreviated to FC. Forest tenure reform abbreviated to FTR. Values for the years 2005 and
2008 are adjusted for inflation using the rural consumer price index for Fujian Province, China (China Statistical
Yearbook, 2009). Robust t-statistics are in parentheses. * significant at the 10% level; ** significant at the 5%
level; *** significant at the 1% level.
Source: Authors’ data.
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Appendix Table 3.4. Effect of the forest tenure reform on non-timber forest product revenue
Dependent variable: Non-timber forest product revenue (yuan/capita)
Model:

(1)

(2)

(3)

2,046.42
(0.87)
-4,092.46
(1.93)*
7,414.64
(2.90)***
-2,352.53
(1.27)
-1,736.00
(0.91)
1,189.62
(0.66)
-130.08
(0.09)

2,274.99
(0.95)
-2,857.37
(1.27)
1,200.47
(1.29)
335.02
(0.32)
1,014.04
(0.94)
613.45
(0.36)
-932.15
(0.68)
0.961
(9.69)***

N

-2,652.864
(1.45)
4843.682
(2.17)**
129

-1,858.427
(1.22)
2079.217
(1.34)
129

1,228.47
(0.57)
-2,042.04
(1.01)
1,567.79
(1.24)
28.71
(0.02)
689.68
(0.50)
932.95
(0.55)
-648.20
(0.48)
0.91
(6.78)***
290.31
(0.75)
-9.59
(0.17)
160.22
(0.48)
-727.70
(1.05)
-81.13
(0.16)
4200.56
(0.65)
-2,242.50
(1.18)
2369.69
(0.36)
129

R2

0.19

0.36

0.38

Fixed effects:

No
-

No
-

No
-

Total area of pre-FTR plots with a FC (ha/capita)
Total area of new plots with a forest FC (ha/capita)
Total area of new plots without a FC (ha/capita)
Dummy = 1 if the year is 2005
Dummy = 1 if the year is 2008
Dummy = 1 if household has at least 1 new plot in any year
Dummy = 1 if household has at least 1 plot with a FC in any year
Non-timber forest product revenue in 2000 (yuan/capita)
Household size in 2000
Head of household age in 2000 (years)
Head of household education level in 2000 (years)
Number of household who work in 2000
Total area of pre-FTR plots without a FC (ha/capita)
Total area of crop production (ha/capita)
Inverse Mills Ratio
Constant

Fixed effects type:
Notes: All models control for the inverse mills ratio for each year from 2000, 2005 and 2008. Forest certificate
abbreviated to FC. Forest tenure reform abbreviated to FTR. Values for the years 2005 and 2008 are adjusted for
inflation using the rural consumer price index for Fujian Province, China (China Statistical Yearbook, 2009).
Robust t-statistics are in parentheses. * significant at the 10% level; ** significant at the 5% level; *** significant
at the 1% level.
Source: Authors’ data.
Table continued on the next page.

214

Appendix Table 3.4 [Continued]. Effect of the forest tenure reform on non-timber forest
product revenue
Dependent variable: Non-timber forest product revenue (yuan/capita)
Model:
(4)
(5)
Total area of pre-FTR plots with a FC (ha/capita)
1,350.06
1,319.21
(0.62)
(0.58)
Total area of new plots with a forest FC (ha/capita)
-2,221.45
-2,597.95
(1.02)
(1.11)
Total area of new plots without a FC (ha/capita)
1,890.45
3,087.09
(1.59)
(1.92)*
Dummy = 1 if the year is 2005
-784.48
-1,002.07
(0.49)
(0.67)
Dummy = 1 if the year is 2008
776.43
607.73
(0.58)
(0.53)
Dummy = 1 if household has at least 1 new plot in any year
2,400.96
2,879.08
(1.11)
(1.24)
Dummy = 1 if household has at least 1 plot with a FC in any year
488.36
604.35
(0.48)
(0.61)
Non-timber forest product revenue in 2000 (yuan/capita)
0.87
0.76
(6.36)***
(3.96)***
Household size in 2000
495.85
535.57
(1.28)
(1.20)
Head of household age in 2000 (years)
67.98
74.38
(1.14)
(1.32)
Head of household education level in 2000 (years)
442.68
449.80
(1.25)
(1.38)
Number of household who work in 2000
-983.92
-1029.86
(1.29)
(1.34)
Total area of pre-FTR plots without a FC (ha/capita)
491.29
436.64
(0.95)
(0.82)
Total area of crop production (ha/capita)
6141.02
7163.93
(0.87)
(1.02)
Inverse Mills Ratio
90.25
-103.90
(0.06)
(0.08)
Constant
-4262.89
-4623.87
(0.83)
(1.22)
N
129
129
R2

0.43

Fixed effects:
Fixed effects type:
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0.44

(6)
10,270.98
(0.60)
-69,184.3
(0.69)
1,474.69
(1.44)
-536.48
(0.46)
1,555.88
(0.90)

14991.32
(1.68)*
-13608.05
(1.16)
-575.27
(0.20)

129
0.74

Yes

Yes

Yes

Township

Village

Household

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
The underlying motivation for this dissertation research was to examine if property
rights matter for forest management. Economic theory predicts that improved tenure
security in the form of strengthened property rights will give households an incentive
to invest in their forest resources, which will stimulate income, ultimately increasing
households’ wealth. However, in the past tenure reforms have not always led to these
intended effects. While researchers have empirically examined the impacts of tenure
reforms, they have not examined potential heterogeneity in responses due to
differences in households’ risk and time preferences. Furthermore, these reforms are
often implemented in areas where the poverty rate is high. Those living in poverty are
assumed to have both high discount rates and high levels of risk aversion, which make
them less likely to make investments. Such characteristics may also hinder the
intended effects of forest tenure reforms.
In this dissertation, I examined these issues in the context of rural Fujian, China,
where a large-scale reform of forest property rights began in 2003 in areas where the
poverty rate is still high. To explore these issues, I used panel household survey data
and risk and time preference data collected using field experiments with real monetary
rewards in empirical models that aimed to alleviate potential biases due to selfselection into receiving a forest certificate for a plot. The four main hypotheses
examined included: H1) Forest property right reforms affect how individuals manage
their forest resources; H2) Time and risk preferences affect forest management and
therefore also augment individual forest management responses to forest property
rights reforms; H3) Time and risk preferences differ across individuals and are
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correlated with wealth; and H4) Household wealth increases as a result of the forest
tenure reforms.
In manuscript 1, I tested H1 and H2. In the base difference-in-differences
estimation that does not allow for heterogeneity in time and risk preferences, I found
that on average there was no significant forest certification effect on forest
management. This suggests that on average that reform is not working as intended.
However, it should be noted that this insignificant effect may be due to the possibility
that households are still in a transition phase. Since forest management requires long
term investments and our data is at most 5 years post-reform, it may be that not
enough time has passed since households received their forest certificates to discern
the reforms intended effects of increased investment in forest resources. In the future,
researchers should collect additional post-reform data to see if the reform has its
intended effects over a loner period of time.
Interestingly, when I allowed for heterogeneity in forest certification effect due to
households’ time and risk preferences, I found that the average overall forest
certification effect had been masking a variety of responses that were occurring but
which varied depending on households’ time and risk preferences. As expected we
found that in response to receiving a forest certificate households that were more risk
averse used less labor for harvesting and more labor for applying inputs than those that
were risk neutral or risk seeking. This supports the hypothesis that households believe
that the forest certificate gives them greater assurance that if they invest or delay
harvest then they will be able to get their returns in the future. More generally, we
found that those households that were risk averse, used less labor for applying inputs,
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spent less on forest inputs, and used more labor for harvesting. This suggests that in
areas where many households are risk averse, policymakers may want to couple forest
tenure reforms with other programs and policy instruments to reduce households’ risks
(e.g., pest, disease, forest fire). Such coupling may stimulate investment in forest
resources generally and also in response to forest tenure reforms. Future research
should examine how households perceive the risks specifically associated with forest
investment and what the levels of actual risks are in order to inform policymakers.
Such information would aid policymakers in identifying which risks need to me dealt
with and to design programs or instruments (e.g., programs to reduce threat of pests
and fire; insurance programs; encourage the formation of voluntary cooperatives
within village as a risk-sharing mechanism) that specifically help to mitigate those
risks.
In Manuscript 1, I also found that more loss averse households used more labor for
harvesting in response to receiving a forest certificate. This suggests that loss aversion
affects harvesting responses to receiving a forest certificate based on the manifestation
of loss aversion in an endowment effect of the forest certificate. Receiving a forest
certificate may have an endowment effect in that once a household receives a forest
certificate for a plot, it becomes more painful for the household to experience a loss of
forest stock from that plot than from other forest plots without forest certificates, and
therefore loss averse households would harvest more in response to getting a forest
certificate for a plot. This suggests that future research should examine households’
demand for insurance that hedges against the risk of loss of forest stock from plots
with forest certificates.
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Lastly, in response to receiving a forest certificate those with higher discount rates
used less labor for applying input and spent less on forest inputs than those with lower
discount rates. And in Manuscript 2, I found statistically weak evidence that the poorer
a household was the higher their discount rate (i.e. more impatient) was. Combined,
these findings suggests that forest tenure reforms should be coupled with programs to
reduce poverty and to allow for and encourage borrowing. As poverty is alleviated,
households’ discount rates may fall, making them more likely to be able to invest,
whether from their own accumulated savings or by borrowing. While a component of
China’s forest tenure reform has been the establishment of a loan program that allows
households to obtain a loan using their forest certificated plot as collateral, in 2008
only 1 of the 104 surveyed households had used their forest certificate as collateral for
a loan. Further research should investigate why households are not taking advantage of
this credit opportunity.
This research used risk and time preference field experiments designed in a
generic context. The case can be made that preferences measured in a generic context
may not translate well to preferences in forest management decisions. I did find that
these preferences had some effects on forest management and responses to receiving a
forest certificate. While this suggests that these generic risk and time preferences are
relevant for forest management decision, it would be valuable in future research to
design and implement risk and time preference field experiments that are
contextualized in a forest decision-making problem in order to examine if context
matters.
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In manuscript 3, I found statistically weak evidence that improved tenure security
in the form of a forest certificate increased net worth per capita by 42% between 2000
and 2008. Furthermore, I found that there was also statistically weak evidence that
forest certification increased bamboo revenue, while obtaining a new plot (without a
forest certificate) increased non-timber forest product revenue. This suggests that even
in this early post-reform time period, the forest tenure reform in China appears to be
improving households’ wealth. Given the long-term time horizon of forest investment,
it may be that wealth will increase more over the longer term. In the future,
researchers should collect additional post-reform data to see if the reform has a more
significant impact on households’ wealth over a longer period of time.
The overall goal of this research was to understand how heterogeneity in time and
risk preferences affected responses to forest tenure reforms. I have found that these
preferences matter for forest management and responses to forest tenure reforms. This
suggests that policymakers who are going forward with a tenure reform should
consider the particular context of the reform and consider coupling the reform with
appropriate programs and instruments to alleviate poverty and to help households’ to
deal with risks and make long-term investments to further stimulate the intended
effects of the reform—increased investment in forest resources and improved
livelihoods.
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Appendix B. Risk Preference Task Record Sheets
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